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Thesis Summary 
 
This study explores institutional complexity in Thai State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
In doing so, a qualitative approach has been employed in this study in order to identify 
institutional logics in the field of Thai SOEs and to understand organisational and 
individual perceptions of institutional complexity in the implementation of performance 
measurement systems (PMS) and how they respond to the complexity. To achieve this 
goal, two Thai SOEs were studied, both of which faced challenges in the 
implementation of Economic Value Management (EVM) and Balance Scorecard (BSC) 
as well as difficulties in linking their individual BSC and incentive systems. The 
qualitative data were collected from semi-structured interviews and document reviews. 
 
The empirical aspects of this study reveal that the institutional logics in the field of Thai 
SOEs are the logic of bureaucracy, commercial operations, social activities, seniority 
and unity. Regarding the multiple institutional logics embedded, SOEs experienced the 
institutional complexity in the implementation of PMS.      The results suggest that the 
organisations have decoupled the EVM and loosely coupled the BSC from 
organisational practices to cope with institutional complexity and conflict institutional 
demands.  Also,  the  evidence  shows  that  the  institutional  logics  influence  SOEs’  actions  
towards resisting changes incentive systems and the relationship between individual 
BSC and incentives. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction  
This study primarily concentrates on exploring the institutional logics in the field of 
Thai State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and the influence of institutional complexity in 
regards to the implementation of performance measurement systems   (PMS). My 
research especially focuses on two systems: Economic Value Management (EVM) and 
the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). The investigation also describes and evaluates the 
organisational responses prompted by the use of these two systems. The relations 
between the organisational incentive systems and SOE performance measurement as 
well as individual BSC are examined in this study. 
 
This introductory chapter outlines the research background, aim and objectives, 
research methodology, contributions and the thesis structure. 
 
1.2 Research Background  
PMS have been extensively portrayed as being one of the most important management 
tools in public sector organisations (e.g. Van Helden et al., 2006). It is argued that 
through these systems, public sector organisations have been able to meet the demands 
of their various stakeholders such as government, the private sector and citizens and at 
the same time deliver quality services to their numerous customers. Most research on 
PMS and performance management in public sector organisations has been carried out 
in developed countries such as Scandinavia (Siverbo and Johanson, 2006; Modell et al., 
2007), the United Kingdom (Adcroft and Willis, 2005; McAdam, Hazlett and Casy, 
2005; Chang, 2006; Fryer et al., 2009) and New Zealand (Northcott and Taulapapa, 
2012). There has been much less research on this topic in developing countries. The use 
of PMS in developing countries such as Thailand normally employs well-known 
systems or standards from developed countries, which may need to be adapted to make 
them relevant to the local context. Therefore, appropriate research is required to 
increase our understanding of the development of PMS in developing country settings.  
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A number of theories are relevant to the study of performance measurement in the 
public sector, such as institutional theory, sociology of translation theory, economic 
theory, political theory, and the functionalist control literature (Modell, 2009). The 
research in the field also tries to explain the consequences of performance measurement 
systems as well as organisational responses using a variety of theories such as 
motivation theory, goal setting theory, agency theory (e.g. Verbeeten, 2007; Burney and 
Widener, 2007; Bedford et al., 2008;  Frey et al., 2013; Belogolovshy and Bamberger, 
2014). However, the research using institutional theory is dominant in this field 
(Modell, 2005, 2009; Van Helden et al., 2006). In the past, studies of performance 
measurement systems in the public sector based on institutional theory have been 
undertaken in the health care sector, universities, and local government. For example, 
Modell (2001, 2003) studied the Norwegian health care and the Swedish university 
sectors, respectively, while Chang (2006) studied UK health care. There also have been 
a growing number of performance measurement research studies in central and local 
governments especially in Scandinavian countries (e.g. Leagreid et al., 2006, 2007; 
Modell and Weisel, 2008; Modell et al., 2007; Modell, 2012; Kasperskaya, 2008; 
Siverbo and Johansson, 2006; Johansson and Siverbo, 2009; Rautianen and Jarvenpaa, 
2012) in addition to studies on other developed countries such as the U.S. federal 
government (Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2004).  
 
According to Modell (2009), most performance measurement research concerns the 
institutional   effects   of   ‘decoupling’   and   ‘loose   coupling’.   However,   Modell   (2009)  
points out that studies on decoupling and loose coupling in PMS have mainly focused 
on the role of embedded agency, while there are many institutional processes related to 
organisations’  structural  characteristics  that  need  to  be  examined  to  various  degrees.  In  
addition, many researchers suggest that the use of other theories such as actor-network 
theory is required to fill the gaps in institutional theory (Callon, 1986; Lawrence and 
Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2008; Modell, 2009).   
 
Recently, institutional research has begun to focus attention in the area of institutional 
logics. The concept of institutional logics refers   to   ‘the   formal   and   informal   rules   of  
actions, interactions, and interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers in 
accomplishing   the   organisation’s   tasks’   (Thornton   and   Ocasio,   1999:   p.   804).   The  
concept has been applied to theorizing the implementation of new practices in 
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organizations (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Particularly, the concept of institutional 
logics has been used in the setting of hybrid organisations where multiple logics are 
embedded. Hybrid organisations can take different forms, such as social enterprises 
(Pache, 2013), public-private partnerships (Jay, 2013) biotechnology companies 
(Powell and Sandholtz, 2012) and medical schools (Dunn and Jones, 2010).  
 
The application of institutional theory in public sector organizations has been extensive. 
However, few studies of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) have incorporated 
institutional theory and the influence of institutional logics. Therefore, this study has 
focused on one type of public organization, SOEs, by providing evidence from the 
implementation and use of PMS and its relationship with an incentive system based on 
a field of Thai SOEs. SOEs can be classified as one type of hybrid organisation in terms 
of their tendency to exhibit multiple institutional logics such as the logic of 
bureaucracy, the logic of social activities and the logic of commercial operations (see 
chapter 5).  
 
1.3 Overview of Thai SOEs 
In 1932, the foundation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) began in Thailand.  Since 
then, SOEs have been part of every subsequent  national  plan  to  improve  the  country’s  
economy and competitiveness as well as to develop the national quality of life.  
Moreover,  in  some  cases,  SOEs  are  required  to  support  Thailand’s  stability  or  to  invest  
in a variety of projects, such as infrastructure (SEPO, 2012).  SOEs were founded in 
order to undertake commercial operations on behalf of the Thai government and are 
owned by the Kingdom of Thailand, either fully owned or as a shareholding of 51% or 
more in part-privatised companies (Thai Government, 1959).  There are currently 58 
state enterprises that can be broadly categorized into 9 major sectors as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table 1.1: Number of SOEs 
 
Sector 
Number of SOEs 
Financial 9 
Energy* 4 
Utility* 4 
Transport 11 
Telecommunications 4 
Industry 6 
Natural Resources 8 
Commerce Service 6 
Social and technology 6 
Total 58 
Note: In some sources, the Energy and Utility sectors are combined as Infrastructure sector.  
Source: Sombatsiri (2010) 
 
These SOEs typically dominate the commercial activity while also acting as the primary 
sources of employment and revenue (SEPO, 2010).  However, many SOEs also benefit 
from monopoly or quasi-monopoly powers, such as Provincial Waterwork Authority 
(PWA) and Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, and require massive capital 
investments or operating subsidies (SEPO, 2010). Table 4.3 shows some key statistics 
to show the importance of SOEs to the Thai economy.  
 
Table 1.2: Key statistics data 
  Unit: Billion Baht 
Year Thailand’s  GDP SOEs’  revenue Thai government 
investment ex. 
SOEs 
SOEs’  investment 
2008 9,080 3,570 184 237 
2009 9,042 3,173 209 208 
2010 10,105 3,635 138 174 
2011 10,540 4,294 214 210 
2012 11,518 4,947 438 293 
Source: SEPO (2013) and Fiscal Policy Office (2013) 
 
As shown in the table, SOEs’  revenue  is  normally  one-third  of  Thailand’s  GDP  and  the  
SOEs’  investment  budget  is  equal  or  even  higher  than  the  government  budget. 
 
1.3.1  Thai  SOEs’  stakeholders 
As mentioned in the approach review, a qualitative approach was adopted because the 
research concerned the views and opinions of stakeholders, which are both internal 
stakeholders and external stakeholders. Like other public sector organisations, Thai 
SOEs also have a variety of stakeholders, which can be grouped into a policy maker 
group and an end user group.   
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Source: Luangnual (2010, p. 2) 
 
The policy maker group consists of significant stakeholders from a variety of 
government agencies to drive the development of SOEs.  This group focuses on the 
improvement  of  SOEs’   efficiency  and   effectiveness,   and   involves   investment   projects  
as   well   as   the   SOEs’   benefits   to   community,   public   sector,   and   private   sector  
(Luangnual, 2010).  The roles and responsibilities of major stakeholders are as follows. 
 
Table 1.3: The roles and responsibilities of major stakeholders 
Agency/Actor Roles and Responsibilities 
Ministry of Finance - Shareholder 
- To conduct technical reviews and develop investment and strategic 
plans 
- To assess SOE performance as well as to introduce new 
management tools to SOEs, such as PMS 
Line Ministry - To set industry development policy 
- To review and approve SOE plans 
Ministry of Labour - To set remuneration of  SOE employees 
National Economics and 
Social Development Bureau  
- To conduct investment direction aligned with country development 
plan 
 
Budget Bureau - To  allocate  budget  for  SOEs’  social  activities 
Regulators - To set pricing policy and quality of services 
Source: Adapted from SEPO (2010) and Luangnual (2010) 
 
However, in many sectors, the roles and responsibilities for policymaking, regulation, 
and operation are overlapping or unclear between ministries, agencies, departments, and 
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SOEs. The end users group consists of the private sector and citizens who receive both 
the direct and indirect  impact  of  SOEs’  products,  services,  and  activities;;  however,  this  
group has no direct power over SOEs, nor does it have much impact on the 
implementation of PMS. Therefore, later in this chapter, the selection of the participants 
is based upon the policymaker group and SOEs. 
 
1.3.2  The  SOE’s  performance  measurement  systems 
The  SOEs’  PMS  has  been  employed  since  1995.     The  main  objectives  of   introducing  
this system were to switch the focus of control from operational control to results-based 
control and to enhance the operational efficiency of SOEs (Thailand Cabinet Office, 
1995). Also in 1995, the Thai Cabinet appointed a Performance Agreement Committee 
(PAC), chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, to ensure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the system (Luangnual, 2010). Since then, the PMS has 
been developed continuously by State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) in collaboration 
with other government organizations.  For example, the Economics Valued Added 
Indicator and the State Enterprise Performance Appraisal (adapted from the criteria of 
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award) were introduced in 2006 and 2008 
respectively (SEPO, 2008).   
 
In addition, in 2004, SEPO introduced an SOE corporate governance system by 
adopting a system consistent with that employed by public limited companies (SEPO, 
2008). In this system, board members will be selected by shareholders and the chief 
executive appointed by the board. SEPO also sets a Good Enterprise System to monitor 
SOEs’   governance. Such a system has been integrated with the SOE performance 
agreement system in order to assess SOE performance. Recently, PMS are growing in 
importance to the Thai Government, as they help to evaluate and improve SOE 
performance as well as to monitor the SOEs’  government  policy-based projects (SEPO, 
2012).  Further  details  of  the  SOE’s  PMS  are  shown  in  Appendix  A. 
 
1.3.3 Case study organisations 
The case studies in this research were undertaken in Provincial Waterworks Authority 
(PWA) and Thailand POST (POST). Both case study organisations can be considered 
as a large-sized SOE regarding their assets and labour forces. PWA is one of three 
SOEs in water sector. It was established in 1979 to provide water supply services in 74 
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provinces across Thailand. Similar to other organisation in the water sector, PWA 
required a massive capital investment in order to expand its water distribution systems 
as well as to improve their efficiency and productivity in order to meet institutional 
demands (Appendix B). PWA is an organisation which is under the control of the 
Ministry of Interior and has to comply with the SOE Act. On the other hand, POST was 
successfully corporatized into a 100% Ministry of Finance (MoF) owned company in 
2003 but it remains under the supervision of the Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology. POST has to comply with both Commercial Law and the 
SOE Act. Due to the emergence of new technologies, POST has experienced some 
difficulty and been pressured to improve its performance and services Therefore, 
recently, POST has expanded its operation into four businesses which are postal, 
logistics, retail and financial businesses (Appendix B).  
Many management tools have been implemented in both cases to overcome these 
perceived difficulties and one of them is PMS.  Accordingly, PWA and POST have 
developed many systems and standards to measure their performance on a variety of 
levels: organisation, departmental and individual levels. This study mainly focuses on 
the influences of institutional logics and institutional complexity on the PMS employed 
as well as how organisations respond to the implementation and use of PMS. 
 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives  
This study started with the general aim of exploring organisations in relation to their 
environments. All organisations have some degree of embeddedness in their wider 
environment regarding the prevailing multiple institutional logics. However, SOEs 
provide an interesting setting as they are likely to experience institutional complexity 
that is caused by conflicting demands and incompatible logics. 
 
1.4.1 Overall aim 
The aim of this research is to examine the influence of institutional logics and 
institutional complexity on the PMS within hybrid organisations. 
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1.4.2 Objectives  
The study focuses on the following objectives in the Thai context.  
1. To investigate the PMS characteristics within the case studies;  
2. To examine how and why the implementation and use of PMS are perceived to 
succeed or fail; 
3. To identify institutional logics embedded in Thai SOEs; 
4. To examine how the case organisations respond to institutional complexity in 
the implementation and use of PMS; 
5. To examine how individuals and organisations respond to changes in incentive 
systems and individual performance assessment. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This study is primarily informed by a qualitative approach (see chapter 4). The 
justification   for   this   choice   of   approach   is   based   on   the   researcher’s   philosophical  
assumptions  regarding  the  ‘constructivism  paradigm’  as  it  focuses  on  ‘reality’  based  on  
how  an   individual’s   experiences   influence   their   views  and   actions   (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012, p. 23). It is acknowledged that a qualitative approach brings with it many 
widely perceived weaknesses regarding the difficulty in respect of the generalisability 
of the findings and the influence of researcher bias which is argued to reduce objectivity 
in   studying   the   phenomena.     However,   this   approach  helps   the   researcher   to   ‘build   a  
complex,  holistic  picture…  and  conduct  the  study  in  a  natural  setting’  (Cresswell,  1998,  
p. 15). Hopper and Powell (1985) also argue that there is no such thing as a totally 
objective or value free investigation. 
 
There are many research studies in the PMS field but a limited number of studies in 
institutional complexity in developing countries. Much is unknown about the 
application of PMS in SOEs in emerging countries.  Due to the lack of information or 
knowledge, it makes best sense to explore this topic using a qualitative approach.  
Accordingly, a multiple case study approach was adopted because this study aims to 
describe and analyse how institutional complexity influences the implementation and 
use of PMS in SOEs in emerging countries.  The data was collected through semi-
structured interviews, documentary research, and observations obtained from the case 
study organisations and related agencies such as the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the 
State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO).   
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Regarding the multiple case study method, the researcher conducted the research in two 
organisations with eighty-one interviews in total. The participants in the interviews 
were not only from the case study organisations but also drawn from related external 
stakeholders such as government agencies and consulting firms.  In addition, the 
interviews within each case study organisation were conducted at various employment 
levels including operational, management and executive levels from head office, 
regional offices and branches. 
 
1.6 Contributions  
The main contributions of this study can be divided into theoretical and practical 
contributions. The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is to explain the nature of 
institutional complexity in state-owned enterprises as well as the responses of SOEs 
towards performance measurement and related systems. Recently, institutional 
researchers have given attention to how institutional logics affect organisational 
behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2011). This study identifies the institutional logics 
embedded in SOEs in the Thai setting and culture and within the individual case study 
contexts. 
 
Greenwood  et  al.  (2011)  suggest  further  research  should  look  into  ‘the  dynamic  patterns  
of   complexity’   and   ‘the   degree   of   incompatibility’   between   institutional   logics.   This  
study   employed   Greenwood   et   al.’s   (2011)   and   Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)  
frameworks to address the degree of institutional complexity in organisations by 
examining   them   through   ‘a   degree   of   compatibility’   and   ‘a   degree   of   centrality’  
together with organisational attributes (see chapter 3 and 8). In addition, this study 
employs  Oliver’s   (1991)  strategic  responses   to   institutional  process   in  explaining  how  
hybrid organisations respond to institutional complexity.  
 
This study also provides a practical contribution that identifies different perceptions 
towards the use of EVM and BSC in Thai SOEs. The study indicates that SOEs can 
adopt the concept of the BSC with fewer difficulties compared to their experiences with 
EVM. The perceived simplicity of the BSC concept enabled knowledge to be more 
widely spread within the case organisations than was the case for the more complex 
EVM concept. As a result, employees felt more able to engage themselves in the use of 
BSC. The findings also show that the case organisations should consider re-designing 
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their incentive systems by concentrating more on performance-based system. 
Employees perceive that there is a judgemental bias in the recent individual assessment 
which leads to unfair incentives. Therefore, a well-designed system and measures can 
help to reduce the negative   perceptions   from   employees   as   well   as   gain   employees’  
trust in assessors. 
 
1.7 Thesis Structure  
This study is organised into nine chapters. A brief overview of each chapter is provided 
below.  
 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
This chapter reviews the literature relating to PMS as the main context of this study.  It 
also seeks to identify knowledge gaps in the existing research. First, it defines PMS and 
demonstrates the factors affecting the development of the systems. In conjunction, it 
presents the various research approaches that have been used in the research field. The 
possible intended and unintended consequences of implementing PMS are also 
presented in this chapter.  Next, it provides a review of research considering economic 
value added, the balanced scorecard and incentive systems, as these practices are 
employed in Thai SOEs. The chapter also reviews PMS in public sector organisations. 
 
Chapter 3 Institutional Theory: The influence of institutional logics 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an explanation of the theoretical frameworks 
employed in this study. It mainly explores the literature applicable to institutional 
theory and institutional logics. Firstly, this chapter incorporates a discussion of how 
institutional theory has been developed and defined. Old institutional theory, neo-
institutional  theory  and  Scott’s  (2014) three pillars are reviewed.  It then considers the 
literature pertaining to institutional logics, which is separated into two parts: the 
definition of institutional logics and multiple institutional logics in organisations. Then, 
the  concept  of  institutional  complexity  is  reviewed  and  Greenwood  et  al.’s  (2011)  and  
Besharov  and  Smith’s  (2014)  frameworks  are  discussed.  Next,  the  chapter  reviews  how  
organizations respond to institutional  complexity,  which  follows  Oliver’s  (1991)  study  
and the concepts of decoupling and loose coupling are introduced. Finally, it covers the 
evidence from case study research relating to institutional complexity and 
organisational responses especially decoupling and loose coupling. 
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Chapter 4 Research methodology 
This chapter outlines the research method used in this study. Firstly, this chapter 
discusses the adopted research paradigm and research approach employed in this study. 
It follows this with a discussion of the research structure, which employs qualitative 
case studies as a research strategy. Each research stage, including case selection, data 
collection and data analysis procedures, is presented. Furthermore, contextual 
information relevant to the case studies is also provided.  
 
Chapter 5 Understanding the institutional logics in Thai State Owned Enterprises 
The findings from the case studies are presented in chapters five through seven.  Firstly, 
based on the field interviews, chapter five explores the field of SOEs and seeks to 
identify the institutional logics that the case study organisations have embedded. Then, 
the chapter discusses the institutional logics as follows: the logic of bureaucracy, the 
logic of social activities, the logic of commercial operations, the logic of seniority and 
the logic of unity. The institutional logics found in this chapter are used in chapters six 
and seven to explain organisational and individual responses to the implementation and 
use of PMS, which include EVM and BSC, and the link between the incentives and 
PMS and individual BSC.  
 
Chapter 6 The implementations of the Balance Scorecard and Economic Value 
Management in the case study organisations 
This chapter explores how institutional complexity affects the development of PMS. 
Firstly,   it   details   aspects   of   the   SOEs’   PMS   that   are   required   by   the  MoF   to   assess  
SOEs’   efficiency.   Then,   the   developments   of   EVM   and   BSC   in   the   case   study  
organisations  are  outlined  in  some  depth.  Participants’  perceptions,  as revealed through 
interviews, of how organisations respond to institutional complexity based on the 
implementations of both practices are presented and discussed. The evidence shows that 
the concepts of decoupling and loose coupling have been employed as a strategic 
response in order to handle institutional complexity as well as institutional demands.  
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Chapter 7 The relationship between the incentive systems and individual balanced 
scorecards 
This chapter investigates the relationship between SOE incentive   systems   and  SOEs’  
PMS as well as the integration of individual BSC and organisational incentive systems. 
Firstly, the chapter contains a descriptive study, which assesses how SOEs calculate 
incentives using performance scores and explains the non-financial incentives from the 
MoF. Then, the focus is placed on the bonus system, which is the most important 
incentive as perceived by the participants. The individual and organisational actions and 
responses towards the incentive systems are provided. According to the findings, the 
logic of appropriateness, the logic of seniority and the logic of unity influence SOEs 
actions towards the change of incentive systems. Next, the study examines how 
individual BSC is implemented in each case organisation and considers why individual 
BSC has not been integrated with other practices. 
 
Chapter 8 Findings and discussion 
This chapter summarises the research aims and objectives and presents key findings that 
the researcher obtained through this study. Then, the chapter discusses the institutional 
complexity   and   organisational   attributes   through   Greenwood   et   al.’s   (2011)   and  
Besharov  and  Smith’s  (2014)  frameworks.  The organisational responses to the use of 
PMS and the link between incentive systems and individual BSC are further considered.  
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
The principal conclusions of the study are brought together in this chapter. Firstly, the 
chapter articulates the contributions to the PMS literature and institutional theory made 
by this thesis. Then, the limitations of this study are discussed. This chapter also directs 
future research to further explore the use of PMS in other contexts.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Chapter 2  
Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents literature related to performance measurement systems (PMS) and 
sets the context for the analysis and discussion that follows later in the thesis. The 
chapter provides an understanding of the relevant PMS literature and the consequences 
of PMS systems for practice.  The discussion in this chapter also offers an indication of 
the relevance of this literature to a study in public sector organisations especially in an 
emerging economy context. 
 
This chapter begins with a definition and development of PMS and extends this to note 
factors that influence the adoption and consequences of PMS. The review then 
considers three management tools employed in Thai state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
including balanced scorecards (BSC), economic value-added (EVA), and incentive 
systems. The next section presents a review of   public   sector   as  well   as   the   PMS’   in  
public sector organisations and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The final part presents 
a summary of the chapter. 
 
2.2 Definition and Development of Performance Measurement Systems  
Performance measurement is a broad concept, and the use of performance measurement 
techniques has a very long history. According to Merchant and Van der Stede, the 
introduction of PMS dates back to the 1920s when the DuPont company developed the 
concept  of   return  on   investment  and  used  ‘a  pyramid  of   financial   ratios’   that   linked  a  
wide   range   of   financial   ratios   to   return   on   investment’   (Neely,   2002,   p.   146).   In   the  
1950s, General Electric employed a set of performance measures which included both 
financial and non-financial measures (Hailey and Sorrgenfrei, 2007).   
 
PMS have been portrayed extensively as one of the most important management tools 
in both business and public sector organisations (Van Helden et al., 2006).    Many 
research areas in management such as human resources and strategy management 
contribute to performance measurement (Neely et al., 1995; Franco-Santos et al., 2007, 
2012). Consequently, a variety of terms have appeared (e.g., performance measure, 
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metric, metric sets, PMS, performance management systems, contemporary PMS and 
business performance measurement), many of which are not defined well (Franco-
Santos et al., 2007, 2012). According to Franco-Santos et al. (2012, p. 80), many 
researchers  define  PMS  ‘in  terms  of  their  features,’  while  others  define  them  in  terms  of  
both  features  and  ‘roles  and  main  processes’.  
 
Neely  et  al.   (2005,  p.  1229)  define  measurement  as   ‘the  process  of  quantification  and  
action  leads  to  performance’;;  performance  measurement  as  ‘the  process  of  quantifying  
the efficiency and effectiveness of action’;;   and   a   PMS   as   ‘the   set   of  metrics   used   to  
quantify   both   the   efficiency   and   effectiveness   of   actions’.   In   this   context   efficiency  
refers to the cost effectiveness of products in relation to customer satisfaction, and 
effectiveness refers to meeting customers’  requirements.  However,  the  terms  efficiency 
and effectiveness that Neely et al. (2005) provided are still blurred, and require 
clarification (Choong, 2013). According to Tvaronaviciene et al. (2009), the required 
degrees of efficiency and effectiveness lie in how organisations view measures.  
 
Neely and Hii (1998) discuss many of the analysis elements of PMS referred to by 
Franco-Santos (2012). Franco-Santos et al. (2007, p. 796) argue that ‘there are only two 
necessary features’,   which   are   ‘performance  measures   and   supporting   infrastructure,’  
but  Neely  et  al.’s  (1995)  definition  does  not  mention  supporting  infrastructures,  which  
include  ‘data  acquisition,  collation,  sorting,  analysis,  interpretation,  and  dissemination’  
(Franco-Santos et al., 2007, p. 792).  Therefore, a PMS can be defined as consisting of a 
process for the collection and reporting of information using an individual measure or a 
set  of  measures  to  ‘quantify  both  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  actions’  (Neely  et  
al., 2005, p. 1229).  
 
Much of the existing literature describes the role and usefulness of PMS. Franco-Santos 
(2007, p. 797) propose five roles of PMS: (1) measure performance, (2) strategy 
management, (3) communication, (4) influence behaviour, and (5) learning and 
improvement. Researchers can identify and select any of these to focus on in their 
investigations. According to Spekle and Verbeeten (2012, p. 134), the primary 
significance of Franco-Santos’s   (2007)   roles   is   located   in   ‘the   number   of   roles   they  
identify and in the  boundaries  between  the  roles’.  Based  on  ‘the  role  of  control,’  Spekle  
and Verbeeten (2012, p. 134-135) propose classifying the use of PMS, consisting of 
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incentive-oriented use (i.e., target setting, incentives, and rewards), operational use (i.e., 
operational planning and process monitoring), and explanatory use (i.e., priority setting, 
double loop learning, and policy development).  
 
According to Modell (2009), a PMS involves a process of evaluating efficiency and 
effectiveness of an organisation by comparing results (i.e., financial and non-financial) 
with organisational goals, and it helps to generate useful information for decision-
making (Brignall et al., 1991; Simons, 2000; Neely et al., 2005; Taylor and Tylor, 
2014). Ferreira and Otley (2009) suggest that PMS allow organisations to balance the 
management and control of organisational performance, and opportunities and threats, 
by using both formal and informal processes. Franco-Santos et al. (2007, p. 798) 
suggest three processes in PMS: information provision, measure design and selection, 
and data capture. They author also suggest two other processes: (1) performance 
evaluations   and   rewards   and   (2)   system   review,   which   are   not   ‘critical   for   the  
functioning’   of   the   system,   but   the   effectiveness   of   the system (p. 799). The Franco-
Santos et al. study adopts the primary objective of PMS from prior studies. These 
objectives include creating continuous improvements (Brignall, 2007; Grunberg, 2004); 
encouraging performance management; acting as a basis for a reward process; 
identifying the effectiveness of existing strategies (Neely et al., 1994);  encouraging 
‘alignment  of  key  business  process’  (Taylor  and  Taylor,  2014,  p.  848)  and  developing  
an organisational strategy (Hass et al., 2005). 
 
An understanding of the background and development of PMS is essential to the study 
and analysis of the systems in the public sector. Lavy el al. (2010) state that one 
important question for an organization using a PMS is what to measure. Some 
researchers indicate that the measures depend on users and requirements of customers 
(e.g. Baldwin el al., 2000; Hinks, 2004) and must emphasize various aspects as well as 
align  with  an  organization’s  goals  (Cable  and  Davis,  2004).    According  to  Otley  (2002),  
the evaluation of performance measurement moved from financial measures to multi-
dimensional measures. The financial dimension was considered as the most important 
aspect of PMS for decades, as an organization faces financial constraints and is required 
to generate more money to satisfy its stakeholders (Otley, 2002). However, according to 
Kaplan and Norton (2001), financial dimensions are inevitably based on past 
performance that could mislead the organization by focusing more on short-term 
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performance instead of long-term performance – signals for continuous improvement 
and innovation (Neely and Hii, 1998). To date, according to Brignall (2007) and 
Anderson and McAdam (2004), in an attempt to overcome these drawbacks and other 
criticisms, PMS have been developed and provide a balanced view through multi-
dimension measures.  Some examples include: Performance measurement matrix 
(Keegan et al., 1989); Results and determinants model (Fitzgerald et al., 1991); BSC 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992); Performance prism (Neely et al., 2001). Amongst all of 
these models, the BSC has been widely used in many organizations across the world 
(Bourne et al., 2002).  
 
Though multi-dimensional PMS may be an effective managerial tool, there are a range 
of problems that can occur in their adoption (Smith, 1990). De Bruijn (2007) suggests 
that employing PMS can also have a range of negative effects. Examples include: (1) 
strategic behaviour: copying not learning (De Bruijn, 2007) and veiling performance in 
public sectors (Bowerman and Hawksworth, 1999 and De Bruijn, 2007); (2) blocking 
innovation and ambition in organisations (De Bruijn, 2007); (3) intra- and inter-
organisational compartmentalisation (De Bruijn, 2007, p. 23). To use performance-
measurement results effectively, an organisation must transform a process of 
performance measurement to performance measurement and management, and it must 
overcome anticipated and required changes (Amaratunga and Baldry, 2002). 
 
Berry et al. (2008, p. 6) state the drawbacks as follows: inaccurate and subjective 
measures, short-term focus on performance by ignoring future consequences, 
inappropriate benchmarks, changes in criteria and measures that might not support 
desired   results   and   ‘lack   of   attention   to   informal   controls   and   organization   context’.  
Other researchers also criticise that the inadequate measures used in PMS can 
negatively affect the accomplishment of organisational goals and strategies (Bourne et 
al., 2002; Norreklit et al., 2006, 2007), hinder organisational activities (Mohanty, 1992), 
and provide false information for decision making (Linna et al., 2010). Looking at the 
issue for another direction, Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) argue that technical problems 
and conflicts of organisational goals and objectives could affect the selection of 
appropriate measures.  
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According to Bourne et al. (2002, p. 1289), problems also include the possibility that an 
excessive set of measures can dilute the overall impact (Beirbusses and Siesfeld, 1997). 
Another difficulty associated with PMS is the contrasting demands of stakeholders, 
which lead to the different perspectives on organisational performance (Yasin and 
Gomes, 2007). Consequently, although PMS can be used to improve organisational 
performance, they can also be a threat to organisational operation and the decision-
making process. The organisations also should carefully design their PMS and related 
processes in order to reduce the effect of the threats as well as to cope with different 
perspectives on performance (De Bruijn, 2002; Bourne et al., 2002; Yasin and Gomes, 
2007). 
 
2.3 Factors Influencing Adoption of Performance Measurement Systems in 
Organisations  
Many organisations are investing considerable resources in implementing PMS. Some 
organisations experience success in doing so, but others do not.  Some writers suggest 
that problems with the process of implementation hinder the achievement of system 
benefits. According to McCunn (1998), seventy per cent of performance measurement 
plans are unsuccessful due to difficulties during implementation. A literature review is 
required to reveal factors that influence adoption of PMS in organisations. Bourne et al. 
(2002)   report   that  many   researchers  use  Pettigrew  et  al.’s   (1998)   recommendations   to  
explain causes of success and failure (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1: Causes of success and failure when implementing performance 
measurement programs 
Issues Reasons 
Organisational 
Context 
1. The need for a highly developed information system 
2. Time and expense required 
3. Lack of leadership and resistance to change 
Development 
Process 
1. Vision and strategies were not actionable 
2. Strategies were not linked to resource allocation 
3. Goals were negotiable 
4. State of the art improvement methods were not used 
5. Striving for perfection undermined success 
Measurement 
Content 
1. Strategies were not linked to department and individual goals 
2. Large number of measures diluted overall impact 
3. Metrics were too poor defined 
4. The need to quantify results in areas that are more qualitative in nature 
Source: Adapted from Bourn et al. (2002, p. 1289) 
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Bourne et al. (2002) interviewed ten manufacturing firms to identify drivers and 
barriers  that  influence  effective  implementation  of  PMS,  identifying  four  factors:  ‘time  
and effort required, data accessibility, consequences of measurement, and being 
overtaken  by  new  parent  company  initiatives’  (p.  1305).   
 
According to Bourne et al. (2002), factors that influence adoption of PMS are not only 
the internal drivers mentioned above, but also include external drivers and barriers to 
changes that depend on four constituent parts: process, people, culture, and system 
(Kennerley and Neely, 2002). According to Kennerley and Neely (2002), organisations 
should review the appropriateness of all four constituent parts to ensure they can meet 
requirements and   reflect   changes   in   PMS.   They   propose   a   ‘framework   of   factors  
affecting  the  evolution  of  PMS,’  shown  in  Figure  2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: A framework of factors that affect the evolution of PMS 
 
Source: Kennerly and Neely (2002, p. 1241) 
 
Kennerley and Neely (2002) recommend that considering the inter-related issues from 
Figure 2.1 helps organisations manage development of PMS.  
 
Padavani et al. (2010) examined factors that influence development of performance 
measurement in public sectors, concluding findings from a multi-case study of 
municipalities. They identified six factors: time-related concepts-duration, paths, 
windows of opportunity, cycles, causal mechanisms, and multiple perspectives (p. 591). 
A PMS is a management tool that requires time for organisations and their employees to 
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adopt, implement, and gain expertise in (Padovani et al., 2010). In public sector 
settings, short-term strategies have been implemented due to various factors such as 
political cycles that influence the successfulness of PMS use (Liner et al., 2001). 
According to Padavani et al. (2010), in order to understand  the organisational actions 
and changes in performance measurement, a path dependency theory can be employed 
to investigate the factors and situations that impact the implementation of PMS. In other 
words, both direct and indirect occurrences of situations and motivations (Pollitt, 2008) 
affect how organizations change their implementation and use of PMS. The third and 
fourth factors – windows of opportunity and cycle – relate to specific situations or 
contexts. An example includes introduction of a new PMS by a government during a 
budgetary cycle. Causal mechanisms consist of four elements that require focus: 
political stability, organisational background regarding PMS, knowledge sharing, and 
support from departments in an organisation. Multiple perspectives of time suggest each 
activity requires its own period. For example, strategy planning requires a longer period 
than task control, which is a daily activity (Padavani et al., 2010). Taking these 
elements into account may lead to more effective development of PMS in public sector 
organisations.  
 
According   to  Keathley  and  Van  Aken   (2014,  p.   2),  many   studies   identify   ‘barriers   to  
success’  with  ‘some  of  factors  identified  in  more  general  content  areas’  such  as  change  
management (Bourne, 2002) and organisation improvement (Bourne, 2002).  The other 
factors also identified in theoretical perspectives include institutional theory (Van 
Helden et al., 2006; Modell, 2005; 2009; Modell and Wiesel, 2008), contingency theory 
(Taylor and Taylor, 2013), and path dependency theory (Padovani et al., 2010) and 
performance-measurement-system-specific factors (Bourn et al., 2002; Franco and 
Santos, 2012).  A review of the literature suggests that impact factors differ based on 
what theory or concept is used during a study. Keathley and Van Aken (2013) argue 
that research results in this area show little consistency, and that many researchers 
attempt to explain many factors that cannot be measured directly or easily. Taylor and 
Taylor (2013) support this idea, suggesting few researchers study effective performance 
measurements, and there is no consensus regarding which factors are important. They 
offer six enabling factors of effective implementation   of   PMS:   ‘strategy   formulation,  
strategy implementation, information systems support, organisational-learning 
orientation,  quality  management  culture,  and  senior  management  leadership’  (p.  5493).  
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Taylor and Taylor (2014) used a contingency perspective to discover organisational size 
effects for each factor, but due to unsuitable PMS that large organisations develop, they 
could not confirm whether such organisations have greater potential than SMEs to 
achieve effective implementation and use of performance systems. However, when 
researchers consider each factor, both large organisations and SMEs have their own 
factors that can be developed and lead to successful adoption of PMS. Many researchers 
agree that alignment with strategy, adequate information systems, development of 
learning organisations, and commitment from leaders influence the success or failure of 
development of PMS. 
 
2.4 Consequences of Performance Measurement Systems 
Franco-Santos et al. (2012) reviewed 72 studies, and sought to identify the 
consequences of contemporary PMS frameworks. The consequences can be identified 
as  occurring  in  three  groups:  the  consequences  for  people’s  behaviours,  organisational  
capabilities, and performance. Franco-Santos  et  al.’s  (2012)  study  is  summarised  below  
in order to contextualise the impact of PMS as they might be seen to relate to this study.  
 
Franco-Santos   et   al.   (2012,   p.   79)   explain   the   way   that   PMS   can   affect   people’s  
behaviours.  Firstly,  PMS  can  affect  ‘people’s  strategic  focus’  by  helping  executives   to 
place  more  emphasis  on  ‘what  is  important  for  the  organisation’  (p.  83).  However,  the  
studies in the field do not provide ways to convert a strategic focus into a measure (e.g. 
Jazayeri and Scapens, 2008). According to Chang et al. (2007), the PMS can create goal 
conflicts, as individuals selectively attain particular goals and ignore others due to their 
lack of capability to cope with all of the goals. 
 
Next, Franco-Santos et al. (2012) argue that findings on the impact of PMS on 
motivation have both positive and negative results. The research in the field claims that 
there is evidence that linking PMS and monetary incentives can negatively affect 
employees’  motivations  (e.g.  Decoende  and  Bruggeman,  2006;;  Spekle  and  Verbeeten,  
2014).  
 
Franco-Santos et al. (2012, p. 92) explain that PMS that link measures with 
organisational goals, and employ them during decision-making,  ‘facilitate  the  provision  
of job-relevant   information.’  The   degree   of   impact   depends   on   the  way   in  which   the  
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PMS is used and designed, on   ‘individuals’   experiences   and   the   perceptions   of   goal  
difficulty’  (Franco-Santos et al., 2012). 
 
Other consequences are said to impact leadership style, organisational culture, and 
individual satisfaction. Franco-Santos et al. (2012, p. 93) suggest that PMS lead to a 
‘cultural   change   and   to   a   more   participative   and   consultative   leadership   style’   by  
reinforcing  ‘desired  behaviours,  values  and  beliefs’  and  creating  new  routines  (Bititci  et  
al., 2006). On the other hand, Lonnoqvist (2002, as cited by Ukko et al., 2007, p. 41) 
suggests  that  organisational  cultures  ‘do  not  complicate  the  measurement’.  Ukko  et  al.  
(2007,   p.   49)   argue   that   from   employees’   perspectives,   even   if   the   PMS   is   used  
successfully,   it   does   not   guarantee   improvement   in   leadership   style’   or affect 
organisational culture. Indeed, Ittner et al. (2003) also point out that employees perceive 
dissatisfaction toward PMS regarding perceptions of unfairness.  
 
Consequences  for  people’s  behaviours  are ‘perceptions  of  subjectivity,  justice  and  trust’  
(Franco-Santos et al., 2012, p. 93).   PMS   raise   a   ‘perception   of   subjectivity   and  
uncertainty’   in  many  ways,  especially  when  considering   their   relationships  with  other  
practices (p. 93). According to Franco-Santos et al. (2012, p. 93), for example, the link 
of a PMS with monetary incentives creates perceptions of subjectivity and uncertainty 
for managers (Ittner et al., 2003) and employees (Burney et al., 2009). However, 
Franco-Santos et al. (2012) argue that organisational characteristics create positive and 
negative perceptions of subjectivity regarding evidence of positive attitude from 
Kolehmainen (2010). Also, the perceptions of justice depend on how a system reflects 
the strategic model and validity of a system. Again a specific argument is made that 
well-defined  measures  lead  to  positive  ‘perceptions  of  justice’  and  ‘trust  in  supervisors’  
(p. 94). However, according to Campbell et al. (1998), even with a well-designed 
system, it is still difficult for supervisors to distinguish various individual performances 
when their work ties together and an individual cannot control the result.  Moreover, 
individuals tend to perceive the injustice, as they are unlikely to accept a performance 
result lower than their self-assessment (Campbell and Lee, 1988). 
 
According to Franco-Santos et al. (2012, p. 942), judgemental biases occur regarding 
the  complexity  of  PMS  and  the  ‘subjective  nature’  of  some  measures.    For  example,  Bol  
(2011,  p.  1250)  found  that  managers  tend  to  ‘subjectively  evaluate  performance’  when  
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it’s  related to incentives and their interests. Also, in the same study, the relationship of 
manager  and  employee  and  ‘information  gathering  cost’  can  affect  the  degree  of  biases  
(p. 1250). Many studies suggest ways to reduce such biases, including use of external 
assessors  (Lipe  and  Salterio,  2002)  and  providing  assessors  with  ‘full  information  about  
the   organisational   strategic   objectives   and   other   related   knowledge’   (Banker   et   al.,  
2004). Franco-Santos   et   al.   (2012,   p.   94)   explain   that   PMS   can   create   ‘conflicts and 
tensions’  within  organisations,  such  as  ‘during  the  development  of  measures,  idea  and  
initiative’  (Marginson,  2002),  causing  reluctance  to  use  the  system,  regarding  shifts  in  
organisational  power  structure  (Tuomela,  2005)  as  ‘costly  and  time  consuming’  (Butler  
et al., 1997). 
 
 According to Franco-Santos et al. (2012, p. 95), use of PMS affects organisational 
capabilities   in   a   number   of   ways,   which   can   be   explained   in   terms   of   ‘strategy  
processes, communication, strategic capabilities, managerial practices, and corporate 
control’.   A   PMS   can   be   an   effective   mechanism   for   ‘alignment,   development,  
implementation   and   review’   of   strategic   processes   (Jazayeri   and   Scapens,   2008;;  
Kolehmainen, 2010; Cruz et al., 2011), but the degree of effectiveness depends on the 
characteristics of the PMS (p. 95). However, Modell (2009) states that rather than these 
technical and instrumental issues, institutional perspectives can help to broaden  the 
view of PMS by emphasising social and political aspects as well as incorporating other 
theories with which the researcher can conduct the research at a micro-level such as 
individual actions.  
 
The consequences Franco-Santos et al. (2012) discuss can help researchers understand 
potential impacts of PMS on organisations, consequently   improving   researchers’  
interpretations of data collected from semi-structured interviews.  
 
2.5 Balanced Scorecard  
2.5.1 The development of the balanced scorecard  
The BSC has been used in many organisations, both in the private and public sectors. 
According to Kaplan and Norton (1996a; 2001a), the BSC is a performance 
measurement tool that helps organisations translate strategic goals into organisational 
objectives and performance measures. The BSC model helps organisations monitor 
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performance, enhance the ability to learn and improve a process, and motivate and 
educate employees. Kaplan and Norton (1992) developed the BSC approach to 
supplement financial measures with non-financial measures. Therefore, the original 
BSC model consisted of four dimensions: financial, customer, and internal business 
processes, and learning and growth. These dimensions represent the major business 
stakeholders: shareholders, customers, and employees. Therefore, all aspects of the 
organisation are included during strategic planning (Bedford, 2008). According to 
Mooraj et al. (1999), the importance of designing the BSC with each of these 
dimensions is that the measures accord with organisational strategies. The measurement 
represents a balance between financial and non-financial measures, long-term 
objectives and short-term actions, and management and implementation of strategy 
(Kaplan  and  Norton,  2001a).  However,  Kaplan  and  Norton’s      (2001a)   study  does  not  
offer much guidance on how to balance the measures when evaluating managerial 
performance, and a major challenge of implementation of the original BSC is difficulty 
in justifying the choice of indicators. Therefore, the original BSC is an inadequate 
condition for success (Epstein and Manzoni, 1997).  
 
During the mid-1990s, Kaplan and Norton (1996a, 1996b, 1996c) introduced an 
improvement to the BSC model known as the strategy map. The consequences of this 
change  were   increased   demand   for   accurate   reflections   of   an   organisation’s   strategic  
goals and increased awareness of reflections   of   disparities   in   managers’   agenda   and  
structure (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, Olve et al., 1999). Many studies on the design and 
use of the BSC, including Norreklit (2000; 2003), Neely et al. (2004), and Johanson et 
al. (2006), report favourably on the model, while some point out difficulties with 
choosing the right measures for BSC and organisational resistance.  
 
2.5.2 The criticism of the balanced scorecard 
Kaplan and Norton (1996b, 1996c) argue that the BSC provides organisations with a set 
of instruments to help them navigate future competitive success, and it addresses an 
insufficient process to link long-term strategy with short-term actions in traditional 
management systems. However, the literature contains criticisms that come from a 
variety of sources.  
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According to Schneiderman (1999) and Berry et al. (2009) the reasons the BSC model 
fails under some circumstances include:  
(1) inaccurately and subjectively identifying non-financial indicators; inadequately 
defined performance metrics and benchmarks;  
(2) accepting   negotiated   goals   rather   than   goals   based   on   stakeholders’  
requirements;;   absence   of   ‘a   deployment   system   that   breaks   high   level   goals  
down to the sub-process  level’  (Schneiderman,  1999,  p.  7) 
(3) absence of systematic improvement methods and breaking the cause-and-effect-
relationship; and 
(4) changes  to  criteria  and  measures  that  might  not  support  desired  results;;  and  ‘lack  
of  attention  to  informal  controls  and  organization  context’  (Berry  et  al.,  2009,  p.  
6).  
 
Others raised doubts about the validity and usefulness of the BSC. According to Kaplan 
and   Norton   (1996a,   1996b,   2001a,   2001b),   a   ‘cause   and   effect   relationship’   should  
pervade all dimensions of the BSC. Therefore, the link between objectives and 
measures helps organisations manage and validate the measurement system. A properly 
constructed BSC in the chain of cause and effect should offer a clear picture of 
organisational strategy. However, Norreklit (2000, 2003) argues that the cause and 
effect relationship described by Kaplan and Norton (1996a and 1996b) is problematic. 
Kaplan  and  Norton’s  study  refers   to   ‘a   finality   relationship’   that  occurs  when  ‘human  
actions,  wishes  and  views  are  related  to  each  other’   (Norreklit,  2000,  p.  76).   It  makes  
the relationship between BSC dimensions more complicated, and use of BSC becomes 
impracticable. Norreklit (2003, p. 616) also questions the cause and effect relationship 
between   some   ‘outcome   measures   and   the   performance   drivers’   contained   on   a  
scorecard.   Invalid   assumptions   lead   to   ‘dysfunctional   anticipation of performance 
measures’  and  ‘sub-optimal  performance’  (Norreklit,  2000,  p.  82).   
 
Kaplan   and   Norton   (1996a)   suggest   that   one   of   the   BSC’s   objectives   is   to   solve  
problems   related   to   strategy   implementation.   However,   Norreklit’s   (2003)   criticism  
makes the BSC doubtful as a strategic management tool. Norreklit (2003, p. 591) 
questions  the  BSC  model,  claiming  that  the  uptake  rate  of  BSC  ‘is  due  to  its  substance  
as an innovative and practical theory or simply to its promotional rhetoric provides the 
focus’  of  Kaplan  and  Norton’s  (1996)  paper.  Bedford  et  al.   (2008)  point  out   that  both  
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theoretical and empirical evidence on the benefits of using cause-and-effect 
relationships with BSC are unclear. 
 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a) argue that BSC is an instrument of strategic control, but 
Norreklit   (2000;;   2003)   questions   the   BSC’s   strategic   control   model,   and   studied   the  
relationship with external stakeholders and the environment, and managers and 
employees. She found that the BSC model is a top-down process, and not all 
stakeholders are included. Some studies criticise that the BSC fails to emphasize the 
contribution of employees and suppliers in the value chain (Atkinson et al., 1997), and 
ignores the importance of institutional stakeholders such as public authorities 
(Norreklit, 2000). The BSC also fails to identify performance measures as an interactive 
process (Atkinson et al., 1997; Norreklit, 2000; 2003). Therefore, a gap of transforming 
a strategy plan into action must be expected (Norreklit, 2000). 
 
According to Kaplan and Norton (2001b), a diversified organisation that requires 
divisional strategies can employ the BSC as a management tool for tailored scorecards 
that  suit  each  division’s  situation  within  the  context  of  an  overall  organisation  strategy.  
The BSC allows each division to identify and set targets and performance measures, 
which can be unique or common across other divisions (Kaplan and Norton, 2001b). 
However, Lipe and Salterio (2000) found that organisations bias evaluations to reflect 
information contained by common versus unique measures. Therefore, one benefit of 
BSC is reduced when those unique measures contain information relevant to managerial 
performance. 
 
Jensen   (2001)   critiques   the   question   of   ‘what   is   balance,’   when   the   use   of   BSC   in  
organisations leads to disputes over trade-offs when multiple dimensions of 
performance cannot be maximized. Other researchers criticize that BSC simply present 
a list of metrics that do not provide a unified view with recommendations (Jensen, 
2001), and that they vary under disparate circumstances (Maltz et al., 2003). 
 
2.5.3 Balanced scorecard in public sectors  
Over the last decade, the BSC emerged as one of the most important PMS, since it helps 
organisations implement strategy into action and measure organisational performance. 
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Although designed for private sectors, the BSC has been employed commonly in the 
public sector.  
 
Many public organisations experience difficulties using the original BSC, since the 
primary objective in the public sector is not financial. Kaplan and Norton (2001) 
explain that the BSC can be adapted to fit organisational interests by identifying 
primary strategic themes at the forefront of the scorecard. Circumstances in the public 
sector increase the need for BSC adjustments regarding both design and implementation 
(Aidemark, 2001; Kaplan 2001). According to Northcott (2012), recent empirical 
research in the BSC literature focuses on private-sector organisations, but less emphasis 
has been placed on the public sector. Most BSC studies in the public sector have been 
conducted within the context of public healthcare organisations (Aidemaek, 2001; 
Chang, 2007; Patel et al., 2008) and local governments, including municipalities 
(Askim, 2004; Kloot and Martin, 2000). According to Northcott (2012), recent research 
reports favourably on the adoption of BSC in public sector organisations, but reasons 
for successes and failures when implementing and operating stages of a BSC 
framework in the public sector have not been examined thoroughly. Therefore, further 
study is required. 
 
Aidemark (2001) and Patel et al. (2008) suggest more indicators were added after 
public-sector organisations employed BSC. Aidemark (2001) suggests that the nature of 
BSC has increased the problem of an excessive number of public-sector performance 
indicators. Patel et al. (2008, p. 913) investigated a cause-and-effect relationship in 
NHS’s  BSC,  suggesting  that  public  organisational  success  is  shaped  by  ‘the  knowledge  
of  relationships  between  indicators,’  and  how  organisations  address these relationships. 
Due to a conflict of indicators in NHSs, performance improvements might be 
unsustainable (Patel et al., 2008). 
 
Gumbus et al. (2003), Patel et al. (2008), Koot and Martin (2000), Askim (2004), and 
Niven (2006) all report successful implementation of BSC in public-sector 
organisations, public healthcare organisations, and local governments. Askim (2004) 
argues that local governments develop into active learners after adopting a PMS like 
BSC. Kloot and Martin (2000) and Niven (2006) also suggest various positive results 
after implementing BSC. They suggest that clearer strategic goals lead to better 
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selection of meaningful and manageable indicators. However, Kloot and Martin (2000) 
point out that use of BSC in public-sector organisations emphasizes financial 
performance and community focus management rather than organisational change.  
 
In conclusion, the BSC is a PMS used in both public- and private-sector organisations 
regarding measures from financial and non-financial perspectives. The BSC also has 
been employed in the case-study organisations at various levels from organisational to 
individual, discussed in chapters 6 and 7, respectively. 
 
2.6 Economic Value Added  
For   the   last   two  decades,  Stern  Stewart’s  Economic  Value  Added  (EVA) formula has 
dramatically gained attention from practitioners in the private sector (Biddle et al., 
1998; 1999). Accordingly, the rise in use of EVA points toward limitations of 
traditional accounting profit measurement systems, which include difficulties faced 
when assessing organisational performance and motivating employees (Aggarwal, 
2001). According to Kysiazis and Anatassis (2007), the difference between these two 
concepts is how to calculate profit and invested capital. EVA provides guidelines when 
calculating economic value created by an organisation, which helps the organisation 
assess and manage invested capital (Kysiazis and Anatassis, 2007), integrate its 
financial  management  system  (Stewart,  1994;;  Stern  et  al.,  1996),  and  recognize  ‘desired  
long-run  effects,’  leading  to  managerial  decision-making (Stern et al., 1996; Chen and 
Dodd, 1997; Bromwich and Walker, 1998).  
 
According to Ittner and Larcker (1998), value-based measures, especially EVA, have a 
higher correlation with share price than accounting measures. Stewart (1991) and Stern 
et al. (1995) claim that EVA helps organisations improve shareholder wealth. To assess 
this statement, many researchers have examined the correlation between EVA and 
MVA (including share price) (Walbert, 1994; Biddle et al., 1997; Chen and Dodd, 
1997),   and   shareholder   return   (O’Byrne,   1997).   Some   researchers   also   find   that  
traditional financial measures such as net income and operating income have a higher, 
positive correlation with market value than EVA does (Kyriazis and Anastassis, 2007). 
Chen and Dodd (1992) and Biddle et al. (1997) argue that EVA cannot replace 
traditional accounting measures, and organisations should consider employing both 
EVA and accounting measures. 
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Stewart (1991) suggests that organisations use EVA for making financial decisions by 
aiming to maximize EVA instead of accounting profit because EVA is a reliable 
measure of decision-making effectiveness. EVA focuses on the opportunity costs of 
capital: if an investment project has a positive profit but its return is less than the cost of 
capital, the project is terminated (De Villiers, 1997). However, according to De Villiers 
(1997,  p.  286),  one  of  EVA’s  demerits  is  that  it  is  based  on  traditional  accounting  profit,  
which  is  ‘a  poor  proxy  for  economic  profit.’  Accordingly,  it  might  lead  organisations  to  
make inefficient investment decisions (De Villiers, 1997; Warr, 2005) and 
compensation outcomes (Warr, 2005). 
 
Some literature supports EVA as a management tool at division and product levels, 
including Hartman (2000) and Shrieves and Wachowicz (2001). However, Zimmerman 
(1997) and Woods et al. (2012) focus on prospective problems of cost sharing and 
target costing due to the complexity of the calculation of cost of capital. Therefore, 
EVA for performance management at the divisional level is impracticable 
(Zimmerman, 1997). Kaplan and Norton (1996) point out that EVA discourages 
organisations from investing in a new project of a prime business division; it is better to 
measure project performance in terms of free cash flow rather than in terms of EVA. 
Organisations   that   base  managerial   decisions   solely   on   EVA  might   underinvest   in   ‘a  
division  with  good  growth  prospects’  (O’Hanlon  and  Peasnell,  1988,  p.  441).   
 
O’Hanlon  and  Peasnell  (1988)  thoroughly  discuss characteristics of EVA, pointing out 
some problematic uses. Stern Stewart intended to adjust GAAP closer to economic 
value accounting by achieving three objectives: accounting conservatism, earning 
management,  and  past  accounting  errors.  However,  O’Hanlon and Peasnell (1988) have 
doubts  about  Stern  Stewart’s  EVA  adjustment  method,  and  mention  that  some  of  their  
adjustments might push EVA back to cash accounting. Even after EVA adjustment, 
various systematic biases remain, and there is still no clear evidence of the relationship 
between EVA and managerial performance. It is not necessarily true that EVA is a 
better measurement of equity returns or firm value than net income (Biddle et al., 
1998). 
 
According to Stern and Shiely (2001, p. 24), a well-designed incentive scheme ensures 
that   managers   act   as   shareholders   ‘by   rewarding   them   for   actions   that   increase  
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shareholder  return.’  Stewart  (2002)  suggests  that  organisations  should  use  EVA  solely  
to assess and reward performance. Lovata and Costigan (2002) examined the 
characteristics of EVA using firms that integrate it with bonus schemes. They point out 
that firms influenced more by institutional organisations and firms using a defender 
strategy tend to employ EVA. According to Lovata and Costigan (2002), use of EVA to 
identify an appropriate incentive as Stern Stewart suggests appears more difficult than 
they imply. Fatemi et al. (2003) examined the relationship between executive 
compensation and organisational performance indicators such as EVA, MVA, ROE, 
and ROA, concluding that there is a weak correlation between incentive schemes and 
EVA. However, Biddle et al. (1998) state that EVA can help organisations overcome 
the drawbacks of traditional earning incentives, and management levels support EVA 
incentives.  
 
O’Hanlon  and  Peasnell  (1988)  also  question  the  usefulness  of  EVA,  and  posit  that  only  
time will tell whether it is a useful technique. Tortella and Brusco (2003, p. 269) point 
out   in  a   literature  review  that  some  researchers  argue  about   ‘whether  EVA is a really 
useful  technique  or  it  is  only  a  management  fashion  that  will  fade  away  with  time.’  In  
support of this view, Brickley et al. (1997) describe EVA as management fashion.  
 
There is limited literature on EVA in the public sector, and Rompho (2009) found that 
there is no literature in the field. Rompho (2009) discuss the usefulness of employing 
EVA in a non-profit organisation, Thammasat University in Thailand, by surveying 250 
participants. He argues that EVA does not focus solely on organisational profit, but 
considers cost of capital. Therefore, implementation of EVA in a non-profit 
organisation helps it set and monitor capital budgeting efficiently. However, the 
difficulty of using EVA in a non-profit organisation concerns how to evaluate the social 
benefits  and  ‘what  the  capital  cost  should  be  measured  against’  (Rompho,  2009,  p.  9). 
 
2.7 The Relationship between Performance and Incentive Systems  
There are many tangible and intangible human resource variables such as incentive 
systems, development and training, and employee skills that affect organisational 
performance (Ferguson and Reijo, 2009). A number of studies have examined the 
influence of PMS in the context of human resources management (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2009) and motivation (Franco-Santos, 2012). According to Merchant and 
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Van der Stede (2007), incentive system design is one of the major elements of effective 
management, besides performance measurement and evaluation.  
 
Over the last two decades, performance incentives gained attention from many 
researchers in various fields of study such as management and economics, and most 
researchers suggest that performance incentives lead to improvements in firm 
productivity (Cadsby et al., 2007). According to Lawson (2000, p. 303), a performance 
incentive  is  a  monetary  reward  based  on  ‘individual,  group  or  company  performance.’  
The benefit of a performance incentive is improvement to organisational performance 
by motivating employees to be more efficient (Lawson, 2000). However, Deckop et al. 
(2004) point out that the success of performance pay and incentives depends on 
individual degrees of risk aversion. Cadsby et al. (2007) support this idea by illustrating 
how highly productive employees tend to self-select pay-for-performance and related 
incentives, while risk-averse employees are less responsive to this type of incentive 
system. According to Franco-Santos et al. (2012), much research suggests that the link 
between   PMS   and   monetary   incentives   can   negatively   influence   employees’  
motivations (Decoene and Bruggeman, 2006; Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). 
 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) explain that group rewards have gained more 
attention recently regarding improvements to employee cooperation and the enhancing 
of organisational efficiency. According to Blazovich (2013), literature on performance 
incentives points out that both team and individual incentives have a positive influence 
on organisational performance. Heneman and von Hippel (1995) argue that 
organisations normally provide a combination of team and individual incentives based 
on a common goal, and try to reduce free riders on a team. 
 
According to Thorpe and Homan (2000), many non-profit and public-sector 
organisations are not able to state goals clearly due to conflicting stakeholder demands. 
Measurement of quality of service is difficult to interpret on a financial form. As a 
result, Thorpe and Homan (2000) illustrate that problems in employing performance 
incentives occur because of (1) the use of wrong measures or targets, which influences 
overall performance, and (2) inaccurate judgments by an assessor, which reduce 
employee motivation. Inappropriate system design between selection of performance 
measures and reward distort overall organisational performance (Lawson, 2000; 
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Blazovich, 2013), and the subjectivity of the incentive system can affect the motivation 
of employees (Ittner et al., 2003; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007, Franco and Santos 
et al., 2012). However, a number of researchers suggest a connection between 
performance measures and incentives in public-sector organisations, and some report 
the successful use of BSC. Even though the results of using performance based 
incentives are mixed, the majority of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development still have used monetary incentives in the public sector and 
the usage does not seem to be declining (Belle, 2015, p. 230). In addition, public sector 
organisations seem to continue their interest in linking monetary incentives and PMS 
(Belle, 2015). 
 
Apart from monetary incentives, Frey et al. (2013) suggest that non-monetary 
incentives such as awards or prizes can be integrated with performance measures to 
motivate   organisational   employees.   They   explain   that   awards   ‘provide   positive  
feedback and social  recognition,’  and  are  suitable  for  public-sector organisations to use 
when avoiding demerits of monetary incentives (p. 962). According to Belle (2015, p. 
290), the use of non-monetary   incentives   can   overcome   ‘some   of   the   motivational  
drawbacks’   of  monetary incentives.  However, few studies exist on the influence of 
awards in public-sector organisations (Frey et al., 2013).  
 
It has been suggested, in the discussion above, that PMS are of high importance in the 
public sector. Studying the adoption of PMS such as BSC and EVA, and the 
relationship between PMS and incentive systems in Thai SOEs, will be useful to further 
understanding the organisational and individual actions and responses toward these 
systems (chapters 6 and 7). The next section discusses PMS literature from the public 
sector. 
 
2.8 Public Sector  
The public sector is usually defined to include traditional non-profit, social 
entrepreneurial organisations and SOEs believed to combine social and financial 
missions (Grimes, 2010). Linna et al. (2010, p. 301) state that the productivity of public 
sector  is  as  important  to  a  country’s  economy  as  the  private  sector  because  the  ‘public  
sector   is   major   employer’,   ‘a   major   provider   of   services   in   economy   particularly  
business  services…and  social  services’,  and  ‘a  consumer  of  tax  resources’.  In  order  to  
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meet these demands, public-sector organisations have employed various private-sector 
management techniques and strategies to cope with competitive markets (Spekle and 
Verbeteen, 2014).  
 
2.8.1 Performance measurement systems in public sector organisations 
PMS gained attention in public-sector organisations internationally over the past two 
decades (McAdam et al., 2005; Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). McAdam et al. (2005) 
argue that the public sector devotes increasing resources and attention toward PMS. 
Performance measurement is part of the public management model that helps an 
organisation reform by setting goals for improvements to efficiency and effectiveness 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000; Kaplan, 2001; Pollitt, 2006; Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). 
However, Spekle and Verbeeten (2014, p. 132) point out two problems concerning 
public-sector   PMS:   ‘the   role   of   PMS   in   accountability   and   incentive   provision   is   too  
narrow’,  and  ‘the  goals  of  many  public  sector  organisations are notoriously ambiguous 
and the selection of appropriate performance measures is known to be difficult in this 
sector’. 
 
Many public-sector organisations implemented PMS adopted from private-sector 
management tools, but such adaptions caused a number of difficulties regarding a 
variety of stakeholders in comparison to private-sector organisations, which focus 
primarily on customers and shareholders (Linna et al., 2010). Dealing with a variety of 
stakeholders poses many challenges to public-sector organisations. According to 
Verbeeten (2008) two stakeholders that influence public-sector organisations most are 
various professionals and the state. Verbeeten (2008) and Tillema et al. (2010) support 
this idea, explaining that the interests of various stakeholders in the public sector vary, 
and hence sometimes conflict. Therefore, the complexity of relationships in the public 
sector leads to difficulties of performance measurement (Smith, 1990; Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998). According to Talbot (2005), some researchers criticise the use of PMS  
in public-sector organisations due to the difficulty of providing a complete picture of 
complex activities. Complexity also causes information overload and increased 
organisational costs (Talbot, 2005). 
 
Barnow (1992) explains that the primary role of a PMS in the public sector is enhancing 
service quality. According to Tillema et al. (2010), the increasing power of stakeholders 
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demands that public organisations perform better and offer improved quantity and 
quality to customers has put an increased emphasis on the use of PMS. However, Talbot 
(2005) explains that public-sector organisations have no incentive to improve service 
due to administrative control mechanisms in monopoly public services. According to 
Modell (2005), another impact of PMS in public-sector organisations is an 
improvement of accountability. However, Modell (2005) points out that many public-
sector organisations claim that this is difficult since they deal with many stakeholders 
and provide services to many customers. Therefore, public-sector organisations should 
develop methodologies such as multidimensional PMS that enable them to make 
strategic directions clearer to achieve better accountability (Modell, 2005).  
 
One challenge that public-sector organisation often experience is a lack of long-term 
continuity. According to Boxall and Purcell (2011), in public sector organisations, the 
frequent change of governments can lead to the change of policies, strategies and senior 
leaders. Therefore, leadership and culture in the public sector become dynamic, making 
long-term plans and strategies impossible to implement. Techniques such as PMS help 
instil long-term continuity in this sector. 
   
From a variety of studies of PMS in public-sector organisations, Rantanen et al. (2007) 
provide a clear suggestion for problems experienced by these organisations. Rantanen et 
al.’s   (2007)   findings   support   other   studies   on  many   stakeholder   problems.  From  case  
studies of the Finnish public sector, they identify the primary reasons for problems with 
PMS from factors influencing the design and implementation of the systems (Table 
2.2).  
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Table 2.2: Classification of the underlying reasons and practical problems in the 
performance measurement of public sector organisations 
 Characteristics of public sector 
organisations (underlying 
reasons) 
Problems in performance 
measurement (outcomes 
caused by the reasons) 
Factors affecting the design of a 
PMS 
Many stakeholders with 
conflicting needs 
Difficulties in solving the 
conflicts between the needs of 
different stakeholders (i.e. not 
clear what should be measured0 
Undefined end products and 
goals (efficiency vs. 
effectiveness) 
Difficulties in target setting (i.e. 
not clear what the goal of the 
operations should be) 
Factors affecting the 
implementation of a PMS 
Lack of ownership of the 
property 
Representatives of different 
stakeholder groups influence the 
development of individual 
measures on a too detailed level. 
The personnel does not 
understand the objectives of the 
measure development 
Poor management skills Too many responsible persons in 
the measurement development 
lead to non-responsibility 
The personnel do not see the 
usefulness of the project for their 
work and  ignore or resist it. 
Overlapping projects hamper the 
measurement project because 
they take resources 
Source: Rantanen et al. (2007, p. 428) 
 
2.8.2 Performance measurement systems in SOEs 
There  is  little  research  on  PMS  in  SOEs  (O’Connor  et  al.,  2006).  Paton  (2003)  argues  
that SOEs face complex problems, with no clear resolutions. According to Straub et al. 
(2010), many SOEs are adopting PMS because such systems are believed to help them 
improve transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness (De Bruijn, 2007). However, Straub 
et al. (2010) also point out that although an ideal set of measures covers performance 
aspects and accountability, SOEs still have a problem with transparency measures due 
to the dynamic environment. Radin (2000) explains that the structures of many SOEs 
make transparency within them extremely  difficult  to  achieve.  O’Connor  et  al.  (2006,  p.  
157) claim that most SOEs in China developed a great deal more independence because 
of  China’s  ‘massive  liberalisation  program’  and  subsequent  competitiveness  of  markets.  
Both the forces of liberalisation and political restrictions in China led to development of 
PMS   in   Chinese   SOEs   (O’Connor   et   al.,   2006).   Manir   et   al.   (2013)   investigated  
institutional factors that influence changes to PMS in a state-owned, Pakistani bank. 
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According to Munir et al. (2013), changes were driven by interactions among 
motivators, catalysts, and facilitators (Kasurinen, 2002).  
 
PMS have been employed in SOEs in Thailand. This literature review facilitates the 
understanding of PMS in public sector organisations and helps researchers identify 
characteristics and perceptions of employees toward PMS, and understand pressures 
from various institutional demands and competing institutional logics (chapter 3) in 
empirical chapters.  
 
2.9 Conclusion  
This chapter provides a literature review on PMS as a domain of study, outlining four 
parts. First are PMS, discussing definitions and terms used in the field, and factors 
influencing development and consequences. Second, the chapter provides reviews of 
the BSC, EVA, and incentive systems to provide context and background for the 
systems described later, which are used in the case-study organisations. Third, the 
application of PMS in the public sector is discussed to provide a background to the 
research conducted in the present study and reported in later chapters. To supplement 
the limited studies of SOEs, especially in developing countries, the researcher 
investigates Thai SOEs and focuses on the influence of institutional logics. The 
research also aims to explain how the case organisations have responded to institutional 
complexity through an explanation of the adoption and the nature of this adoption of 
PMS. The next chapter reviews literature on institutional theory and the concept of 
institutional logic in more detail as well as provides examples of relevant empirically 
based institutional theory studies of public sector organisations with a focus on PMS. 
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Chapter 3 
Institutional Theory: The Influence of Institutional 
Logics 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Institutional theory has been employed in many studies of performance measurement 
systems (PMS) (Modell, 2009). A number of these studies examine the key issues that 
have been identified in the use of PMS in public sector organisations. The purpose of 
this chapter is to outline the theoretical constructs, institutional theory and institutional 
logics that have been used to explore Thai State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in this 
study. The aim of this research is to explain how institutional complexity has affected 
the implementation of PMSs in these SOEs.  The PMS implementations examined 
include Economic Value Management (EVM) and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) systems 
as well as individual BSC and incentive systems. This chapter aims to provide a broad 
background of institutional theory in order to outline institutional logics and the 
frameworks used in this study. The chapter also presents the institutional perspective 
focused on PMS in public sector organisations. This includes a consideration of 
Modell’s   (2009)   review   of   performance   measurement   research using Institutional 
Theory and examples of institutional theory based empirical research in public sector 
organisations. 
 
The next part of the chapter presents a background for institutional theory and an 
overview of old institutional theory and neo-institutional theory. This is followed by a 
discussion  of  Scott’s   three  pillars   to   explain   the   link  between   institutional   theory   and  
organisational culture. Next, institutional logics and the framework employed in this 
study are presented.  The next two sections present a review of organisational responses 
as well as an overview of decoupling and loose coupling. Then, the chapter provides a 
review of PMS research that considers institutional perspectives in the public sector and 
case studies from previous literature. Finally, the chapter summary is provided. 
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3.2 Institutional Theory Background   
According to Scott (2014), institutional theory was developed in order to represent a 
robust sociological perspective on organisational behaviour and has been widely used in 
various fields such as political science and economics (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
Zucker (1987) indicates that institutional theory is mainly focused on the environmental 
factors that are experienced by organisations, including governments. Institutional 
theorists emphasise the extent to which the social and cultural elements of any society, 
such as the rules, norms, and values (Modell, 2009), might influence an organisation 
rather  than  ‘the  task  and  technical  elements’  (Ashworth  et  al.,  2007). 
 
According to Oliver (1991), institutional studies have developed explanations and 
theories for the various types of institutional processes that are involved in the 
organisations’   structural   characteristics   as  well   as   organizational   change. Institutional 
theory has been applied in various disciplinary fields (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) 
to   interpret   the   ‘organisation   processes   of   continuity   and   change’   (Ashworth   et   al.,  
2007, p. 166).   
 
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in order to 
understand the similarity and stability of organisational arrangements, institutional 
theory provides an alternative rational explanation of organisational forms. According 
to Oliver (1991), institutional theory presumes that organisations are exposed to 
different types of institutions. Therefore, in order to survive, organisations must be 
responsive to institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977); however, their 
responses might vary depending on the organisation and time period (Oliver, 1991). 
Accordingly, with the specific institutional conditions in each organisation, institutional 
theory may be not suitable to investigate in the view of larger cases (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). On the other hand, other institutional theorists still believe that this 
theory can be used to interpret organisational change phenomena; for instance Seo and 
Creed (2002), Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005), Ribeiro and Scapens (2006).  
 
Institutional theory has been adapted over a considerable period of time and developed 
into two broadly recognized and distinct areas: old institutional theory and neo-
institutional theory. According to Ahmed and Scapens (2003), due to their focus on the 
importance of institutions and institutional intra-relations, both theories have been used 
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in organisational research to provide insights into the adoption of new management or 
accounting instruments. 
 
3.2.1 Old institutional theory  
According to Scott (2014), old institutional theory was originally derived from 
Selznick’s   (1948)   institutional process concept. Selznick (1949) pays particular 
attention   to   the   dynamics   of   organisational   changes   such   as   ‘organisational   values’,  
‘organisational-environment  interactions’,  ‘coalition’,  ‘influence  and  power’,  ‘informal  
structure’   and   ‘conflict   and   interest’   at   a   micro-institutional environment level 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, p. 1031). This later became known as the 
‘institutionalisation   process’.      According   to   Powell   and   DiMaggio   (1991,   p.   12);;  
research which employs old institutional theory,  for  example  Selznick’s  (1949)  study,  is  
often   ‘straightforwardly   political   in   its   analysis   of   group   conflicts   and   organisational  
strategy’.   Old   institutional   theory   identifies   that   ‘institutional   process’   come   from   ‘a  
result of political trade-offs and alliances’  of   the  constitutional   interests   (p.  12)  which  
are  formed  by  ‘face-to-face  interaction’  as  well  as  informal  interaction  (p.  13).  In  other  
words, this theory tends to explain the institutionalisation process as well as the 
relationship between actions   and   institutions   through   ‘the   shadow   land   of   informal  
interaction’  (Selznick,  1949,  p.  260).  For  example,  Burns  and  Scapens   (2000)  use  old  
institutional theory to explain the dynamic process involving the changes of managerial 
accounting by employing the concepts of rules and routines. They conclude that 
organisations tend to accept new rules depending on the consistency level with their 
existing   routines,   which   means   that   a   certain   ‘path-dependency’   occurs   in   the  
institutionalization process (p. 12).  
 
3.2.2 Neo-institutional theory  
Neo-institutional theory was introduced by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983). According to Modell (2009), neo-institutional theory or neo-
institutional sociology has been developed over the past two decades. Unlike old 
institutional theory, neo-institutional theory highlights the dynamic of organisational 
changes at the macro-level (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Kasperskaya, 2008). According 
to Arafa (2012), neo-institutional theory focuses on studying institutional behaviour in a 
given organisation as it is embedded in the institutional environment. Kasperskays 
(2008, p. 365) also adds that neo-institutional theory has been employed in order to 
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understand  the  ‘uniformity’  and  ‘similarity’  of  the  organisational changes in particular 
institutional conditions.  
 
According to Kasperskaya (2008), neo-institutional theorists are also concerned with 
the emergence and diffusion of new management instruments leading to the adaptation 
of organisational behaviours and the effect this has on other organisations within the 
same populations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), neo-institutional theory explains that an 
organisation adopts other organisational practices or legitimated elements because of 
the pressures forced by the surrounding environment. Of the two types of isomorphism, 
‘competitive   isomorphism’  and  ‘institutional   isomorphism’,   their  study  focuses  on   the  
institutional  form.  Institutional  isomorphism  is  when  ‘organisational characteristics are 
modified  in  the  direction  of  increasing  compatibility  with  environmental  characteristics’  
as  well  as  a  force  that  causes  ‘one  unit  in  a  population  to  resemble  other  units  that  face  
the  same  set  of  environment  conditions’  (DiMaggio  and  Powell, 1983, p. 149). In other 
words, to seek legitimacy, organizational structures tend to change into forms that fit 
with their interpretation of institutional requirements. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
define three forces driving institutionalisation: coercive isomorphism, mimetic 
isomorphism and normative isomorphism.   
 
Coercive isomorphism results from external pressures that are exerted by other 
organisations such as governments and regulatory agencies, where legitimacy is 
attained when organisations adopt the structures or systems that satisfy institutional 
requirements (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). According to Scott (1987, p. 502), 
institutional   theorists   have   paid   more   attention   to   ‘authority   relations:   the   ability   of  
organisations, especially public  organisations,  to  rely  on  legitimate  coercion’.  Coercive  
pressures present the legal and regulative requirements that are imposed on an 
organisation.   Furthermore,   these   pressures   may   also   come   from   ‘contractual  
obligations’   with   other   actors   or   organisations (Ashworth et al. 2007, p. 167) while 
nonconformity to these pressures may result in an organisation facing a legal liability 
(Arafa, 2012).   
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DiMaggio and Powell (1983) state that mimetic isomorphism occurs under uncertain 
circumstances. High levels of uncertainty encourage organizations to imitate leading 
organisations as well as structures or systems perceived as more successful in order to 
enhance their legitimacy. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Abrahamson (1996) 
comment that when mimetic pressures occur  organisations  may  adopt  others’  structures  
or systems without any concrete evidence as to their benefits. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe normative isomorphism as the process that arises 
from professional rules or standards. The influence of a certain profession as well as 
professional associations or networks can influence organisational behaviours and 
structures (Edelman et al., 1992; Ashworth et al., 2007). In other words, in order to gain 
legitimacy, organisations are expected to conform to relevant professional standards as 
well as adopt structures or systems accredited by professional bodies (Ashworth et al., 
2007). 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) conclude that under uncertain and ambiguous 
circumstances, in order to survive, organisations will end up with isomorphic structures 
that are perceived to be more legitimate. Consequently, neo-institutional theorists 
believe that due to the desire to fit with an external environment, organisations with the 
same conditions as well as institutional environments tend to employ similar practices, 
which  lead  them  to  ‘become  isomorphic  with  each  other’  (Kostava  and  Roth,  2002,  p.  
215; see also Martinez and Dacin, 1999). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
over time, this isomorphism leads organisations in the same field into a homogenization 
process   and   traps   them   in   an   ‘iron   cage’.   Later   on,   Ashworth   et   al.   (2007)   re-
investigated   the   ‘iron   cage’  using   their  definition  of   conformity   to   support  DiMaggio  
and   Powell’s   (1983)   study,   stating   that   over   time,   ‘organisations are moving in the 
direction   that   is   consistent   with   isomorphic   pressures’   (compliance)   to   ‘the   extent   to  
which  all  organisations  in  a  field  resemble  each  other  closely  (convergence)’  (p.  169). 
 
The main criticism of this theory is that early neo-institutional research was too focused 
upon isomorphism as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and tried to explain 
‘how  practices  spread  throughout  various  fields’  (Lounsbury,  2008,  p.  350).    This  led  to  
‘a   narrow   conceptualisation   of   institutional   dynamics’   in   explaining   ‘the   diffusion   of  
new  practices’  (Lounsbury,  2008)  as  well  as  weakening  the  theory’s  analytical  power  to  
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explain the internal dynamics of organisational changes (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996). 
 
On the other hand, Hasselbladh and Kalinikos (2000) argue that most neo-institutional 
research tends to be too idealistic and broad. For example, in explaining the changes of 
practices in organisations, research has tended to focus on the existence of inertia rather 
than how the processes of institutionalization help organisations to change or adapt to 
environmental factors more quickly (Oliver, 1991).  According to Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996), research in this field cannot explain the difference between successful 
and unsuccessful adopters even when they are faced with similar conditions.  
 
Hasselbladh and Kalinikos (2000, p. 700) suggest that one way to overcome these 
limitations is for research in this field to focus more on micro-mechanisms of social 
construction,   cognitive   meaning,   ‘rationalized   beliefs’   and   ‘standardized   scheme   of  
actions’  rather  than  ‘the  bird’s  eye  view’  of  the  field.  An  alternative  way  is  to  use  other  
theories, such as resource-based theory, path dependency theory and actor-network 
theory (Oliver, 1997; Callon, 1986; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2008; 
Modell 2009) to support and complement institutional theory. 
 
Alongside institutional isomorphism, neo-institutional theorists have also given 
attention to how organisations established legitimacy in order to respond to institutional 
pressures. Meyer   (1992,   p.   140)   defines   institutionalisation   as   ‘characterized   by   the  
elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organisations must conform if 
they are to receive support and legitimacy from the environment’. In other words, an 
organisation changes their internal characteristics in order to seek legitimacy from as 
well as to conform to the expectations of stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ashworth et al., 2007). Therefore, in this part, the review 
of legitimacy is provided. 
 
According to Scott et al. (2000, p. 237), in order to survive, organisations not only 
require   assets   such   as   ‘material   resources   and   information’,   but   also   ‘social  
acceptability  and  credibility’  (legitimacy). Suchman (1995) points out that a definition 
of   legitimacy   depends   on   a   researcher’s   perception.  Therefore,   he   provides   a   broader  
definition of organisational legitimacy where  
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‘Legitimacy  is  a  generalized  perception  or  assumption  that  the  actions  
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed  system  of  norms,  values,  beliefs,  and  definitions.’  (p.  574) 
 
Scott (2001, p. 77) also suggests that legitimacy based on institutional isomorphism 
comes   from   ‘conforming   to   common definition of situation, frame of reference, or a 
recognizable  role  or  structural  template’  (p.  74).  Thus,  these  three  isomorphisms  create  
different   forms   of   legitimacy   that   are   ‘legally   sanctioned’   (coercive   pressure),  
‘comprehensible,   recognisable   and   culturally   supported’   (mimetic   pressure)   and  
‘morally  govern[ed]’  (normative  pressure). 
 
Neo-institutional theory has paid attention to the importance of legitimacy as opposed 
to economic efficiency as an explanation of organisational structure. Moreover, Siverbo 
and Johansson (2006) suggest that institutional theorists propose that there is no 
economic rationale behind the decision-making on organisational structures but are 
convinced that a desire for legitimacy is a driver of change in organisations. According 
to Meyer and Rowan (1977), under certain conditions, such as the inadequacy of 
adopted instruments, organisations strive for legitimacy; accordingly, they tend to 
employ instruments that are acceptable to stakeholders. Meyer and Rowan (1997) also 
point out that instead of following through on the intention of improving organisational 
efficiency, organisations tend to adopt new management instruments ceremonially. 
Covaleski  et  al.  (1996,  p.  11)  state  that  ‘ceremonial  means  [are  used]  for  symbolically 
demonstrating  an  organisations’  commitment  to  rational  course  of  actions’.  It  is  argued  
that  such  ceremonial  adoption  can  construct  the  ‘right’  organisational  image,  ‘legitimize  
them  in  their  social  contexts’  and  may  help  organisations  to  have  ‘privilege[d] access to 
resources’  (Kasperskaya,  2008,  p.  365).     
 
Neo-institutional theory has been criticized for ignoring economic rationales. Some 
studies (e.g. Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Modell, 2002) suggest that institutional 
theorists need to further combine economic rationality and legitimacy in their 
consideration of organisational behaviours, as under competitive pressure there is not 
necessarily   a   conflict   between   ‘striving   for   legitimacy’   and   ‘striving   for   economic  
efficiency’  (James,  2009,  p.  367).  According to Ax and Bjornenak (2005), the bundling 
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of several management instruments in an organisation may be a consequence of a desire 
for both legitimacy and efficiency. Also, Scott (2014) claims that the early works of 
neo-institutional theory are limited within the field of their studies such as social 
science, sociology. Therefore, he has developed the three pillars framework (section 
3.3) that can explain the concepts from the diverse fields together (Scott, 2014). 
 
3.3 Scott’s  Three  Pillars 
Scott’s   (2014) three-pillar framework reinforces the link between institutional theory 
and organisational culture as manifest in institutional logics (see also Thornton, 2002), 
which is a focus of this study. Therefore, this section presents a brief summary of the 
framework. Scott (2014) considers the origin and various strands that make up modern 
institutional  theory  by  providing  an  ‘omnibus  concept  of  institutions’  as   
 
‘Institutions   comprise   regulative,   normative   and   cultural-cognitive 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide  stability  and  meaning  to  social  life.’  (p.  56) 
 
Scott (2014, p. 59) concludes from literature in the field that the following three pillars, 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive,  are  ‘identified  as  making up or supporting 
institutions’.   On   the   other   hand,   these   three   pillars   can   be   used   to   explain   how  
organisational  behaviours  have  been  shaped.  Scott  (2014,  p.  59)  sees  three  pillars  as  ‘a  
continuum  moving  ‘from  the  conscious  to  unconscious  and  from  the  legally enforced to 
the taken-for-granted’  (Hoffman  1997,  p.  36),  and  the  pillars  do  not  work  in  isolation.  
Scott’s  three  pillars  are  shown  in  the  table  3.1: 
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Table  3.1:  Scott’s  three  pillars:  Varying  emphases 
Pillar Regulative Normative Cultural- Cognitive 
Basis of 
compliance 
Expedience Social obligation Taken for 
grantedness, Shared 
understanding 
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding 
expenditures 
Constitutive scheme 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicator Rules, law, 
sanctions 
Certification, 
accreditation 
Common beliefs, 
Shared logics of 
action, Isomorphism 
Affect Fear Guilt/ 
Innocence 
Shame/Honor Certainty/Confusion 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Comprehensible 
recognizable, 
Culturally supported 
Source: Scott (2014, p. 60) 
 
Scott  (2014,  p.  74)  employed  his  three  pillars  and  ‘the  basis  of  legitimacy’,  as  discussed  
above, to explain how organisations make decisions regarding the adoption of new 
instruments. Scott   (p.  95)  also   states   that   ‘the   institutions  …  are  conveyed  by  various  
types  of  vehicles  or  carriers’  where  ‘the  carriers  are  important  in  considering  the  way  in  
which   institutions   change’.   The   relationships   between   the   three   pillars   and   the   four  
types of carriers – ‘symbolic  systems’,  ‘  relational  systems’,  ‘activities’  and  ‘artefacts’  – 
are identified in table 3.2. Furthermore, within the regulative pillar, an organisation is 
required to comply with laws and regulations. The normative pillar highlights the 
‘moral   base   for   assessing   legitimacy’,  which   leads   organisations   to   act   in   accordance  
with the expectations and obligations created from social values and norms.  
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Table  3.2:  Scott’s  three  pillars:  Carriers 
Pillar Regulative Normative Cultural- Cognitive 
Symbolic systems Rules 
Laws 
Values  
Expectation 
Standards 
Categories 
Typifications 
Schemas 
Frames 
Relational systems Governance 
systems 
Regimes  
Authority systems 
Structural 
isomorphism 
Identities 
Activities Monitoring 
Sanctioning 
Disrupting 
Roles, jobs 
Routines 
Habits 
Repertoires of 
collective action 
Predispositions 
Scripts 
Artefacts Objects complying 
with mandated 
specification 
Objects meeting, 
conventions, 
standards 
Objects possessing 
symbolic value 
Source: Scott (2014, p. 96) 
 
According to Scott (2014), a social actor considers appropriate actions or responses 
towards  a  given  situation  by  ignoring  their  own  interest.  This  is  referred  to  as  ‘the  logic  
of  the  appropriateness’
1 which  ‘grounds  action  in  a  normative  framework  that  considers  
one’s  relations  and  obligations  to  others  in  a  situation,  it  continues  to  maintain  the  old  
duality between interests and norms and does not specify how norms themselves are 
likely  to  vary  with  situation  or  cultural  content’  (Thornton  et  al.,  2012,  p.  30).  Lastly, 
the cultural-cognitive pillar refers to the actions taken by social actors as a result of 
their  ‘taken-for-granted’  scheme.  Thornton  et  al.  (2012)  argue  that  ‘the  actions  of  social  
actor’  or  ‘individual  behaviour’  can  lead  to  institutional  persistence or change.  
 
Scott’s  three  pillars  framework  is  an  integration  of  old  institutional  and  neo-institutional 
theory.  Each pillar provides a different rationale regarding sources of legitimacy 
(Thornton   et   al.,   2012).   Scott’s   three   pillars   framework   is   ‘intended to develop a 
typology of literature on institutional approaches and carriers rather than achieving a 
theoretical   integration   among   them’   (Thornton   et   al.,   2012,   p.   40).   Recently,   many  
institutional researchers have employed the concept of institutional logics, which is seen 
                                                          
1
 The logic of appropriateness  is  a  perspective  on  individual’s  appropriated  actions  which  are  seen  as  
‘natural,  rightful,  expected  and  legitimate’  within  a  given  situation  (March  and  Olsen,  2004,  p.  3).  
Therefore, the logic of appropriateness is different from the institutional logic discussed in the next 
section. 
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to respond to criticisms of institutional theory and enable multi-level organisational 
analysis.  
 
3.4 Institutional Logics 
According to Lounsbury (2008), neo-institutional researchers have recently begun to 
shift away from the popular focus on isomorphism by revisiting the concept of 
rationality under neo-institutional theory suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977). He 
suggests this is because organisational studies using neo-institutional theory suffer from 
several limitations including   a   lack   of   attention   to   ‘the  micro   processes   of   changes’,  
which are driven by a group of individuals within an organisation to confront 
institutional environments. As a consequence, the concept of institutional logics has 
recently begun to attract attention in accounting research (Lounsbury, 2008; Reay and 
Hinings,  2009;;  Rautiainen  and  Jarvenpaa,  2014)  as  well  as  become  ‘one  of  the  fastest-
growing  areas  of  scholarship  in  organisational  theory’  (Greenwood  et  al.,  2011,  p.  321).  
According to Gawer and Phillips (2013, p. 1038), one reason why institutional logics 
have  been  of  so  much  interest  to  institutional  researchers  lately  is  because  ‘they  are  so  
central to many institutional phenomena which include the boundaries of fields, the 
identities of field members, their values and interests, and the nature of their 
interactions.’ 
 
3.4.1 The definition of institutional logic 
The introduction of institutional logic as a perspective in organisational studies dates 
back   to   1991   when   Friedland   and   Alford’s   (1991)   study employed the fundamental 
works   from   Powell   and   DiMaggio’s   (1987)   book,   ‘The   New   Institutionalism   in  
Organisational   Analysis’.   Friedland   and   Alford   (1991,   p.   232)   state   that   ‘the   central  
institutions  of  contemporary  society  …shape  individual  preferences  and organisational 
interests   as  well   as   the   repertoire   of   behaviours   by  which   they  may   attain   them’   and  
‘these   institutions   are   potentially   contradictory   and   hence   make   multiple   logics  
available   to   individuals   and   organisations’.   Neo-institutional theorists have 
subsequently  used  Alford  and  Friedland’s  concept  of  institutional  logics  to  expand  ‘the  
scope  of  institutional  analysis’  by  focusing  more  on  social  actors  (Lounsbury,  2008,  p.  
351). Many researchers in organisational studies have expanded this concept (e.g. 
Thornton, 2004; Scott et al., 2000). Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p. 804) provide an 
early definition of institutional logics:  
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‘…   the   socially   constructed,   historical   pattern   of   material   practices,  
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individual produce 
and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space and 
provide  meaning  to  their  social  reality.’ 
 
Thornton subsequently (2002, p. 82) provides a clearer definition of institutional logic:  
 
‘the  norms,  values,  and  beliefs  that structure the cognition of actors in 
organizations and provide a collective understanding of how strategic 
interests  and  decisions  are  formulated.’ 
 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008, p. 101-102) argue that even though there are many 
definitions of institutional   logics,   the  core  concept   is  similar  and  helps   researchers  ‘to  
understand   individual   and   organisational   behaviour,   …and   [that]   this   institutional  
context   both   regularizes   behaviour   and  provides   opportunity   for   agency   and   change’.  
The behaviour of individual social actors in a group may vary due to differences in 
beliefs, values and norms (Thornton, 2002; Scott, 2014). In other words, the concept of 
institutional   logics   places   an   emphasis   on   taking   ‘the   micro-processes of changes in 
practices and practice variation’  into  account  (Ancelin-Bourguignon, 2013, p. 207).   
 
According to Thornton et al. (2012), the concept of institutional logics is not limited 
solely to conformity and legitimacy like neo-institutional theory, as it suggests that the 
legitimacy of an organisation does not necessary lead to conformity or isomorphism, 
since organisations must respond to conflicting demands from multiple logics 
differently,   and   it   also   depends   on   how   a   ‘social   actor’   interprets   and   combines   the  
logics. 
 
3.4.2 Multiple institutional logics in organisations  
There are institutional logics at different institutional levels. In early research, the 
concept of institutional logics was employed to explain institutional changes and 
isomorphism (e.g. Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, and Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
However, recently the research in the field has given more attention to institutional 
diversity.  Friedland and Alford (1991), Scott (2014) and Dacin et al. (2011) state that 
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organisations are confronted with multiple logics,   which   can   create   ‘diversity   in  
practice’  (Lounsbury,  2008)  as  well  as  reflect  the  different  logics  in  their  structure  and  
practices (Greenwood et al., 2011; Besharov and Smith, 2014). According to Thornton 
(2004) and Greenwood et al. (2011), these co-existing multiple logics create enormous 
ambiguity, therefore in order to shape the complexity within organisations, the logics 
need to be blended or newly created and new practice variants are emerging 
continuously (Lounsbury, 2008).  
 
After the introduction of  ‘institutional  logics’  by  Friedland  and  Alford  (1991),  recently,  
the research into institutional perspective has given attention to institutional logics by 
focusing on how organisations respond to complex situations experienced from multiple 
institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). According to Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 
318), organisations are typically faced with multiple logics, which may or may not be 
compatible. Lander et al. (2013) state that competing logics present contradicting 
demands; hence   the   ‘degree   of   recognition   awarded   to   each   logic   varies   between  
organisations. The incompatibility of different logics can generate challenges and 
tensions to organisations as well as lead to institutional change (Lounsbury, 2007; Dunn 
and Jones, 2010).  
 
In   Greenwood   et   al.’s   (2011)   review,   the   term   ‘incompatible’   refers   to   ‘contested,  
conflicting   and   competing’   (p.   332)   logics.   They   conclude   that   recent   studies   of  
incompatible  logics  are  based  on  two  approaches.  The  first  is  Pache  and  Santos’s  (2010, 
p. 466) approach, which focuses on conflict over different goals or means that can lead 
‘organisational   members   to   overtly   recognize   the   incompatibility   of   the   demands   on  
goals,  which  may,  in  turn,  jeopardise  institutional  support’.  The  other  is  Goodrick  and 
Salancik’s   (1996)   study,   which   emphasises   ‘the   specificity   of   logics’   that   affect   the  
degree   of   organisational   discretion,   as   ‘the   greater   the   ambiguity   (in   goals   and  
practices),   the   greater   the   scope   for   discretionary   action’   (Greenwood   et   al.,   2011,   p. 
333). 
 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011), recent works on multiple institutional logics 
focus on the competition between two logics as well as shifts in institutional logics at 
the field and organisational levels. Competing institutional logics occur where no single 
logic becomes dominant in the organisation (e.g. Reay and Hinings, 2009; Dunn and 
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Jones, 2010). In these circumstances, competing institutional logics in the organisational 
field give rise to different sets of socially constructed ideas where social actors have 
different interests and ways to legitimate their ideas (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). 
According to Reay and Hinings (2005), many scholars have given attention to the 
institutional   logics   that  can  shift  over   time,  however  ‘these  shifts tend to be treated as 
exogenous  shocks  that  separate  eras  of  equilibrium’  (Lounsbury,  2007,  p.  302).   
 
Apart from the study of institutional logics in the organisational field and organisation 
levels, another area that many researchers have shown interest  in  is  ‘the  examination  of  
how  individuals  draw  on  multiple  societal  logic  to  initiate  change’  (Gawer  and  Phillips,  
2013, p. 1038). According to Friedland and Alford (1991), early applications of 
institutional theory employed embedded agency theory to explain the social structure on 
three   levels:   ‘individuals   competing   and   negotiating,   organizational   conflict   and  
coordination,   and   institutions   in   contradiction   and   interdependency’   (Thornton   and  
Ocasio, 2008, p. 104). According to Holm (1995, p. 398), the problem of embedded 
agency  is  ‘How  can  actors  change  institutions  if  their  actions,  intentions,  and  rationality  
are  all  conditioned  by  the  very  institution  they  wish  to  change?’    Thornton  and  Ocasio  
(2008, p. 115) claim that the institutional logic can solve this problem because they can 
be   characterized   by   ‘cultural,   differentiation,   fragmentation   and   contradiction’.      
According   to   Thornton   and   Ocasio   (2008,   p.   11),   ‘logics   shape   individual   and  
organisation   action’  where   ‘individuals   are  members   of  multiple social groups with a 
collective  identity’  which  later  develops  into  institutional  logic  embedded  by  the  group.  
The behaviours of groups of individuals (social actors) vary from each other due to their 
different beliefs, values and norms (Thornton, 2002; Scott, 2014). Many institutional 
researchers   also   try   to   examine   the   ‘actors’   roles   and   their   rationales’   in   the  
institutionalization process (e.g. Change, 2006; Hopper and Major, 2007).  
 
Many scholars in this field define an organisation that embodies two or more 
institutional logics at its core logics as a hybrid organisation (Battilana and Dorado, 
2010, Pache and Santos, 2013a; Besharov and Smith, 2014).  According to Pache and 
Santos (2013a), hybrid organisations can take different forms such as social enterprises 
(Pache and Santos, 2013b), public-private partnerships (Jay, 2013), biotechnology 
companies (Powell and Sandholtz, 2012) and medical schools (Dunn and Jones, 2010). 
This study explores Thai SOEs as hybrid organisations whose goal is to serve the 
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community   as   well   as   to   do   business,   and   face   ‘institutional   complexity’   (see   next  
section)   institutional   logics.   This   is   similar   to   Pache   and   Santos’s   (2013b)   study   of  
social enterprises, which found that these organisations have to deal with market logic 
as well as social welfare logics. Also, according to Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 332), 
some literature in this field shows that the combination of different logics can create 
‘hybrid   organisational   form’   (Pache   and   Santos,   2010),   ‘hybrid   logics’   (Glynn   and 
Lounsbury,  2005),  hybrid  practices  and  ‘hybrid  identities’.   
 
3.5 Institutional Complexity 
Complexity appears to be a relatively new concept employed within institutional studies 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). According to Greenwood et al. (2011), the complexity of 
institutional processes and their influences on organisations is central to many studies. 
They also state that institutional complexity occurs (is a situation) when an organisation 
has to cope with different demands, goals and practices coming from multiple logics. 
 
 Meyer and Rowan (1977), for instance, suggest that organisations may be faced with 
social and commercial expectations that may not be compatible. Scott (1991, p. 167) 
points out that organisations encounter many institutional environments   and   ‘some  
would-be   sources   of   rationalized   myths   may   be   in   competition   if   not   in   conflict.’  
However, the early studies focus mainly on the ways in which institutional forces affect 
how organisations shape or conduct themselves in a way that is similar to those 
practices in their organisational field (Greenwood et al., 2011).   
 
According   to   Greenwood   et   al.   (2011,   p.   323)   ‘organisations   face   institutional  
complexity whenever they confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple 
institutional  logics’  and so far the literature on multiple institutional logics has focussed 
on organisations enduring institutional complexity such as is evident from research in 
the health care sector (Reay and Hinings, 2005, 2009), educational services and 
professional services (Thornton et al., 2005, Lounsbury, 2007). There are other limited 
studies elsewhere in the other types of public sector (Rautianen and Jarvenpaa 2012; 
Pache and Santos, 2013b).  So far, the studies of institutional logics tend to focus on 
these type of organisations  that  ‘tend  to  be  motivated  and  conditioned’  by  several  logics.   
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Greenwood et al. (2011) reviewed literature in this field in order to understand the 
‘strategies’  employed  by  organisations  that  confront  multiple  institutional  logics  as  well  
as how   multiple   logics   affect   hybrid   organisations’   structures   and   practices.   They  
propose the institutional complexity framework as shown below. 
 
Figure 3.1: Institutional complexity 
 
Source: Greenwood et al. (2011: p. 324) 
 
This study employs Greenwood et al.’s   (2011)   institutional   complexity   framework   in  
order to explore whether co-existing logics create institutional complexity in case study 
organisations, as well as to see how organisations respond to the complexity. This study 
also employs Greenwood et al.’s   (2011)   study   on   the   field   structure,   institutional  
complexity   and   organisational   responses   together   with   Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)  
framework, which will be presented later. 
 
3.5.1 Organisational field 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008, p. 106) state that ‘institutional   logic   may   develop   at   a  
variety   of   different   levels’,   for   example   sub-organisation, organisation, and 
organisational  field’.  The  organisational  field  layer  provides  ‘institutional  structure’  and  
context such as organisational size, culture and capacity to change as well as the impact 
of the institutional environment (Scott, 1995). In other words, the definition of 
institutional  field  is  ‘those  organisations  that,  in  aggregate,  constitute  a  recognized  area  
of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies 
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and   other   organisations   that   produce   similar   services   and   products’   (DiMaggio   and  
Powell, 1983, p. 148). According to Markowitz et al. (2011), many institutional 
theorists employ the concept of organisational fields in order to explain isomorphism 
and homogeneity rather than changes in organisations. However, this study employs 
this definition of institutional field to identify the field within which both case study 
organisations are located as well as their institutional logics (see chapter 5).   
 
Organisational actors play an important role in reproducing, modifying and 
reconstructing the model (Scott, 2014). Accordingly, organisations are shaped by 
imposed rules as well as environmental expectations and actors,  which  develop  ‘shared  
systems  of  meaning  within  an  organisational  field’  (Dambrin  et  al.,  2007,  p.  175).  Dacin  
et al. (2011) state that at the field-level,  the  ‘local’  logics  have  been  encoded  and  it  is  
common that organisations embody multiple institutional logics that are from their 
fields. Examples include market logic and social welfare logic in the field of social 
enterprises (Pache and Santos, 2013) and the logics of business-like healthcare and the 
logic of medical professionalism in medical schools (Reay and Hinings, 2009). 
 
To date, most of the literature on the pluralism of institutions in hybrid organisations 
focuses mainly on the organisational and field level perspectives (e.g. Lounsbury, 2002; 
Reay and Hinings, 2005; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Dunn and Jones, 2010; van 
Gestel   and   Hillebrand,   2011)   and   on   ‘the   conditions   that   promote   the   diffusion   and  
persistence  of   logics  at   that   level’   (Kodeih  and  Greenwood,  2014,  p.  9)  while   there   is  
little mention of how organisations incorporate multiple as well as competing 
institutional logics internally (Pache and Santos, 2013a, 2013b). Scott (2014) states that 
organisational fields are a significant level in studying institutional effects and the field 
complexity can affect the organisational structure and functioning (see also Scott and 
Meyer, 1983). Pache and Santos (2010, p. 457) state that organisational fields vary in 
‘the   complexity   of   resource   and   power   arrangements’   and   ‘the   configuration   of   their  
wider   structures   and   legitimating   rules’.  They also suggest that the divergence of 
organisational fields can affect how organisations respond to the institutional 
complexity  as   it   is   shaped  by  ‘the  structure  of   the  organisational   field’   (Greenwood  et  
al., 2011) and institutional logics from the field diffuse as a given entity to all field 
actors (Ashworth et al., 2009). Consequently, a lot of research has focused on the 
structure of the organisational field by trying to distinguish between mature and 
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emerging fields (Greenwood et al., 2011) and to   examine   ‘the   specific   relational  
linkages  and  patterns  of  activities  employing  network  and  other  methodologies’  (Scott,  
2014, p. 223). According to Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 335-336), emerging fields 
experience  uncertainty  in  ‘institutional  arrangements’,  which  leads  organisations  in  the  
field to be influenced by the actors and the logics outside the field, while mature fields 
are  ‘more  settled  and  stable’,  as  ‘such  fields  have  a  single  logic’  or  ‘a  dominant  logic’.    
While Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 337-337) argue that the distinction between mature 
and emerging fields is appropriate in the early institutional research, they recommend 
that   further   study   should   analyse   ‘the   relationship   between   field-level structures and 
institutional  complexity’. 
 
Greenwood et al. (2011) recommend future research focus on (1) the degree of 
‘fragmentation’,  which  refers  to  ‘the  number  of  uncoordinated  constituents  upon  which  
an   organisation   is   dependent   for   legitimacy   or   material   resources’,   (2)   ‘formal  
structuring/ rationalisation’   and   (3)   ‘centralisation’.   They   also   claim   that   a   ‘high  
fragmented  field’  occurs  when  institutional  logics  arise  from  the  conflicting  demands  of  
different institutions as well as the instability and inconsistent demands from institutions 
and that this can increase the degree of institutional complexity. On the other hand, 
when there are consistent and predictable sets of competing institutional demands, 
organisations can develop structures and practices to cope with such complexity.  Next, 
‘formal   structuring refers to whether those demands are formally or informally 
organised’   (Greenwood   et   al.,   2011,   p.   337).  Meyer   et   al.   (1987,   p.   188)   suggest   that  
organisations   are   surrounded   by   ‘formally   organised   interests,   sovereigns,   and  
constituency   groups’ and   ‘less   formally   organised   groups’.   The   impact   from   the   less  
formal groups, however, tends to be less than that from the formal groups (Greenwood 
et   al.,   2011).   Lastly,   ‘centralisation   concerns   the   hierarchical   power   structure   of  
institutional constituents’   (p.   337).   From   this,   a   highly   centralised   field   faces   less  
institutional complexity, as the conflicting demands have been resolved at a higher level 
(Greenwood   et   al.,   2011).   However,   Pache   and   Santos   (2010,   p.   458)   argue   that   ‘a  
structure that is particularly likely to impose conflicting institutional demands on 
organisations  is  one  where  a  highly  fragmented  field  is  ‘moderately  centralised’.  They  
define  moderately  centralised  fields  as  fields  ‘which  are  characterised  by  the  competing  
influence of multiple and misaligned players whose influence is not dominant yet is 
potent  enough   to  be   imposed  on  organisations’   (p.  458).   In   this   study,  we  employ   the  
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concept of field structure to identify the degree of institutional complexity facing Thai 
SOEs. 
 
3.5.2 Organisational attributes 
Recent studies relating to institutional fields have also focused attention on 
organisational factors that are associated with the adoption of new management 
practices. One of the important variables is organisational attributes. Scott (2014, p. 
204) states that organisations vary in many ways regarding organisational attributes. 
Early  studies  found  that  the  size  of  an  organisation  is  an  important  attribute,  as    ‘larger  
organisations tend to be more resource-rich’,   and   ‘more   differentiated’;;   on   the   other  
hand,  larger  organisations  are  also  ‘more  sensitive  to  environmental  changes’  and  ‘more  
visible   to   external   publics   including   government   bodies’   (p.   204).   According   to  
Greenwood  et  al.  (2011,  p.  319),  ‘institutional  logics  pass  through  organisational  fields’  
but the degree to which organisations experience institutional complexity varies 
depending  on  ‘organisational  attributes’  such  as  ‘structure,  ownerships,  governance  and  
identity’,  as  the  attributes  frame  ‘how  organisations  experience institutional complexity 
and  how  they  perceive  and  construct  the  repertoire  of  responses  available  to  them’.   
 
Structure refers to both formal and informal structures in organisations, which some 
researchers call networks (e.g. Lounsbury, 2001; Butler, 2003; Greenwood et al., 2011). 
The degree of complexity depends upon the powerful actors who are the supporters of 
institutional   logics   and   how   they   ‘represent’   them   through   the   network   in   their  
organisation (Pache and Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). Therefore, the network 
is an important mechanism facilitating whether a logic will be accepted or rejected by an 
organisation (Lounsbury, 2011). The key group of people in the network are referred to 
as  the  ‘social  referent’  group.  Their  power  in  the  network as well as the number of the 
referents can give voice to institutional logics in order to reinforce a particular demand 
in an organisation (Greenwood et al., 2011). Also, the social referent group as well as 
the characteristics of members in the network  can   impact   logic  compatibility,  as   ‘they  
selectively   draw   on,   interpret   and   enact’   the   logic   they   carry   (Besharov   and   Smith,  
2014). 
 
Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 344-345)  state  that  ‘organisational  responses  to  institutional  
complexity are likely to be reflexive  of  the  interest  of  the  most  influential  group’  and  the  
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organisation’s   tendency   to  be   affected  by   ‘its   dependence  upon   important   institutional  
actors’.  In  other  words,  organisations  tend  to  respond  to  the  demands  or  preferences  of  
the actors or institutions that are providing its critical resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Oliver, 1991; Lounsbury, 2001). Another organisational attribute is governance, 
which  focuses  on  ‘the  relationship  between  power  and   institutional  complexity’  where  
the actors in different positions and groups can use their power to influence 
‘organisational  decisions  and  strategies’  (Greenwood  et  al.,  2011,  p.  345)  as  well  as  how  
groups distribute their power (Pache and Santos, 2010). 
 
The last organisational attribute suggested by Greenwood et al. (2011) is identity, which 
is considered at two levels, institutional and organisational. Like the other attributes, 
identity shapes organisational behaviour regarding institutional complexity. The 
identity claimed by an organisation is their representation as a member of the group of 
the institutional environment that confronts them (Hsu et al., 2010) in order to gain 
legitimacy in that category (King et al., 2010). According to Greenwood et al. (2011), 
organisational behaviours also depend on how organisations value their identity or just 
‘take   it   for   granted’.  Moreover,   to   date,   researchers   have   little   knowledge   about   this  
organisation-shaping process (Greenwood et al., 2011). Regarding organisational 
identity, the focus is on how it can define the difference between organisations, 
‘especially   for   those   who   share   the   same   institutional   category’   (Greenwood   et   al.,  
2011, p. 347). According to Gynn (2008) the literature in this field is limited and most 
of it emphasises institutional isomorphism.  
 
3.5.3 Types of logic multiplicity within organisations 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 318), generally organisations are faced with 
multiple logics that may or may not be compatible. They also suggest that further 
research should consider situations when more than two institutional logics are 
embodied  in  an  organisation,  ‘the  dynamics  patterns  of  institutional  complexity’  and  the  
organisational   responses,   as  well   as   ‘the  degree   of   incompatibility’  of  multiple   logics.  
As a result, in this  study  we  have  employed  Besharov  and  Smith’s  (2014)  framework,  
which   they  developed  from  Greenwood  et  al.   (2011)   in  order   to   focus  on  ‘how  and   to  
what  extent  organisations  embody  multiple  logics’  Consequently,  most  of  the  content  of  
Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014) framework is similar to the field structures and 
organisational attributes described by Greenwood et al (2011). 
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According   to  Besharov   and  Smith   (2014),   research   in   this   field   ranges   from   ‘whether  
organisations embody multiple logics to understanding variation  in  how  they  do  so’  (p.  
375) but the relationship between logics has been ignored. Therefore, Besharov and 
Smith’s  (2014)  framework  proposes  that  the  different  types  of  logic  multiplicity  within  
organisations can be explained by the degree of two dimensions:   ‘compatibility’   and  
‘centrality’.   The   framework   focuses   on   the   conflict   of   multiple   logics   that   affect   the  
organisational   level   and   field   level   outcomes.   ‘Compatibility’   is   used   to   describe   ‘the  
extent to which the instantiations of logics imply consistent and reinforcing organisation 
action’  (p.  367)  while  ‘centrality’  describes  ‘the  extent  to  which  multiple  logics  manifest  
in   core   features   that   are   central   to   organisational   function’   (p.   366).   The   degree   of  
centrality depends on the number of core logics, as the more core logics involved, the 
higher degree of centrality will be expected. 
 
Besharov and Smith (2014) also summarise the factors that influence the degree of 
compatibility and the degree of centrality by reviewing the studies in the field (e.g. 
Jones and Dunn, 2007; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013b). 
 
Table 3.3: Driver of variation in compatibility and centrality 
Level of 
Analysis 
Factors that influence 
compatibility 
Factors that influence 
centrality 
Institutional field  
Number of professional 
institutions and relationship 
between them 
Power and structure of field 
actors (i.e. fragmented 
centralisation) 
Organisation Hiring and socialization Mission and strategy  Resource dependence 
Individual Ties to field-level referents Interdependence 
Adherence to logic 
Relative power 
Source: Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 371) 
 
Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 367-368)  state,   ‘the  availability  of  members  who  carry  
particular   logics’   is   influenced   by   professional   institutions   (John   and Dunn, 2007), 
organisation-level practices and characteristics. In addition, the relationships between 
members   and   their   ‘degree   of   independence’   can   affect   the   compatibility   between  
multiple  logics.  Research  shows  that  members  ‘selectively  draw  on,  interpret  and  enact’  
the logic they are faced with in the relevant field (Besharov and Smith, 2014, p. 368). 
The varied characteristics of members also lead to differences in the degree of 
compatibility. 
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According to Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 371), the power and structure of field actors, 
organisational  mission   and   strategy,   ‘resource   dependency’,   ‘individual   networks   and  
position’   and   how   a   logic   is   valued   by   individuals,   can   influence   the   degree   of  
centrality. They point out the importance of the characteristics of field structure, such as 
fragmented centralisation and the degree of hierarchy in the field that influence the 
degree of centrality. Also, Besharov and Smith (p. 370) state that organisations tend to 
respond to the demands of institutions that provide  them  critical  resources  ‘even  if  they  
oppose   the   logic   underlying   those   demands’   (Sauder,   2008).   As   mentioned   before,  
Besharov  and  Smith’s  (2014)  framework  is  developed  from  Greenwood  et  al.  (2011).  As  
a result, the factors that influence multiplicity within organisations are similar to the 
field structure (see section 3.5.1) and organisational attributes (see section 3.5.2) in 
Greenwood   et   al.   (2011).   Besharov   and   Smith   (2014)’s   framework   can   be   illustrated  
below: 
 
Figure 3.2: Types of logic multiplicity within organisations 
 
Source: Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 371) 
 
Besharov and Smith (2014) explained the four types of organisations as follows. First, 
‘contested  organisations’  occur  when  organisations  have  a  low  degree  of  compatibility,  
as they have more than one core logic. This can lead to conflict in various aspects such 
as mission, strategy, structure, and core activities because of the low consistency in 
organisational  actions.  Second,  ‘estranged  organisations’  have  a  primary  logic,  but  they  
still   experience   the   effect   of   ‘subsidiary   logics’.   Consequently,   conflict   from  multiple  
logics  can  still  occur  but  to  a  moderate  degree  only.  Third,  ‘aligned  organisations’  have  
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multiple core logics that align with each other. According to Besharov and Smith 
(2014),   in   this   type   of   organisation,   ‘minimal   conflict’   can   occur.      Lastly,   ‘dominant  
organisations’  are  similar  to  ‘estranged  organisations’  and  have  one  core  logic,  as  their  
‘subsidiary   logics’   are   consistent   and   align   with   the   core   one.      As   a   result,   in the 
extreme, it seems that organisations have only a single logic because there is little 
influence   from   ‘subsidiary   logics’   which   lead   to   ‘no   conflict’.   Besharov   and   Smith  
(2014,  p.   375)   also   suggest   that   ‘the  nature  of   logic  multiplicity  within  organisations’  
can lead to the changes in institutional logics such as replacement or blending of the 
logics.  
 
3.6 Organisation Responses 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011) the responses to complex situations are important 
for an organisation to gain social legitimacy and accessibility to resources.  They state 
that,  according  to  recent  literature,  an  organisation’s  response  to  institutional  complexity  
depends   on   whether   emphasis   is   on   ‘organisational   strategies’   or   ‘organisational  
structure’.  The  ‘strategies’ examine  ‘whether  and  to  what  extent  organisations  embrace  
prescriptions urged upon them by field-level referent audiences and seek to explain how 
those  preferences  are  determined’  while  the  ‘structure’  focuses  on  ‘how  multiple  logics  
are reflected in the organisational   structure  and  practices’   (p.  348  and  351).  The  early  
literature in the institutional field, such as Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Oliver (1991), 
points out the ways that hybrid organisations respond to competing institutional logics 
through decoupling/loose coupling and compromising respectively. More recent 
literature has also considered strategies to combine logics (Pache and Santos, 2013).   
 
Pache and Santos (2010, p. 462-463) state that organisations respond to conflicting 
institutional demands   by   exercising   some   ‘level   of   strategic   choice’   because  
organisational members are concerned that there are alternative courses of action that 
require   them   to  make   decisions   that   can   ‘secure   support   and   ensure   survival’   for   the  
organisation. In other words, organisational members employ a course of action that 
they consider appropriate. According to Greenwood et al. (2011), the organisational 
responses to institutional complexity depend upon the number of institutional logics 
embedded in the organisation   and   ‘the   relative   power   of   each   logic’s   representative’.  
However,   the   responses   ‘may   not   be   generalizable   because   the   extent   of   complexity  
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experienced may be underestimated or misinterpreted; and the particular responses 
observed may not be properly understood’  (Greenwood  et  al.,  2011,  p.  332).     
 
In this study, we consider the responses to competing institutional logics in 
implementing PMS and the integration between individual BSC and incentives. 
Consequently, a review of the strategic responses by Oliver (1991) is provided below 
while a review of decoupling and loose coupling is presented in the next section. 
 
Organisations have employed different strategies when experiencing multiple 
institutional pressures for compliance (Pache and Santos, 2010). According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), organisations tend to comply with demands from 
institutions on which they depend for legitimacy and resources. However, Pache and 
Santos  (2010,  p.  463)  argue  that  DiMaggio  and  Powell’s  statement  ‘is  inadequate  when  
exploring   the   issue   of   responses   to   conflicting   institutional   demands’.   They   point   out  
that compliance problems occur when the organisation has to comply with one demand 
and ignore other competing demands, but in reality, organisations are faced with 
multiple demands   in   a   context   where   institutions   have   a   ‘similar   level   of   power’   (p.  
463).   Consequently,   many   researchers   have   employed   Oliver’s   (1991)   framework   to  
study how organisations respond to conflicting institutional demands (e.g. Chang, 2006; 
Rautianen and Jarvenpaa, 2012; Pache and Santos, 2010 and 2013). In this research we 
suggest   that   Oliver’s   strategic   response  model   can   provide   better   explanations   where  
organisations   are   facing   complexity.   Oliver   (1991,   p.   145)   proposes   ‘the   strategic  
responses to institutional   process’   and   suggests   five   strategies   – ‘acquiesce’,  
‘compromise’,   ‘avoid’,   ‘defy’   and   ‘manipulate’   – where   the   responses   vary   in   ‘active  
organisational  resistance  from  passive  conformity  to  proactive  manipulation’.    Oliver’s  
(1991) strategic responses to institutional process can be seen in the table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Strategic responses to institutional process 
Strategies Tactics Example 
Acquiescence Habit Following invisible, taken-for-granted norm 
 Imitate Mimicking institutional models 
 Comply Obeying rules and accepting norms 
Compromise Balance Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents 
 Pacify Placating and accommodating institutional elements 
 Bargain Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
Avoid Conceal Disguising nonconformity 
 Buffer Loosening institutional attachments 
 Escape Changing goals, activities, or domains 
Defy Dismiss Ignoring explicit norms and values 
 Challenge Contesting rules and requirements 
 Attack Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure 
Manipulate Co-opt Importing influential constituents 
 Influence Shaping values and criteria 
 Control Dominating institutional constituents and process 
Source: Oliver (1991, p. 152) 
 
According to Oliver (1991), organisations tend to compromise as a strategic response 
when they are confronted with different institutional demands (logics). However, 
Rautiainen   and   Jarvenpaa   (2012,   p.   183)   state   that   ‘the   rival   institutional   logics   can  
retain their separateness and still allow improved co-operation and  performance’.  They  
also claim that the compromise, manipulation and avoidance responses have a potential 
to promote stability in an organisation when change is being experienced. On the other 
hand, Pache and Santos (2013b) suggest that at the organisational level, the competing 
logics  can  be  combined  by   ‘selective   loose  coupling’   rather   than  decoupling   (see  next  
section) or compromising. They also state that in order to gain acceptance, hybrid 
organisations   ‘may   manipulate   the   templates   provided   by   the   multiple   logics’   in   the  
fields where they lack legitimacy (p. 973). 
 
3.7 Decoupling and Loose Coupling as Strategic Responses 
In section 3.6, the institutional field studies pointed out that decoupling strategies are 
employed in order to handle institutional complexity within organisations. 
Consequently, this section provides a review of decoupling and its related concept, 
loose coupling. 
 
Decoupling/ loose coupling is one of the most popular areas for study in institutional 
theory (e.g. Mayer and Rowan, 1977; Orton and Wieck, 1990; Dillard et al., 2004; 
Dembrin et al., 2007; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Pache and Santos, 2011). 
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According   to   Newton   et   al.   (2014,   p.   748),   there   are   two   strategies   available   ‘for  
modifying the prevailing institutional arrangements: decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977)  and  loose  coupling  (Orton  and  Weick,  1990)’.  Dillard  et  al.  (2004,  p.  509)  define  
decoupling   as   ‘the   situation   in  which   the   formal   organisation   structure   or   practice   is  
separate and distinct from actual organisational practice’.   On   the   other   hand,  
researchers  have  talked  of  loose  coupling  as  being  a  situation  in  which  ‘work  practices  
and  symbolic  display  are  distinct  but   interconnected’   (Newton  et   al.,  2014,  p.  748)  or  
work  practices  ‘contain  elements  that  are  only  weakly connected to others and capable 
of   fairly   autonomous   actions’   (Scott   and   Davis,   2007,   p.   93;;   see   also   Scott,   2014).  
Loose coupling offers an alternative to the concepts of tight coupling and decoupling. 
However, the explanation of loose coupling is still in question and there is only limited 
research that has distinguished loose coupling from decoupling (Nor-Aziah and 
Scapens, 2007; Newton et al., 2014).  According to Cruz et al. (2009), many 
institutional researchers normally employ both decoupling and loose coupling as 
interchangeable concepts to explain a separation between organisational structures and 
activities.   
 
Orton and Weick (1990) criticise previous research for not sufficiently explaining the 
difference between decoupling and loose coupling. They suggest that this has been 
because of the uncertainty over their exact meaning. Therefore, they attempt to clarify 
the concept of loose coupling by distinguishing it from decoupling and tight coupling. 
According to Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007, p. 214), tight coupling occurs when 
elements  ‘share  their  identity  and  are  responsive’  to  or  dependent  upon  other  elements.  
Decoupling  occurs  when  elements  are  ‘distinctive  and  not  responsive’  to  or  independent  
from other elements (p. 214). Loose coupling is therefore defined as ‘having  
independent  components  that  do  not  act  responsively’  (Orton  and  Weick,  1990,  p.  205).    
However, it cannot be implied that loose coupling is the midpoint between the other 
two systems; rather it can indicate that loose coupling is the presence of both systems.  
 
Orton   and  Weick   (1990)   interpret   ‘the   dialects   of   loose   coupling’   from   literatures   in  
various  disciplines   and  classify   loose   coupling   into   five   ‘voices’   that   are   separate  but  
interconnected with each other.  In an organisational context, loose coupling (1) is 
caused   by   causal   indeterminacy   and   fragmented   environments   (‘the   voice   of  
causation’),  (2)  has  different  types  of  forms  (‘the  voice  of  typology’),  (3)  ‘has  specific  
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effects  and  the  effects  are  desirable  (‘the  voice  of  direct  effects’),  (4)  is  compensatory  
phenomena  in  order  to  maintain  organisational  cohesion  (‘the  voice  of  compensation’)  
and (5) the outcomes of loose coupling are persistence, buffering, adaptability, 
satisfaction   and   effectiveness   (‘the   voice   of   organisational   outcome’)   (Orton   and  
Weick, 1990). 
 
Many   researchers   employ  Orton   and  Weick’s      (1990)   loose   coupling  concept   in   their  
research, especially when conducting research in specific organisations about the 
emergence of new public management (e.g. Modell, 2003; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 
2005; Nor-Aziah  and  Scapens,  2007).  However,  Orton  and  Weick’s   (1990)  study  still  
does not   provide   a   clear   explanation   of   ‘the   process   of   loose   coupling’   at   the  
organisation level; therefore, further studies need to be undertaken (Collier, 2001; Nor-
Aziah and Scapens, 2007).  Newton et al. (2014, p. 747- 748) employ Orton and 
Weick’s   (1990)   explanation   of   loose   coupling   in   their   study   and   refer   to   it   as   when  
existing  practices  and  a  new  practice  are  ‘distinct  but  interconnected’  in  order  to  resolve  
‘institutional   contradiction   without   undermining   the   institutional   legitimacy   of   their  
social   entity’.   In   addition,   loose   coupling   is   also   an   attempt  made  by   an   organisation  
that   wants   to   introduce   change   that   is   ‘potentially   inconsistent with prevailing 
institutional   arrangements’   (p.   747).      So   far   ‘how   loose   coupling   is   initiated’   is   still  
unclear (p. 748). Consequently, some researchers seek to understand the emerging of 
loose coupling in organisations (e.g. Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Newton et al., 
2014).  
 
In this thesis we distinguish the concepts of loose coupling and decoupling by 
emphasising the relationship between organisational practices. Decoupling is the 
situation when the new practices are separated from recent practices. On the other hand, 
loose coupling falls between decoupling and tight coupling, as it occurs when the 
practices are partially linked to each other. The term of loose coupling can also be used 
when organisations tightly couple a new practice with some practices and decouple it 
from others.   
 
One of the important studies of decoupling within an institutional field is Meyer and 
Rowan (1977).  They suggest that decoupling occurs when organisations ceremonially 
conform to normative and regulative pressures in order to give the appearance of 
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compliance and when seeking legitimacy.  Also, in order to serve the interests of 
multiple stakeholders, organisations tend to employ loose coupling strategies through 
tactics  of  ‘partially  conformity’  (Oliver,  1991)  to  deal with new practices or structures 
as they emerge (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006). According to Donaldson (2001), the early 
research in the neo institutional field focused on the dominant functional view of 
organisations, which seeks appropriate organisational structures that fit certain 
environmental and intra-organisational contingencies. In this perspective, when 
conflicting demands occur, organisations tend to separate the role of organisational 
units from the formal structure. 
 
As indicated in section 3.3, Scott explains organisational views through his three pillars; 
therefore, the decoupling/ loose coupling as an organisational response will be 
explained through regulative, normative and cognitive views. In the regulative view, the 
organisations use loose coupling in response to coercive pressure. Meyer and Rowan 
(1977)   state   that   conflicts   of   stakeholders’   interests   can   lead   to   the   decoupling   of  
practices. As claimed by Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 358) and Oliver (1991), 
occurrences of decoupling and loose coupling can benefit institutionalized organisations 
in resolving the conflict between the institutional pressures and organisational activities 
by   enabling   them   ‘to   maintain   standardized,   legitimating,   formal   structures’   while  
actual practices vary in response   to  ‘practical  consideration’.  According   to  Nor-Aziah 
and Scapens (2007, p. 213), these loose coupling structures are important for 
organisations   as   ‘legitimising   symbols’   and   ‘acting   as   a   kind   of   symbolic   window-
dressing’  (see  also  Carruthers,  1995).  
 
According to Scott (2008), from the normative view, institutional theorists focus on the 
values embedded in pre-existing institutional orders. Clegg et al. (2006) explains the 
notion   of   ‘total   institutions’   through   questions   such   as   who   has   the   power and how 
institutional order arrangements are made in organisations. Within an institutional 
order, conflicting demands do not arise, as they are resolved or practices are determined 
by the high-power institution (Clegg et al., 2006). According to Brignall and Modell 
(2000, p. 288) the degree of decoupling depends on the power of external stakeholders 
from  which  organisations  need  support  in  order  to  ‘secure  access  to  vital  resources  and  
long-term   survival’;;   therefore,   from   this   statement,   many   scholars   assume that such 
decoupling tends to occur in the public sector more than that in the private sector 
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because of the difficulty in evaluating efficiency in public organisations (Johansson and 
Siverbo, 2009).  
 
The cognitive view of decoupling/ loose coupling has gained attention in the study of 
the institutional logics field, as it explains the combination of an agency of regulation 
and institutional order. In the institutional logics field, decoupling has been claimed to 
be a strategic response to competing logics as well as to institutional complexity; 
however, not all decoupled structures are purposeful responses to complexity and 
remain decoupled over time (Greenwood et al., 2011).  There are many studies in the 
field  to  support  Greenwood  et  al.’s  (2011)  statement.      Reay  and  Hinings’  (2009)  study  
in the health care field found partial loose coupling regarding medical matters, while 
being strict in other areas that can allow the co-existence of competing logics. Rautianen 
and Jarvenpaa (2012) state that in order to avoid the implementation of new 
management practices, when an organisation focused on professional logic or 
operational logic perceives that the new practice is not relevant in the recent context, the 
decoupling strategy will be employed. On the other hand, in order to compromise with 
the institutions, the loose coupling strategy has been employed for balancing the 
demands or pressures (Rautianen and Jarvenpaa, 2012). Dambrin et al. (2007) explain 
that   in   their   study,   two   aspects   ‘the   process   of   decoupling   ‘and   the   changes   of  
institutionalization’  can  be  considered  as  the  same  issue.  In  their  study,   the  occurrence  
of decoupling of a management control system is not only caused by the organisational 
response  to  ‘institutional  demands’  but  also  ‘an  attempt developed by internal coalitions 
to  resist  the  new  logic’  (Dambrin  et  al.,  2007,  p.  174).   
 
From   this   review,   it   is   clear   that  which  of  Scott’s  pillars   are   relevant   in   an   individual  
research study is driven by the research question, and in this study, the question involves 
the way organisations and individuals respond to competing logics in the use of PMS. 
Therefore, this study focuses on the decoupling and loose coupling from regulative and 
cognitive perspectives.  Before seeking to explain the institutional complexity and 
organisational responses in Thai SOEs in empirical chapters, it is appropriate to review 
previous research of institutional perspectives in the field of PMS in the next two 
sections. 3.8   considers  Modell’s   (2009)   review   and   some   recent research of PMS in 
public sector organisations. Then, section 3.9 reviews some empirical evidence in public 
sector organisations. The review helps researchers identify characteristics and 
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perceptions of employees toward PMS, and understand pressures from various 
institutional demands and competing institutional logics in empirical chapters.  
 
3.8  Modell’s  (2009)  Review  of  Performance  Measurement  Research  in  Institutional  
Theory  
This   section   is   based   primarily   on   Modell’s   (2009,   p.   277)   review   of   ‘institutional 
research on performance measurement and management in the public sector accounting 
literature’.  When  studying  new  public  management  in  the  public  sector,  there  are  many  
theories such as institutional theory, sociology of translation theory, economic theory, 
political theory, and functionalist control literature (Modell, 2009). However, research 
using institutional theory is dominant in the field (Modell, 2005; 2009; Van Helden et 
al., 2006).  
 
Institutional theory has been used to assess new public management, which includes 
PMS in the public sector. According to Modell (2009, p. 281), past studies of PMS 
based  on  institutionalism  have  been  undertaken  in  ‘the  health  care  sector,  universities,  
and   local   government’.   For   example,   Modell   (2001;;   2003)   studied Norwegian 
healthcare and the Swedish university sector, respectively, Kasperskaya (2008) studied 
local government in Spain, and Chang (2006) and Ostergren (2006) studied healthcare 
in the United Kingdom and Norway, respectively. Recently, however, research on 
central government has gained attention, including Modell (2009). Other examples 
include studies on Scandinavian central and local governments (Leagreid et al., 2006; 
2007; Ostergre, 2006; Modell et al., 2007; Modell and Weisel, 2008; Siverbo and 
Johansson, 2006 and Johansson and Siverbo, 2009; Rautianen and Jarvenpaa, 2012) and 
developed countries such as the U.S. federal government (Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2004). 
However, few studies examine developing countries (Yang and Model, 2013) and state-
owned enterprises (James, 2009; Munir et al., 2013). 
 
Although researchers in this discipline still question which theoretical perspective is 
most appropriate, institutional theory is popular as a dominant theory underpinning 
performance measurement research (Modell, 2009). There are issues in performance 
management that have been neglected in the institutional theory literature. Studies 
typically examine how the multi-level dynamics of institutional processes relate to the 
implementation of performance management practices, while ignoring micro-dynamics 
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during the implementation process (Modell, 2009). Research into how various users of 
performance management as reflective actors think about constructing meaning should 
reduce   the   ‘emphasis   on   loose   coupling   as more or less automatic response to 
institutional  pressures’  (Modell,  2009,  p.  289).  Therefore,  many  researchers  suggest  use  
of other theories such as actor-network theory to fulfil the institutional theoretical gap 
(Callon, 1986; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2008; Modell 2009).  
 
3.9 Previous Case Studies Employing Institutional Theory and Institutional Logics  
This section provides examples of case studies in public-sector organisations by 
combining them into four groups: case studies in (1) decoupling and loose coupling, (2) 
isomorphism, (3) competing institutional logics, and (4) organisational responses.  
 
3.9.1 Case studies in decoupling and loose coupling 
According to Modell (2009), three research topics in institutional theory assess multi-
dimensional performance measurement, including the BSC (Chang, 2006; Modell and 
Wiesel, 2008; Kasperskaya, 2008; James, 2009), goal-directed performance measures 
(Johnsen, 1999), and relative performance evaluations (RPE) (Siverbo and Johansson, 
2006; Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). Modell (2009) also states that the majority of 
performance measurement research concerns institutional effects of decoupling, which 
depend on the relative power of multiple constituencies (Chang, 2006; Modell, 2003; 
Kasperskaya, 2008). Modell (2009) also argues that loose coupling emerged because of 
‘institutional  field  level  dynamic[s]’  to  make  transformations  smooth  (Modell,  2003,  p.  
295; Kasperskaya, 2008) and dynamic process resistance to change in performance 
measurement practices (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Johansson and Siverbo, 2009; 
Bourguignon et al., 2013). Examples of case studies in public-sector organisations are 
now discussed. 
 
Chang (2006) investigated local health authority managers in NHS reactions to 
performance targets regarding central government pressures. Results are inconsistent 
with Modell’s  (2001)  study,  since  decoupling  did  not  occur  with  local  health  managers  
interviewed about facing multiple stakeholders. However, managers were more 
responsive to factors that suited their interests, which in the study included maintaining 
rigid relationships with the central government to seek legitimacy and funding (Chang, 
2006). 
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Kasperskaya (2008) observed loose coupling during adoption of BSC in two Spanish 
city councils, and the role of individuals or groups that influenced implementation of 
the BSC. Kasperskaya (2008, p. 375) explains that various change scenarios, and 
extensive and customized BSC models in case study organisations led to disparities in 
‘the   meaning of loose-coupling’.   In   organisation   A,   due   to   the   complexity   of   an  
extensive BSC model, resistance to change formed among middle managers in the 
company,  which  later  ‘decouple[d]  its  operational  activities  from  the  BSC’,  leading  to  
abandonment of the BSC (p.   376).   The  BSC  model   used   in   organisation  B   ‘loosely-
coupled  with  the  idea  of  an  advanced  multidimensional  strategic  PMS’,  but  its  activities  
were coupled with institutional requirements (p. 376).  
 
Johansson   and   Siverbo   (2009,   p.   198)   investigated   ‘the causes of differentiated 
utilisation  of  RPE’  in  Swedish  municipalities.  They  found  that  fad-follower behaviours 
regarding adoption of RPE sought legitimacy, and decoupling of RPE can occur even if 
RPE is just an optional management instrument. Johansson and Siverbo (2009, p. 217) 
conclude,   ‘The   stated   adoption   of   management   accounting   practices   is   sometimes  
decoupled  from  its  use,  or  at  least  the  intensity  in  use.’ 
 
Bourguignon et al. (2013) studied the role of individuals in the institutionalisation of 
new PMS in a division of a French public organisation. Adoption of the new 
performance   measures   by   the   actors   was   ‘ceremonial’   regarding   resistance   to   use,  
including unaware managers concerning the gap between discourse and practices on the 
adoption of the systems. Bourguignon et al. (2013, p. 229) conclude that coherent ideas, 
discourses, and techniques, and internalized systems in an organisation drive 
institutionalisation as expected, but responses from actors are unpredictable, which can 
lead to decoupling  by  developing  ‘alternate,  unexpected  and  sometimes  non-deliberate 
practices  with  the  system’.  
 
Modell (2009) points out that most studies on decoupling and loose coupling in PMS 
focus on the role of embedded agency, whereas there are many institutional processes 
related   to   organisations’   structural   characteristics   that   need   to   be   considered.   Some  
recent studies use other performance measures such as quality indicators and economic 
factors (Van Helden, 2005) to observe decoupling.  
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3.9.2 Case studies in institutional isomorphism 
Much research in the field suggests that adoption of PMS is driven by institutional 
isomorphism (Lawton et al., 2000; Moynihan, 2004, Siverbo and Johansson, 2006; 
Kasperskaya, 2008; James, 2009; Manir et al., 2013). According to Siverbo and 
Johansson (2006), empirical research shows that RPE is popular because of mimetic 
isomorphism, and most local Swedish government authorities use RPE to compare 
performance with other agencies. A smaller number, however, use RPE to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Kasperskaya (2008) argues that adoption of BSC by two Spanish city councils first 
came from coercive isomorphism due to a legal framework. However, design and 
implementation were influenced by mimetic and normative isomorphisms, which led to 
different ways of using the BSC. During a design stage, organisation A employed an 
extensive BSC model by adapting a template acquired from other city councils (i.e., 
mimetic isomorphism). Organisation B employed a customized BSC. In both 
organisations, people used experiences and knowledge acquired across various sources 
(i.e., normative isomorphism) to construct a BSC system.  
 
James (2009) studied the impact of national competition policy (NCP) on the adoption 
of a BSC in an electricity corporation owned by the Australian government to discuss 
the rationale and notions of legitimacy seeking when adopting a new performance 
management system. Findings suggest that the organisation adopted the BSC model, 
which is well known in the private sector, to appear legitimate to stakeholders (i.e., 
mimetic isomorphism). Munir et al. (2013) found that significant pressures from 
politics and government (i.e., coercive isomorphism) created awareness in Anonbank, 
which led to a change to its PMS. To seek legitimacy, Anonbank adopted successful 
performance measurement operations from other banks (i.e., mimetic isomorphism) 
because it presumed that such systems would be acceptable to constituents.  
 
3.9.3 Case studies in competing institutional logics 
As mentioned in section 3.4, many researchers draw attention to multiple logics 
embedded in organisations (Lounsbury, 2007; Reay and Hinings, 2009; Dunn and 
Jones, 2010; Qiao, 2013). Examples focus on competing logics within organisations 
since it is the primary concern in this study. Lounsbury (2007) investigated how 
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competing institutional logics shaped new practices in U.S. mutual funds using data 
from 1944 through 1985. In the study, trustee and performance logic appear to have 
been employed as dominant logics. The study employed a comparative case-study 
method to investigate Boston and New York mutual funds, both of which were 
embedded in these two institutional logics. However, due to differences in geographic 
locations, the competing logics led mutual funds to disparate forms of rationality. 
Lounsbury (2007) concludes that triggers to adaptation of new practice are not from 
poor performance or organisational inefficiency; competing logics are responsible for 
shaping organisational behaviours and alternative logics.  
 
Reay and Hinings (2009) investigated the coexistence of two competing logics in the 
Canadian  healthcare  sector   from  1994   to  2008.   In  1994,   ‘a  new  logic  of  business-like 
health   care’   was   introduced   that   focused   more   on   cost   efficiency   and   customer  
satisfaction. This logic was a direct challenge to a previous logic of medical 
professionalism, which emphasized professional knowledge to provide appropriate care 
and medical direction for patients. Reay and Hinings (2009) conclude that coexistence 
of competing logics led to collaboration in management practices between field actors, 
who include both physicians and managers. Field actors employed mechanisms that 
allowed them to remain independent but work collaboratively to accomplish the 
mission and fulfil institutional requirements. 
 
Qiao (2013) examined the relationship between institutional logics and corporate 
finance in Chinese firms, including SOEs that embody two competing logics – state and 
market. They investigated how institutional logics influence organisational capital 
structure and corporate financing decisions. Qiao (2013) distinguished SOEs from 
private firms using firm ownership, and employed SOEs as representative firms that 
embody state logic. Accordingly, state logic affected the flexibility of adaptations and 
limited actions. Qiao (2013) concludes that capital structures in SOEs are less 
heterogeneous and deviate more from optimality in comparison to firms dominated by 
market logic. However, evidence also shows that heterogeneities and degree to 
optimality increase over time in both SOEs and firms dominated by market logic. 
Institutional logics also influence selection of chief executive officers. 
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Dunn and Jones (2010) studied changes of multiple logics – care and science – in 
medical education in the United States from 1910 through 2005. Care logic is based on 
medical professionalism, which focuses on patient and physician orientations. Science 
logic emphasises clinical-science logic. Dunn and Jones (2010) point out that 
throughout history, medical education has been confronted with coexisting, multiple 
logics, supported by groups and interests.  
 
Rautianen   and   Jarvenpaa   (2012)   found   in   a   case   study   of   two   Finnish   cities,   ‘the  
operational  logic  and  professional  logic  were  separable’;;  however,  regarding modernity 
leading   to   similar   developments,   some   collaboration   existed.   They   argue,   ‘The   rival  
institutional logics can retain their separateness and still allow improved co-operation 
and  performance’  (p.  183).   
 
Lander et al. (2013) investigated mid-tier accounting firms in the Netherlands to 
evaluate shifts from trustee to commercial logic to assess resistance and change. The 
trustee logic emphasizes the professionalism of accountants, which leads firms to 
deliver a limited number of services. However regarding the investment of the 
attainment of high quality standards reinforced by government as well as professional 
associations, mid-tier accounting firms believe they have to be more commercially 
oriented and focus on customer demands and satisfaction. These competing logics 
present contradicting demands, and hence different degrees of each logic recognized by 
firms lead to varying responses and strategies. Lander et al. (2013) note that in 
comparing multi-national firms, trustee logic strongly prevails in mid-tier accounting 
firms regarding their local connections. Mid-tier firms also were seen to respond more 
to the emergence of new logics using strategies deemed applicable to the context. 
 
3.9.4 Case studies in organisational responses to institutional complexity 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011), researchers have recently increasingly turned 
their attention to institutional complexity. This section presents case studies on 
organisational responses and actions toward institutional complexity. 
 
Rautiainen and Jarvenpaa (2012) analysed institutional logics and investigated 
responses to PMS using a comparative case study of two cities in Finland. They used 
Oliver’s   (1991)   typology   of   responses   to   examine   how   organisations   respond   to  
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implementation of a BSC, depending on institutional logic. They argue that adaptations 
of PMS are typically based on institutional logics – financial or operational – which can 
lead to disparate PMS emerging in an organisation, accompanied by disparate responses 
(Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5: Focus on institutional logic and typical tactical level responses to NPM 
pressures 
Responses:  
Focus of Institutional Logic 
Operational/Professional Financial/ Business-like 
Acquiescence Not applicable (N.A.), or sagacious 
conformity to PMS change 
Accepting NPM and New PMS; 
compliance 
Compromise Balancing, but also placating 
window-dressing & loose coupling 
Balancing the expectations of 
multiple pressures; actual 
developments possible 
Manipulation Dominating important institutional 
constituents and processes 
Shaping values and criteria 
(explaining deviations away) 
Avoidance Escaping,  ‘PMS  is  not  relevant  in  
this  special  context’,  decoupling 
Buffering,  ‘preserving  old  
resources’;;  loose  or  decoupling 
Defiance Ignoring the finances, attacking 
sources of institutional pressures 
N.A.,  or  ‘rational’  choice  not  to  
adopt, or financial crises 
Source: Rautiainen and Jarvenpaa (2012)  
 
Pache and Santos (2013) used a comparative case study of four social enterprises to 
explore how hybrid organisations that embody competing institutional logics – social 
welfare and commercial – deal with multiple demands to survive and grow. They argue 
that at the organisational level, competing logics can be combined by selective loose 
coupling rather than decoupling or compromising because selective loose coupling 
allows  an  organisation  to  manage  ‘the  incompatibility  between  logics’  better  (p.  973).  
To   gain   acceptance,   hybrid   organisations   ‘manipulate   the   templates   provided   by   the  
multiple  logics’  in  the  field  to counter lack of legitimacy (p. 973). 
 
Villani and Phillips (2013) investigated micro-foundations of multiple institutional 
logics in three types of organisations that were confronted with academic and market 
logics to understand how each type of organisation faced the same institutional 
complexity and handled prescriptions and pressures. They suggest three mechanisms to 
cope with multiple logics: employing boundary spanners, which enhance the quality of 
communication in networks; mirroring institutional demands, which help organisations 
assign roles to social actors according to logic; and buffering multiple logics rather than 
simply connecting the logics (p. 22 and p. 35).  
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In conclusion, application of institutional theory in public-sector organisations has been 
extensive because it helps organisations meet demands from various stakeholders. 
However, few studies of SOEs incorporate institutional theory. Regarding the research 
gaps in institutional theory that Modell (2009) mentions, this study uses institutional 
logics and complexity to underpin the investigation.  
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical background that this study employs. The 
review has outlined the impact and direction of institutional theory over the past several 
decades. This includes old institutional theory, neo-institutional   theory,  Scott’s   (2014)  
three pillars and institutional logics. The study focuses on the multiple institutional 
logics that create institutional complexity and influence organisational and individual 
actions. The chapter also presents the proposed theoretical framework – Greenwood et 
al.’s   (2011)   institutional   complexity   and  Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)   types   of   logic  
multiplicity within organisations.  The thesis uses these ideas to explore institutional 
complexity in the case organisations. Greenwood et al. (2011) state that institutional 
complexity within organisations in the same field depends upon organisational 
attributes, while Besharov and Smith (2014) explain the multiplicity of logics within 
organisations through the degree of centrality and compatibility of logics. Both 
frameworks are similar in the frameworks they provide. How organisations respond to 
institutional  complexity   and  multiplicity  demands   is   addressed  by  employing  Oliver’s  
(1991) strategic responses to institutional process and the concept of decoupling and 
loose coupling. The researcher has tried to distinguish between the concepts of 
decoupling and loose coupling, using relevant arguments from the literature. Finally, 
the chapter discusses PMS from an institutional perspective, and provides examples of 
case studies regarding decoupling and loose coupling, isomorphism, institutional logics 
and complexity particularly in public-sector organisations.  
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters provided the background of literature and theory related to this 
study. This chapter reviews the research methodology and presents how this research 
was carried out. The chapter starts with the research philosophy and research approach. 
Based on a constructivism paradigm, this research employs a qualitative approach by 
using a case study strategy for the field study. The main research design (case study) 
will be explained in detail, including the case selection with an overview of the case 
study organisations and the context of Thai SOEs, plus the data collection and data 
analysis. The research collects data from two case study organisations in Thailand to 
realize the research aim of understanding the use of performance measurement systems  
(PMS) in State Owned Enterprises. This is followed by a discussion of the conduct of 
the interviews and the content analysis. Finally, a brief summary of the chapter will be 
provided. 
 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
Lee  and  Ling   (2008,  p.  6)  state,   ‘Research   is  about  generating  knowledge  about  what  
you believe  the  world  is’;;  however,  the  knowledge  should  be  scientific  (Singleton  and  
Stratits,  2005).  According  to  Collis  and  Hussey  (2003,  p.  55),  ‘a  research  paradigm’  is  a  
‘philosophical   framework’,   and  a  good  paradigm  should  help   to   improve   researchers’  
ability to understand social phenomena (Patton, 2002). Therefore, the selection of 
paradigms used in research can guide the researcher as to how to undertake the 
research. According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), even though there are several 
classifications used to differentiate paradigms, philosophers mostly focus on the two 
following  matters:  ‘ontology’  and  ‘epistemology’.  Nonetheless,  many  philosophers  are  
also   concerned   about  matters   of   ‘methodology’   (Creswell,   2003)   and   ‘axiology’   (Lee  
and Ling, 2008). These four matters of paradigm can influence the research objectives. 
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Ontology   concerns   ‘the   nature   of   reality   and   existence’;;   for   example,   the   theory   or  
study of existence (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 17). In this concept, researchers 
believe that reality is subjective and socially constructed by actors (constructivism) 
(Collis et al., 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2011). Epistemology concerns the nature of 
knowledge and the way to acquire it (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  According to 
Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 15), the paradigms involved with this concept are 
‘positivism’,   ‘realism’,   ‘interpretivism’   and   ‘critical   theory’.  Methodology   concerns   a  
procedure of generating knowledge in which the techniques used in each research study 
depend   on   the   researcher’s   choice   of   paradigms   (Creswell,   1994).   The   techniques   of  
research are qualitative and quantitative methods; researchers can employ one or both 
of them, which is called a mixed method. Lastly, axiology is concerned with the values 
of research (Collis et al., 2003). According to Lee and Ling (2008), axiology gets little 
attention compared with other matters. However, regarding the perception of 
researchers, axiology is important because the aim of research is to understand and 
explain the world (Lee and Ling, 2008). 
 
Collis and Hussey (2003) and Clarke (1998) state that there are two main research 
philosophies: positivism, which usually adopts a quantitative approach, and 
interpretivism, which is typically associated with a qualitative approach.  In reality, 
most research is conducted between these two paradigms (Lee and Ling, 2008). The 
positivist researchers believe that reality can be identified and apprehended (Lincoln 
and Guba, 2000), while interpretivist researchers tend to understand the world from the 
view of related people rather than outsiders (Saunders et al., 2012).   
 
According to Saunders et al. (2012), positivist researchers tend to develop research 
through  the  methods  of  ‘natural  science’.  Lee  and  Ling  (2008,  p.  13)  state  that  one  merit  
of  positivism  is  its  ‘verifiability’,  in  which  the  research  is  established  as  a  science  and  
allows for the development of hypotheses based on tentative theories. However, the 
downside of this paradigm is that positivist researchers treat humans as objects by 
separating themselves from the data sources and reacting objectively according to 
stimuli (Kim, 2003). In studying PMS, such as this research does, it is difficult to 
quantify data. The actions and perceptions of involved persons towards the 
implementation or adaptation of the systems need to be interpreted. As a result, the 
positivist paradigm is not suitable in this research context.  
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According to Saunders et al. (2012, p. 137), positivism has been criticized by many 
philosophers  who  say   that   it   is  not  suitable  for   the  complexity  of   ‘the  social  world  of  
business’.  They  also  state  that  the  merit  of  this  paradigm  comes  from  ‘phenomenology’  
and  ‘symbolic  interactionism’.  Therefore,  interpretivism, which differs from positivism, 
is  employed  to  understand  humans  as  social  actors  and  ‘the  subjective  meaning’  of  their  
actions (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p. 16). It has been suggested that researchers have to 
understand social actors from their point of view (Saunders et al., 2012). However, 
according   to   Weber   (2004),   obtaining   the   knowledge   from   an   individual’s   point   of  
view,  which   differs   by   experience   towards   a   situation,  may  be   beyond   a   researcher’s  
perceptions.   In   the   researcher’s   point   of   view,   interpretivism is more suitable to this 
research area than the previous paradigm, positivism, because the interpretivist 
researcher can use a variety of research methods, both quantitative and qualitative, to 
interpret and quantify findings. 
 
Recently, both PMS and institutional complexity studies in the public sector have been 
undertaken using different research paradigms to shape research design. Regarding the 
drawbacks of the two paradigms, interpretivist and positivist, mentioned above, the 
intention of the proposed research is to employ a social constructivist paradigm. 
According to Habermas (1970), constructivism is one type of interpretivism, as 
constructivist  researchers  focus  on  ‘reality’   that   is  relative  and  socially  constructed  by  
people rather than by objects (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 23). This paradigm is 
based  on   the  ontology  aspect   in   the  subjectivist  view,  which  appreciates   that  people’s  
views and actions are based upon their experience (Saunders et al., 2012), as well as the 
researcher’s experience (Lincon and Guba, 2000).  In other words, according to 
Cresswell   (2009,   p.   9),   constructivist   researchers   believe   that   ‘individuals   seek  
understanding  of   the  world   in  which   they   live  and  work’.   In   this  paradigm,  Easterby-
Smith et al. (2012, p. 24)  state  that  the  observer  is  considered  as  ‘part  of  what  is  being  
observed’,   and   human   interests   are   ‘the   main   driver   of   science’,   so   these   two  
characteristics  help  researchers  to  explain  ‘the  general  understanding  of  the  situation’.  
However, Burr (2003) argues that human reactions to situations or phenomena may be 
different. Therefore, reality is reconstructed through informed consensus. 
Methodologically, qualitative methods are then the main data collection tools for 
research conducted under this paradigm to gathering rich data, but these can be 
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complemented by quantitative methods.  Therefore, a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods can be used to interpret and quantify findings in this paradigm 
(Lincoln and Guba, 2000). The sample required in this paradigm is a small number of 
carefully selected cases. 
 
As mentioned before, research in the field can be undertaken with several paradigms in 
designing the research methodology. In this research, constructivism was been selected 
due to its characteristics,   which   suit   the   research   aim.   Participants’   views   of   the  
implementation and use of performance measurement as well as how they respond to 
institutional complexity can be effectively investigated using a qualitative approach. 
 
4.3 Research Approach 
As mentioned earlier, there are two main types of approaches commonly used to 
distinguish research studies: qualitative and quantitative. The features of each approach 
are as follows. 
 
Table 4.1: Features of quantitative and qualitative research approach  
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Research objective Description, explanation and 
prediction 
Description, exploration and 
discovery 
Scientific method Deductive 
- Researcher tests hypotheses 
and theory with data 
 
Inductive  
- Researcher generates new 
hypotheses and grounded 
theory from data collected 
during fieldwork 
Nature of reality Objective Subjective and socially 
constructed 
Research design All areas of the study are 
carefully designed before data 
is collected 
The design emerges as the 
study unfolds  
Form of data collected Quantitative data, which is 
variables and in the form of 
numbers and statistics  
Qualitative data, which is in 
the form of words, pictures, 
or objects  
Nature of data More efficient, able to test 
hypotheses, but may miss 
contextual detail  
More  ‘rich’,  time  consuming,  
and less able to be 
generalised  
Data collection Uses tools such as 
questionnaires or equipment, 
to collect numerical data  
Researcher is the data 
gathering instrument  
Form of final report Statistical report Narrative report 
Source: Miles and Huberman (1994), Collis and Hussey (2003) and Saunders et al. (2012)  
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Both approaches are widely used to design and construct research in performance 
measurement. Recently, performance measurement research dominant in quantitative 
methodology tended to use survey methods to collect the data (e.g. Cavaluzzo and 
Ittner, 2004; Laegreid et al, 2006; Siverbo and Johansson, 2006). On the other hand, the 
qualitative research tended to employ case study strategy based on interview data (e.g. 
Modell, 2005, 2009 and 2012; Ostergren, 2006; Modell et al., 2007 and 2013). In 
addition, considering the research in the field of institutional logics, especially the study 
in organisational responses towards multiple institutional logics, there are many 
research studies that employed the qualitative approach (e.g. Reay and Hinings, 2009; 
Batillana and Dorado, 2010; Rautiainen and Jarvenpaa, 2012). 
 
As this research is designed to investigate and explore a social phenomenon, the 
research seems to suit the features of the qualitative approach explained in the table. 
According to Myer (2009), the qualitative approach was first developed to study 
phenomena in social science, which helps researchers to capture data on the perception 
of the informants. A qualitative   approach   helps   the   researcher   to   ‘build   a   complex,  
holistic picture, analyse words, report detailed views of informants, and conduct the 
study  in  a  natural  setting’  (Creswell,  1998,  p.  15)  through  interactions  of  the  researcher  
with participants (Veal, 1997). The following part will discuss why a qualitative 
approach is suitable for this research. 
 
First, the qualitative approach is appropriate in situations where the topic is new or 
where the researcher is unsure about what the important variables are (Creswell, 2003). 
Even though there are many studies in PMS focusing on the public sector, the number 
of research studies in developing countries is still limited; much is unknown about PMS 
and institutional complexity in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Thailand. Also, there 
are few studies in institutional logics using SOEs as their research domain. 
Consequently, due to limited information available, it would be better to explore this 
topic using a qualitative approach, which allows the researcher to gather data from the 
informants’  perspectives  and  develop  a  theme  to  explain  the  phenomenon. 
 
Second, individual actions towards the implementation and the use of PMS and their 
relation to incentive systems can be considered as complex in nature. Also, as we saw 
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in chapter 3, Modell (2009) suggest that further research on individual actions toward 
the implementation of PMS is required. Since the quantitative approach uses statistics 
and correlation to define meaningfulness, it may not be sufficient to describe the 
complexity   of   this   research.   The   qualitative   approach’s   inductive   nature   should   be   a  
better option for the researcher to organize and analyse the data patterns and data 
collection to explore the phenomenon (Saunders et al., 2012).  In addition, according to 
Creswell (1998), a qualitative approach research is useful for deriving theoretical 
narratives and theoretical frameworks from the data to provide holistic views of social 
phenomena.  
 
Third, given that SOEs play important roles in the Thai economy in various ways, this 
research applies a qualitative approach to explore the development of PMS 
implemented in SOE and investigate how organisations respond to institutional 
complexity, which may affect the success or failure of the use of performance systems. 
The   research   tries   to   understand   the   factors   through   the   SOEs’   context   and   insiders’  
perceptions, which cannot be easily proved by using quantitative evidence. According 
to McQueen and Knussen (2000), a qualitative approach is suitable for exploring social 
phenomena to gain an understanding of how and why the participants function and 
behave.  Furthermore, Creswell (2003) explains that qualitative research permits the 
collection of open-ended, emerging data. Due to rich context data expected in this 
research, the inductive nature of a qualitative approach would help the researcher to be 
able to focus on a small sample of subjects, which is more appropriate than a large 
number in the sample in a quantitative approach.  
 
Regarding the reasons above, for this research, it is contended that a qualitative 
approach   is   suited   to   the   researcher’s   aim   and   objectives.   The   qualitative   approach  
characteristics help the researcher to examine newly discovered issues as well as to 
generate new hypotheses, themes and ground theories (Saunders et al., 2012). However, 
due to its nature, rich-context data is expected from the qualitative methods and 
techniques used to collect data, which will be discussed in the next part.    
 
4.4 Multiple Case Study Approach 
As mentioned in section 4.3 research approach, a qualitative approach was mainly 
adopted because the research concerned the views and opinions of stakeholders, which 
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are both internal stakeholders and external stakeholders such as the Ministry of 
Finanace (MoF), line ministry and consulting firms, about performance measurement 
systems and other related activities (see chapter 1 section 1.3). However, not all 
qualitative methods can be used for studying performance measurement. Amongst, the 
number of qualitative methods, this research employed case studies to investigate a 
phenomenon within performance measurement in public sector.   
 
According to Creswell (1998),  a case study approach is widely used in organisational 
research because it provides a strategy for doing research that involves empirical 
investigation using multiple sources of evidence (Robson, 1993), which may be 
qualitative, quantitative, or combination of both (Richardson et al, 1995).  The major 
aim of this research is to describe and analyse how public organizations conceptualise 
and implement performance measurement systems in an emerging country context, 
specifically Thailand, where such research is relatively scarce. Case studies can be 
particularly valuable because they generate rich data.    
 
According to Ryan et al (2002), a case study provides a researcher an opportunity to 
better understand the nature of the subject studied because it typically is employed to 
explore real life events over which the researcher has little control, and where the 
boundaries between the context and events are not readily evident, as well as to 
improve the quality of the information (Yin, 1994; Gummesson, 2000). Saunders et al. 
(2012) state that a case study strategy is commonly used in explanatory and exploratory 
research to answer the questions what, why, and how. Consequently, to answer the 
research question, Saunders et al. (2012) state that case study strategy is commonly 
used to ensure that the researcher can be confident that they are interpreting the data 
correctly.  All of these makes case study more favourable for research that requires an 
in-depth understanding of the particular topic studied (Gummesson, 2000).  
 
This research fits the above statements since its focus is to examine how case study 
organisations respond to institutional complexity and to understand how and why 
performance measurement systems are perceived to succeed or fail in SOEs over which 
researcher has no control. Therefore, a qualitative case study approach would be an 
ideal method for providing models, frameworks, or theories, which can then be 
extended to other cases in similar situations.  In this research, the researcher employed 
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the field of Thai SOEs as the main study area (see chapter 1 for the overview of Thai 
SOEs) as it provides an interesting setting in which to study developments in PMS from 
an institutional perspective.  
 
4.4.1 The selection of case studies 
According to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), the multiple case study approach allows 
the researcher to acquire different types of case  studies,  which  helps  to  achieve  ‘broader  
exploration   of   research   questions   and   theoretical   elaboration’.   Consequently,   the  
multiple case study approach was used in this research in order to collect two empirical 
cases of the implementation and used of the PMS, which are both required by the MoF 
and adopted by the SOE itself.   
 
The multiple case study approach also allows the researcher to explore and compare the 
different types of problems and contexts found in the process of implementing and 
adopting PMS in the case study organisations. Even though when selecting a case it is 
not necessary to find a representative case, a researcher may select a case that covers 
the relevant issues (Collis and Hussey, 2003).   Therefore, in this research, the aim of 
selecting a case study is to focus on specific case areas within the public sector in 
Thailand, with the cases needing to be reasonably representative of the State-Owned 
Enterprises. The research uses two cases from two different industrial sectors in 
collecting the data to answer the research question.  According to Stake (1995), in 
designing the selection criteria for a research case study, the researcher must understand 
the study context as early as possible. Provincial Waterworks Authority (PWA) and 
Thailand Post Company (POST) have been selected by using the following selection 
criteria: the representativeness of the main industrial sector and the practical feasibility 
of access to the case study organisations. The reasons for choosing these organizations 
are summarized as follows.  
 
Firstly, PWA is a main target to be part of this study because it is in the infrastructure 
sector, the reform of which has gained attention from governments around the world 
with the aim of increasing competition and economic efficiency as well as to enhance 
environmental and quality standards (Abbott et al., 2011). Secondly, POST was chosen 
because it can represent the change in the dynamic and competitive environment in 
parcel service, while its domestic mail service is still reserved as a monopoly and 
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assumed to be an insufficient profit-making unit. According to Borenstein and Becker, 
the emergence of new technologies, environmental initiatives and social responsibility 
have accelerated the pressure for the postal sector to improve its service and 
management (Bravo, 1995; Zairi, 2000; Borenstein and Becker, 2004) as well as retain 
minimum or reserved services for citizens at the promised prices (Rodriguez and Storer, 
2000). Thirdly, both PWA and POST have branches across Thailand that may need 
adequate guidelines and processes in implementing or employing PMS. This helps the 
researcher to better investigate the organisational responses in the PMS. Fourthly, both 
organisations can be considered as the biggest organisation in their sector in term of 
asset size and number of employees. The size of the cases is also an important issue 
because it should be large and varied enough to ensure that sufficient data is collected 
in order to better understand the phenomena in the research. Finally, the case study 
organisations have been involved with the PMS assessed by the MoF since its 
introduction in 1995. In addition, in 2012, both PWA and POST have adopted 
Economic Value Added (EVA) and Balance Scorecards (BSC), which this study 
intends to investigate for organisational and individual perspectives towards the PMS.  
 
Regarding data accessibility, the researcher selected case study organisations in 
Thailand, which allowed her to collect data with more convenience and helped to gain 
access to key informants in the case study organisations. The source of these cases was 
based  on  the  researcher’s  personal  contact  with  some  officials  in  government  agencies  
and SOEs. The researcher approached a few potential SOEs; however, some of them 
rejected the request for access for various reasons such as issues of confidentiality, or 
the time planned for field study overlapped with their other schedules. Therefore, the 
two case study organisations were chosen due to the help of the State Enterprise Policy 
Office and strong personal ties with the researcher. In both selected case study 
organisations, the researcher had two or more discussion sessions about the 
organisational context and a request for formal research permission was made to each 
organisation chief executive officer before collecting data in the field.  Therefore, the 
case study organisations that took part in the study were selected based on their 
willingness to participate in the research, their ability to provide information on the 
subject, and  informants’  availability  for  the  interviews  and  questionnaires. 
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4.4.2 The overview of case study organisations 
This section provides an overview of selected two case study organisations: PWA and 
POST and their characteristics.  
 
4.4.2.1 Provincial Waterworks Authority 
In 2004, the Thai government failed to corporatize SOEs in the water sector and to 
found a Water Regulator due to the strong protest from labour unions. The water sector 
has been under-controlled and regulated by a number of government agencies and 
committees, which sometimes create conflicts of interest amongst themselves. In 
addition, the water bureaucracy contributed to the inefficient performance such as poor 
service standards, poor water quality and excessive operating costs. Moreover, the 
water sector requires a massive capital investment, which needs to be well-managed to 
avoid under-pricing. Therefore, in order to be more efficient, State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) in this sector have been required to improve their efficiency, productivity, 
distribution of water supply, and customer satisfaction, as well as to fulfill individual 
stakeholder requirements. Many management tools are required to overcome these 
obstacles and one of them is a PMS.  
According to the problem above, the study of SOEs in the water sector can help the 
researcher  better  understand  the  PMS  in  the  field.  In  this  research,  Thailand’s  Provincial  
Waterworks Authority (PWA) is selected as a case study. 
PWA was established on 28th February 1979, in accordance with the Provincial 
Waterworks Authority Act 1979, to provide a proper water supply system for Thai 
people  in  74  provinces  across  the  country.  The  PWA’s  vision  is  “PWA  shall  be  a  good  
organization with high efficiency in providing full access to standard drinking water 
supply   service   to   the   population   throughout   the   country”   (PWA,   2012).   PWA   key  
activities include water collection and storage, water treatment and water distribution. 
According to a study by Chulalongkorn University, in 2032, the consumption of clean 
water  under  PWA’s  responsibility  will  reach  2,280  million  cubic  meters  or  2.3  times  the  
current consumption (PWA, 2012). Therefore, PWA will face with many challenges in 
the near future. To meet the rising demand, PWA has been forced to expand the water 
production and distribution systems.  
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4.4.2.2 Thailand Post 
Over the last several decades, despite the advance of information technology and its 
substitution for traditional postal services, POST has play as a vital role as a basic 
communication approach in strengthening  Thailand’s  economy  and  society.  POST  and  
CAT telecom Co. Ltd. were originally a part of Communication Authority of Thailand 
and were corporatized on August 14, 2003 with 100% ownership by Ministry of 
Finance. However, it is still under supervision from Ministry of Information and 
Communication   Technology.   POST’s   vision   is   “To   be   the   leader   in   postal   business  
through a comprehensive, convenient, quality network that can always be relied on to 
serve  the  need  of  Thai  people”.  POST  has  defined  its market in four businesses: postal, 
logistics, retail and finance. Only the postal market has been regulated by the Postal 
Service   Commission,   which   is   responsible   to   determine   ‘the   authorities,   rights   and  
benefits  of  POST’  (MICT,  2010).   
 
According to Union Postale (2012), the emergence of the internet caused a change in 
customer behaviour, which led to a decreasing number of customers for mail service, 
while the use of parcels and logistics services are rising due to a high demand from e-
commerce businesses across the world. In addition, in 2015, the Asean Economic 
Community (AEC) will be founded, which will lead to a free movement of products, 
services, labour forces and capital in the region, which consists of 10 countries. POST 
expects to face a great challenge due to the open market for the logistics business, so to 
overcome this situation, the organisation has been forced to improve its network and 
services. Recently, POST has been studying the impact of the AEC, which points out 
that some performance standards used in the organisation may be subject to change to 
become more internationalized, and the proposal of expanding its logistics business is 
in  the  Ministry  of  Information  and  Communication  Technology  (MICT)  and  the  MoF’s  
review process. 
 
The two case studies have some different characteristics that help the researcher in 
investigating how different types of SOEs can affect the use of PMS.  The key 
characteristics of PWA and POST are summarised and shown in Table 4.5 below. The 
information on organizational structure and financial data of the case study 
organisations is also provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 4.2: The key characteristics of PWA and POST 
 Provincial Waterworks 
Authority 
Thailand Post 
Ownership 100% owned by Thai 
government 
100% owned by Thai 
government 
Line ministry Ministry of Interior Ministry of Information and 
Communication 
Technology 
Regular body No The Postal Commission 
Corporatisation No Yes 
Privatisation No No 
Sector characteristic Capital intensive Labour intensive 
Company size Large-sized Large-sized 
Core product Treated water Postal services, 
communication and retail 
Subsidy from government Yes No 
Financial structure High leverage Low leverage 
Revenue tax responsibility No Yes 
Source:  Summarize  from  PWA  and  POST’s  annual report and performance measurement report 
 
In conclusion, this section provided the selection criteria for the case study 
organisations as well as relevant information about the field of Thai SOEs and the case 
study context for the research. The first part is to investigate the field of Thai SOEs and 
the development of PMS. Then, the case study context, which included the overview of 
the organisations and their characteristics, was presented.  All of these are necessary 
background for identifying institutional logics in chapter 5 and understanding 
institutional complexity, PMS and incentive systems in the case study organisations in 
chapters 6 and 7.  
 
4.5 Data Collection  
From the structure of the research mentioned above, the research used a qualitative case 
study approach. In this section the data stage will be discussed, including a brief idea 
about the data collection and techniques that were employed in the research. Schlappa 
(2009) state that to capture the range of perceptions of participants, an open and flexible 
approach for data collection is needed and structured to ensure that all data is collected 
systematically. Multiple sources of data are useful for the purpose of corroborating the 
themes as well as to enhance the validation of the findings (Hoque and Hopper, 1994). 
There are a variety of data collection techniques that allow participants to express their 
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opinions: interviews, open-ended questions, etc.  In this study, to increase the strength 
of the study findings, a semi-structured interview method was mainly adopted with 
support from document research. 
 
Yin   (2009,   p.   43)   states   that   ‘a   case   study   involves   an   inference   every   time   an   event  
cannot be directly observed. An investigator will infer that a particular event resulted 
from some earlier occurrence, based on the interview and documentary evidence 
collected   as   part   of   the   case   study.’   Therefore,   it   is   important   to   note   that   before   the  
field   research,   the   documentary   research   was   critical   in   building   the   researcher’s  
familiarisation with the organisations. This understanding provided invaluable 
background evidence related to the field of Thai SOEs and the case study organisations. 
It also helped the researcher to identify key informants as well as potential issues for the 
research and in planning for the following stages of the empirical research. At this 
stage, researcher collected board document data since the beginning of the introduction 
of PMS in 1995 (see the example of documents in section 4.5.2).  
 
The collected data includes the participants’ reflections upon their past experiences of 
working in SOEs and the changes that they have experienced in PMS and this helped 
the researcher to understand the connection between the research questions and the 
broader context (Creswell, 2003).  Even though, the primary fieldwork was undertaken 
from May to July, 2012, the scoping period of data collected from both the semi-
structured interview and in-depth documentary research was mainly focussed upon the 
period from the introduction of EVA and BSC to Thai SOEs in 2006 until the time of 
the interviews which were fully completed by the end of 2012. In this research, a 
scoping period refers to the period of time that determines the boundary of content and 
the extent of data that the researcher collected to define the issues that were to be 
analysed in the research.  
 
This scoping period was employed so that the researcher could establish a clear timeline 
for the research, to obtain the information that the researcher is looking for and to aid 
the data collection process.  The timeframe covered by this research can be summarised 
as shown in figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.1: Research timeframe 
 
Source: Adapted from Luangnual (2010, p. 4)  
 
4.5.1 Semi-structured interviews 
An interview technique was employed as the main type of data collection technique to 
understand the views of stakeholders related to PMS in Thailand. According to Miller 
and  Crabtree   (1999,   p.   89),   an   interview   technique   is   ‘a   research-gathering approach 
that seeks to create a listening space where meaning is constructed through an 
interexchange/co-creation  of  verbal  viewpoints  in  the  interest  of  scientific  knowing’.   
 
Thai SOEs are known for the difficulty in accessing their internal data and their 
bureaucratic structure in which authority is a key driver in organisational operations. 
Therefore, to collect data in such organisations, compared to other data collection 
techniques   the   interview   technique   can   be   more   efficient   because   of   the   interview’s  
flexible and dynamic nature though interactive discussion, which allows the researcher 
to explore the experiences of participants as well as to bring out new information which 
is not stated in a paper (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). There are many types of interviews, 
which range from highly formal and structured to informal and unstructured 
conversation (Saunders et al., 2012).  
 
According Rubin and Rubin (2005), the semi-structured interview helps researchers to 
explore contexts that cannot be easily investigated, by seeing the research topic from 
the  participants’  perspectives  and  understanding  how  and  why  they  have  their  particular  
perspectives (King, 1994). Accordingly, active interaction between interviewers and 
participants is expected and is shaped by the contexts and situations in which the 
interviews take place (Fontana and Frey, 2005). As a result, in this research, a semi-
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structured interview technique was employed due to its flexibility and appropriateness 
to the objectives of the study, especially in the situation where the researcher is 
uncertain about what and how much information she would get from the interview 
(King, 1994).  
 
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect qualitative data for identifying 
institutional logics and their responses to PMS and incentive systems, as well as to 
gather information and valuable opinions related to the research (Bryman and Bell, 
2007; Saunders et al., 2012).  Semi-structured interviews allow more flexibility for both 
the interviewers and interviewees to explore more on the topic of the interview. 
Consequently, the scoping period which the interview questions were designed to 
address covered (or emphasised) the period from 2006 to 2012 as shown in the figure 
4.2. According to Saunders et al. (2012), in a semi-structured interview, the researcher 
has some key questions or a list of themes but the sequence of the questions and 
additional  questions  depend  on  the  participant’s  experience  and  the  conversational  flow.  
Such interviews allow the interviewee to talk freely, and the more comfortable the 
interviewee is, the more they are prepared to openly share their thoughts. This method 
gives us the flexibility to use prepared questions, but strict adherence to them is not 
required, as new questions might emerge during the conversation (Myers, 2009).  
 
This helps the researcher to collect data on some research topics in detail as well as 
makes the participant who is conversant with the topic better express his opinion (King, 
1994).  This research focuses on issues which are vital for understanding an individual’s  
perception of the implementation of performance measurement and incentive systems 
as well as to explore the hidden messages such as the institutional pressures and the 
effects of their context on how the organisation adopts and implements PMS. However, 
this method does have some disadvantages, such as when there is a lack of trust shown 
by the interviewee towards the interviewer, inducing biased or inaccurate answers. 
Also, if the interviewee is too talkative, then too much irrelevant data will be gathered; 
if he is not in a talkative mood then too little information will be gathered (Myers, 
2009). Accordingly, guidance for the semi-structured interview will be constructed 
based on information collected from document research and the literature review, and 
this helps the researcher to give a structure to this interview process and keep the focus 
of the interviewee on the relevant topic and avoid some of the drawbacks of these types 
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of interviews (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Myers, 2009). To conduct the interviews, the 
following issues should be considered. 
 
4.5.1.1 Selection of the interviewees 
The focus of this research is to examine how and why the implementation and 
operational stages of PMS are perceived to succeed or fail; therefore, data were 
collected at the individual level. One-to-one interviews were used to help the researcher 
better control the flow of conversation as well as to allow the participants to express 
their opinions more freely on a sensitive topic. The selection of the interviewees is an 
important stage to ensure that the researcher can gather adequate data from participants. 
According to Ritchie et al. (2003a), qualitative research uses non-probability samples 
for  which  the  basis  of  selection  is  based  on  ‘the  characteristics  of  the  population’.  As  a  
result, in this research the sample was chosen in such a way as to ensure the desired 
information is provided (Merriam, 1998). The researcher purposively selected the 
participants who were at least involved in one of the PMS. The variety of the 
participants is also important for the researcher to get different points of views.  
 
Based on the research aims, the participants can be divided into three categories: 
(1) top-level management, including chief executive officers, financial directors and 
other executives in order to investigate the policies used and the relationship 
between government and organisations;  
(2) organisational employees at various levels from operational staff to managers to 
represent how they perceived institutional logics as well as how they perceived 
and responded towards institutional complexity in the implementation and use 
of PMS and what constraints occur when a PMS is conducted within an 
organisation; and  
(3) external stakeholders including government agencies and consulting firms  to 
understand the policy, regulation, and interconnection with SOEs.   
 
In both cases, to understand the context of the organisation as well as its performance 
measurement policy, the two most important participants who were purposively 
selected were the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO). The 
other executives and other employees were selected based on the organisational 
structure and their involvement with PMS. In the process of selecting the list of 
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participants in this group, the researcher had to discuss closely with the key personal 
contact due to the limitations of availability and accessibility. Lastly, the participants 
from the external stakeholder group were purposively chosen based on their 
relationship with the case study organisations. Most participants in this group were 
from  the  MoF  due  to  their  involvement  with  the  SOEs’  PMS.   
 
According to Ritchie et al. (2003a), in qualitative research, there is no requirement for a 
sufficient size of sample due to the rich information acquired from each sample; 
therefore, quality samples are usually small in size. In order to achieve the research 
objectives, the study is carried out through semi-structured interviews of the key 
informants. The target interviewees of this study were divided into two categories: 
policymakers and State-owned Enterprise employees, and the number of interviewees 
will be eighty-one in total as shown in Table 4.6 below.   
 
Table 4.3: The number of participants 
Interviewee Group No. of participants 
Policy Maker 
- Ministry of Finance 8 
- Ministry of Interior 1 
- Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology 
1 
- National Economics and Social 
Development Bureau 
1 
- Consulting firms 2 
Total 13 
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Interviewee Group No. of participants 
State-Owned Enterprise (2 organisations) 
 Case Study 
1 
Case study 
2 
Total 
- Board of Directors 1 1 2 
- Chief Executive Officer 1 1 2 
- Financial Director 1 1 2 
- Other top management participants 9 12 21 
- Mid-level manager 9 12 21 
- Staff 11 9 20 
Total amount 32 36 68 
 
4.5.1.2 Interview preparation  
Saunders   et   al.   (2012,   p.   384)   state,   ‘the   key   to   a   successful   interview   is   careful  
preparation’  which   helps   the   researcher   to   gain   credibility  with   the   interviewee.      The  
key measures for preparation are   ‘level  of  knowledge’,   ‘developing   interview   themes’  
and  ‘the  appropriateness  of  interview  location’.  Before  the  field  research,  the  interview  
plan was drawn up. As mentioned before, the flexibility of a semi-structured interview 
helps the researcher to explore the research objectives and additional information as 
well as to develop conversation flow in unique ways for each participant. Therefore, 
knowledge of the research topic and organisational context is required (Saunders et al., 
2012). In addition to a literature review, documentary research about the organisation 
and discussion with key contact and informant persons had been done before the field 
interviews. This helped the researcher to gain confidence as well as to demonstrate 
researcher credibility.  This preparation also helped the researcher to reduce 
misinterpretation   of   participants’   messages   due   to   ‘culture   differences’   between   the  
researcher and participants (Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
In the developing the interview themes stage, the interview questions were carefully 
designed based on prior literature and organizational context to reflect the research aim 
and objectives.  The list of questions helps the researcher to better control the 
conversation flow by guiding participants to discuss their experiences and opinions in 
the scope of a PMS. However, the nature of a semi-structured interview also allows the 
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researcher to be more open in seeking additional information which may beyond the list 
of questions but is still relevant to the performance measurement topic. The interview 
questions were designed in English, and subsequently translated into Thai (see 
Appendix C).  
 
Three pilot interviews were conducted in order to test the appropriateness and clarity of 
the list of questions as well as to assess whether the translated questions can be 
understood appropriately. Three pilot interviews were carried out with an account 
manager and an account officer in the State Enterprise Policy Office, the MoF. The 
other interview was with a manager in the National Housing Authority. Based on the 
comments and feedback from the pilot interviewees, the questions were revised to be 
more understandable and to provide some examples for a clearer explanation.  Finally, 
the question guidelines for different types of participants were prepared for the three 
types of participants: participants from SOEs, participants from the MoF and 
participants from other stakeholders (see Appendix C).  
 
The finalized interview questions contained three key topics. Firstly, the background 
information of the participant was collected. Next, the questions focused on the 
participant’s  and  organisational  relationship  with  government  agencies  and  other  SOEs,  
especially the MoF. This helps the researcher to explore the occurrences of institutional 
complexity regarding prevailing multiple institutional logics that affect the adaptation 
and implementation of PMS. Lastly, how PMS were implemented and employed in the 
organisation was examined. This topic helps the researcher to investigate the 
organisational responses as well as to find the key success or failure factors of the use 
of PMS. Also in this part, the connection between PMS and organisational incentive 
systems was questioned. At the closing stage of the interview, the researcher also gave 
participants the opportunity to share their opinions on related issues which may not 
have been mentioned in the earlier stages. In additional from the finalized questions, the 
pilot interviews also helped the researcher to assess the length of the interviews and the 
sequence of questions. 
 
4.5.1.3 Interview process 
The interviews were conducted from May to July 2013, and the data from eighty-one 
participants were collected. Semi-structured interviews were mainly conducted on the 
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field site of the case study organisations, both in head offices in Bangkok and in their 
branches or plant locations. For the government agencies and consulting firms, all the 
interviews  took  place  at  the  participants’  sites.   
 
As mentioned before, the first group of participants, case   study   organisations’  
executives and government agencies were selected purposively based on their position 
and knowledge of PMS. The other group of participants, especially employees at the 
operational level, were self-selected by their willingness to participate in the research. 
First, before the field research was undertaken, the researcher asked for permission 
from  both  cases’  chief  executive  officers  to  conduct   the  research  in  their  organisation.  
Next, an appointment with each participant was made through the key contact person 
and in some cases by researcher herself. After appointment confirmation, an 
information sheet and consent form were sent to each participant at least a week before 
the interview session.  
 
On the day of the interview, the researcher started the interview by introducing herself 
and made some short conversation with the participant to gain credibility. Then, an 
opening statement which included a brief background of the research and the 
explanation of the consent form was read out to each participant to clarify the purpose 
of the research as well as to assure the participant that his identity would remain 
confidential (see Appendix D). Next, the participants were asked for permission to tape 
the interview, or if this was not possible then alternatively to take brief notes during the 
interview.  
 
Then,  the  researcher  followed  Myers’  (2009)  guidelines: 
● Ask short and clear questions; 
● Encourage participants to recall past experiences and events relevant to the 
topic; 
● Ask only a few broad and open ended questions; 
● Be flexible and open to new ideas and lines of inquiry. 
 
The researcher used the list of interview questions as a guideline to ensure that the 
information obtained from participants covered all relevant research topics and met the 
research aims in the time limit (Patton, 1990). Related additional questions were added 
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based   on   the   participant’s   experience   context   and   conversation   flow.   Then,   the  
researcher summarised the key sensitive issues and confirmed them with the 
participants. 
 
At the end of the interview session, the researcher thanked the participants for sharing 
the information; however, informal conversations with some participants were also 
carried out depending on their willingness. Some useful information was also collected 
at this stage. The length of the interviews conducted ranged from one to one and a half 
hours. On average, an interview took approximately one hour. Sixty one interviews 
were digitally recorded. Furthermore, informal conversations with some key informants 
were conducted, which also provided the researcher with some significant information. 
 
4.5.2 Documentary research/ Secondary data  
According to Yin (1994), secondary data is useful because it can provide additional 
evidence or arguments, particularly about the wider context.  According to Scott (1990, 
p.   59),   the   documents   published   by   governmental   agencies   are   the   ‘single   most  
important  category  of  documentary  sources  used  in  social  research’.  Generally  it  is  seen  
that there is a wealth of data and information within Thai governmental organisations 
and case study organisations that can be drawn upon and analysed to address 
performance measurement issues as well as develop questions for interviews. The 
collection of secondary data relevant to the research was undertaken to collect 
information on the cases, to develop a broad view as well as to understand the 
guidelines for PMS in SOEs and other research related data.  
 
As suggested by Bryman and Bell (2007), existing internal studies, known as internal 
secondary data, related to the research topic will be examined at the beginning of the 
study in order to gain a deeper understanding of PMS and background information on 
the research subject. Research using this approach is appropriate since the Thai 
government has conducted studies related to the subject of the study. This information 
is already recorded and documented by the State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) and it 
serves as the main source for further documentary research. Most documents from the 
Thai government  and  SEPO  are  related  to  SOE’s  PMS  such  as  The  master  plan  for  state  
enterprise sector reform, State Enterprise Performance Evaluation, State Enterprise 
Performance Appraisal, Good Governance etc., and the performance agreement 
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between the MoF and SOE and State Enterprise Review, which included brief 
information on each SOE in its financial condition, operation and key issues. This helps 
the researcher to better prepare herself for her field interviews. The other important 
source of the documentary research is the documents from case study organisations, 
which were collected from the key informant persons and participants. The documents 
collected in this research are as follows. 
 
Table 4.4: The documents collected in this research 
Document Source Year 
The performance measurement system in state owned 
enterprise 
Thai cabinet office 1995 
The master plan for state enterprise sector reform Thai government 1998 
EVA measurement manual prepared for State Enterprise 
Policy Office 
Stern Stewart & Co. 2003 
EVA measurement calculation guideline for State 
Enterprise Policy Office 
Stern Stewart & Co. 2004 
State Enterprise Policy office annual report SEPO 2004 
Water sector privatisation plan SEPO 2005 
EVA calculation report for PWA  SEPO and Stern 
Stewart & Co. 
2005 
The EVM implementation guideline (PWA) SEPO and Stern 
Stewart & Co. 
2007 
The evaluation of performance measurement system  SEPO 2008 
SOE awards report SEPO 2008-2012 
Public service obligation guideline SEPO 2009 
Thailand water service assessment Asian Development 
Bank 
2009 
The manual of  performance measurement system SEPO 2010 
The presentation of SOEs governance structure Mr. Kulit Sombatsiri, 
Deputy Director 
General, SEPO,   
2010 
Good governance criteria SEPO 2010 
Annual accounting report (PWA) PWA 2010-2014 
Annual accounting report (POST) POST 2010-2014 
State Enterprise Review (PWA) SEPO 2010-2014 
State Enterprise Review (POST) SEPO 2010-2014 
Performance agreement (PWA) MoF 2010-2013 
Performance agreement (POST) MoF  2010-2013 
Performance measurement report (PWA) PWA 2010-2012 
Performance measurement report (POST) POST 2010-2012 
State enterprise performance review SEPO 2011-2012 
State Enterprise Performance Appraisal Guideline 
 
SEPO 2011 
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Document Source Year 
The development of state enterprise performance 
measurement system  
Mrs. Danucha 
Yindeepit,  Advisor 
on Finance, the 
Ministry of Finance 
2011 
PWA investment plan (submitted to NESDB) PWA 2011 
PWA individual balance scorecard manual PWA 2011 
POST investment plan (submitted to NESDB) POST 2011 
PWA customer service evaluation report PWA 2012 
EVM and the requirements of EP calculation for 2012 SEPO 2012 
State owned enterprises performance measurement 
system  
SEPO 2012 
Statement of directions for state owned enterprises SEPO 2012 
Organisational performance report and self assessment 
report (PWA) 
PWA 2012 
Organisational performance report and self assessment 
report (POST) 
POST 2012 
PWA strategic plan (2011-2016) PWA 2011 
POST business plan (2011-2016) POST 2011 
POST business plan (2012-2017) POST 2012 
POST shareholders’meeting report POST 2012 
Board of directors minute of meeting PWA 2011-2012 
The overview of SOEs  2013 
The manual of performance measurement system and 
incentive system 
SEPO 2013 
 
The scoping period of this in-depth documentary research was from 2006 until the end 
of 2012. This enabled the researcher to examine the impact of institutional 
arrangements and logics as well as how organisations report their progress or issues on 
the use of PMS. Furthermore, this in-depth documentary research provided significant 
material related to the Thai context and in-depth detail on case study organisations 
which further helped the researcher to interpretation the phenomena. This rich data is 
also useful to re-confirm some missing or confusing interpretations of the interviews if 
they occur. However, the researcher signed agreements with each case study 
organisation that prohibit the researcher from publishing some important information 
before receiving consent from the organisations. In addition, external secondary sources 
of data such as reliable journals and external studies related to the research topic were 
examined. The following are some of the other sources of external secondary data: 
government publications, consulting firm studies, and published research materials 
from electronic databases.   
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Even though documentary research is known as a cost-effective method (Payne and 
Payne, 2004), there are potential limitations of this type of research method. According 
to Crowther and Lancaster (2008), the available data could be relatively complex or not 
specific to the context of the proposed research topic. Also, it is easy for anyone to 
place information on the web and the information may only be a personal opinion and 
not a peer-reviewed research paper. Consequently, to overcome the document research 
limitations, the documents used in the research were obtained using a cautious approach 
with data collected only from trustworthy sources such as the Thai government and 
SOEs to ensure that only authentic and reliable information was analysed.  
 
4.6 Data Analysis  
According to Robson (1993), qualitative data analysis seeks to explain underlying 
research problems with less direct assertion than numerical forms of measurement. 
Normally, raw qualitative data are vast and come in various forms, such as interview 
transcripts, observations, and written documents (Ritchie et al., 2003b). As mentioned 
above, this research used semi-structured interviews and secondary data from two cases 
from two different sectors to collect qualitative data, which needed to be analysed and 
interpreted.  Because there are different sectors, environmental regulations and 
environmental performance measures, it makes more sense to use a qualitative analysis 
to understand and explain how organisations are dealing with different environmental 
pressures and what practices they are adopting. 
 
According to Myer (2009, p. 165-166),  ‘One  of  the  reasons  for  focusing  on  the  analysis  
and interpretation of qualitative data is that a qualitative researcher almost always ends 
up with a huge amount of data. ...It is obvious that you cannot possibly include all of 
your  data  in  a  thesis.’ 
 
One of main challenges to qualitative analysis is a lack of conventions for the 
researcher to use for analysis (Robson, 1993). It may also be complicated to structure 
and summarise the data for effective analysis.  Therefore, data reduction and data 
interpretation are the main tasks in qualitative analysis (Ritchie et al., 2003).  Also, 
Saunders et al. (2012, p. 547) explain that the qualitative data analysis process starts 
with  data  selection,  which  is  ‘based  on  meaning  express  through  the  words’.  Then,  the  
researcher needs to summarise and simplify as well as organize the selected data. The 
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well-organized data  is  called  ‘data  display’,  which  will  facilitate  the  researcher  to  better  
interpret and analyse the data in the final stage.  
 
Although, there are many qualitative data analysis methods available, applying the 
general convention to the nature of this research mentioned above, the data were 
analysed using qualitative content analysis. According to Mostyn (1985), qualitative 
researchers use content analysis as a diagnostic tool to deal with a large volume of 
open-ended material. Content analysis is a technique  through  which  researchers  ‘seek  to  
demonstrate  the  meaning  of  written  or  visual  sources  …  by  systematically  collocating  
their content to pre-determined, detailed categories, and then both quantifying and 
interpreting  the  outcome’  (Payne  and  Payne,  2004, p. 51).  
 
The approach to content analysis used in this research will be thematic analysis to find 
distinctions  made  between  cases.  Ryan  and  Bernard   (2000,  p.   780)   state,   ‘themes   are  
abstract constructs the investigators identify before, during, and after  analysis’,  in  order  
to   uncover   ‘themes   and   patterns’   of   meaning   in   the   data.   According   to   Braun   and  
Clarke (2006, p. 37), the key advantages of thematic analysis are as follows: flexibility, 
easily  used,  can  identify  ‘similarities  and  differences  across data  set’  and  ‘can  generate  
unanticipated   insights’.      In   this   research,   thematic   analysis   was   also   used   under   the  
content analysis technique by following the six phases of analysis that are 
recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006). 
 
Phase 1: Familiarizing with the data  
This phase is similar to the other forms of qualitative analysis in that the researcher has 
to make herself familiar with the data content by various methods such as transcribing 
the data, reading and re-reading the data. After conducting an interview, the researcher 
transcribes the audio into written text (Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999).  As mentioned 
before, all the interviews were carried out in Thai; therefore, the transcripts were 
transcribed in the original language used in the interview.  By transcribing, the 
researcher can gain more familiarity and better understanding of the data (Braun and 
Clarke,   2006).   In   order   to   prevent   ‘lost   in   translation’   problems,   all   the   interview  
records were kept and analysed in their original language to help the researcher to 
capture the true message of the interview data. Also in this stage, the list of ideas from 
the entire set of data was generated. 
98 
 
Phase 2: Generating initial codes 
After the researcher was familiarized with the data, this phase involved going through 
all   the   text  and  producing   the   ‘initial   codes’   from   the  data   (Braun  and  Clarke,  2006).    
According   to   Saunders   et   al.   (2012),   ‘initial   coding’   is   the   process   of   providing   a  
‘similar   unit   of   data’   with   a   category   or   a   label.   By   generating   initial codes, the 
researcher can better connect the conceptual interpretations with the data by organizing 
them  into  a  ‘meaningful  group’  (Tuckett,  2005)  and  reducing  the  data  into  manageable  
chunks (Dey, 1999).   
 
Since this phase was an early stage of the data analysis, the researcher worked back and 
forth  through  the  entire  data  set  as  well  as  using  my  ‘subjectivity’  as  a  research  tool  to  
create   codes.   According   to   Auerbach   and   Silverstein   (2003,   p.   77),   ‘subjectivity,  
interpretation and context are inevitably interwoven   into   every   research   project’.  The  
‘subjective  coding’  was  used  to  identify  the  core  category  to  recognize  the  relationship  
between codes and sub-codes (Saunder et al., 2012). In this study, the rationales for 
selecting codes in this phase were as   follows:   the   researcher’s   academic   background  
and   experience   in   the   performance  measurement   field,   the   researcher’s   experience   in  
the Thailand context and culture as well as the case study context in interpreting the 
conversations with participants.  
 
An Excel programme was employed to help the researcher manually organize the data 
and code them by PMS and other related systems such as EVM, BSC, or incentive 
system etc. as the main categories that appear interesting to the researcher. Furthermore, 
the set of codes was developed after the first interview and additional codes coding 
from each interview were included in the set, which sometimes required the researcher 
to look backward to the previous interview record. According to Bryman (2004), initial 
coding has been criticized for losing context; therefore, in this research other relevant 
surrounding data was also kept.  However, according to Braun and Clarke (2006), the 
initial code of research data differs from the theme, but it should lead the researcher to 
identify concepts and themes in the next phase.  
 
Phase 3:  Searching for themes and Phase 4: Reviewing themes 
According to King (2004), after coding the transcripts from the interviews into broad 
themes, the researcher needs to analyse each broad theme in detail, which could help 
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the researcher to find distinctions between cases. After the researcher lists initial codes 
in phase 2, Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 19) explain that this phase 3 is searching for 
themes  by  ‘sorting  the  different  codes  into  potential  themes’.    At  this  phase,  themes  and  
sub-themes for the research were created. Some codes that did not belong or fit to any 
theme were put in a miscellaneous theme in case it might be useful in the future.  
 
In  phase  4,  ‘candidate  themes’  that  the  researcher identified in phase 3 were refined by 
combining, regrouping or breaking down into new themes. Regarding the validity of 
themes, the data set was reviewed again to ensure that individual themes could 
represent the phenomenon accurately as well as to look for missing additional data that 
matched with the themes. 
 
In this research, the third and fourth phases were worked back and forth to help the 
researcher   in   sorting   different   codes   into   ‘potential   themes’,   which   could   form  main  
themes or sub-themes in the research. The literature review was used to identify 
research themes. In addition, due to the uncertainty of using themes, no theme was 
discarded in this phase. 
 
Phase 5: Defining and naming themes and Phase 6: Producing the report 
Phase 5 focused on organizing the themes that were used in this research by looking for 
coherence of the content of data in each theme. Then, the researcher tried to figure out 
why and in what way the content of data is important, so later on the researcher could 
analyse the data and explain the story behind each theme as well as decide the degree to 
which there is a need of sub-themes in the main theme (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This 
helped to structure the complex themes. At the end of this phase, the identified themes 
for the research as well as their titles were provided and used in the final analysis and 
write up of the thesis. At this final phase, the modification of codes occurred to re-
ensure their appropriateness, accuracy and coherence in the thesis context. The 
segments   of   interview   statements   were   used   as   evidence   to   support   the   researcher’s  
interpretation as well as to re-tell what happened in the organisation.  
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4.7 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter attempted to design, justify and explain the analytical 
procedures used in the research by starting with the philosophy and approach choices 
that  lie  behind  the  research.  According  to  the  researcher’s  view  on  constructivism,  the  
methodology that fit this research was a qualitative approach, which also led to the 
selection of methods and techniques to conduct the research.  Constructivist researchers 
seek  to  understand  ‘reality’  through  individual  action  and  perception  of  phenomena  that  
are socially constructed rather than discovered (Crotty, 1998). This researcher’s  choice  
of paradigm led to the selection of a qualitative approach.  A multiple case study 
strategy was used to conduct the research. According to Eisenhardt (1989), multiple 
case study characteristics, replication and extension among individual cases helps a 
researcher to validate and generalize findings. Therefore, in this research, two cases 
were selected from two different industrial sectors for comparison and generalization.  
In doing these case studies, the following data collection techniques were employed: 
semi-structured interviews and document research.  Semi-structured interviews as the 
main technique were used to acquire in-depth data. The interaction between researcher 
and participants helped the researcher to explore issues, clarify meaning and verify the 
relationship occurred. The interview process also explained how the samples were 
selected, with the number of interview participants totalling eighty-one people.  Finally, 
for the data analysis, the researcher employed thematic analysis for qualitative data. The 
codes were first developed and then the themes were created to explain the phenomena.  
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Chapter 5  
Understanding the Institutional Logics in  
Thai State Owned Enterprises  
  
5.1 Introduction  
The review of performance management and measurement systems as well as 
institutional theory and  related issues in chapters 2 and 3 reveals that there have been 
only a few studies conducted on the institutional logics in State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and thus far no research has focused on SOEs in Thailand. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to identify the possible institutional logics shared amongst Thai SOEs. 
The findings are mainly drawn from the case study context and characteristics discussed 
which derived from the in-depth documentary research (see section 4.5, table 4.4)  and 
semi-structured interviews with various groups of participants from the case study 
organisations as well as some participants from policy maker groups (See chapter 4 
section 4.5, table 4.3).  
 
Research has shown that multiple institutional logics occur in hybrid organisations (e.g. 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). The next section presents the 
field of SOEs in Thailand. Then, this chapter examines five institutional logics: the 
logic of bureaucracy, the logic of commercial operations, the logic of social activities, 
the logic of seniority and the logic of unity.  The first three logics are identified from 
SOE managerial practices, while the others are derived from Thai culture and the 
organisational norms. In each logic, the empirical data and explanations are provided in 
order to better explain how the logic is embedded in the organisation and how 
institutional complexity affects the case study organisations. The final section provides 
a brief summary of the chapter. 
 
5.2 The Field of State Owned Enterprises 
In chapter 3 section 3.5, it was noted that there are many levels at which institutional 
logics may develop, including the organisation or its markets and the organisational 
field (Thornton and Ocasic, 2008, p.106). This study focuses on the institutional logics 
in organisations and organisational fields with an emphasis in the field of SOEs, rather 
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than the industry in which the case study is located. The field of SOEs is ideal for this 
study because it provides an ideal   field   setting   to   address   the   study’s   objective   by  
comparing two cases as Thai SOEs rather than two organisations in different industry 
sectors.   
 
According   to   Greenwood   et   al.   (2011,   p.344),   ‘the   nature   and   extent   of   institutional  
complexity facing organisations is fundamentally shaped by the structure of the 
organisational   fields  within  which   they  are   located’.     As  we   saw   in   chapter  3   section  
3.5,  organisations  in  the  field  can  experience  uncertainty  in  ‘institutional  arrangement’,  
which results in them being influenced by the actors and logics outside the field. This 
section identifies the type of field structure of the field of SOEs, which helps to identify 
institutional logics in the next section and the degree of institutional complexity 
experienced by organisations in the field, as discussed in chapter 8.  
 
Regarding the characteristics of public sector organisations described in chapter 1 
section 1.3, SOEs have to deal with various stakeholders; however, the most influential 
group is the policy maker group, which consists of a variety of government agencies. 
During the interviews with executives and management level participants in PWA and 
POST,  it  was  recognised  that  two  important  agencies  that  have  an  influence  on  SOEs’  
management and policy are the MoF and line ministries, which are the Ministry of 
Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology 
(MICT) respectively (see chapter 1 section 1.3). However, the degree of the 
involvement of the line ministry depends on how active the Minister is at that time, as 
well as the specific policy given directly to the SOE.  
 
In PWA, most executive participants agree that the involvement of MoI is normally in 
policy and budget management. Many participants at middle management and 
operation levels point out that MoI does not participate in PWA operations significantly 
except in the budgeting planning process, while the MoF involves itself rather more in 
PWA  operations  and  management  through  the  MoF’s  designed  PMS. 
 
According to one PWA executive (B1_001),  
 “MoI  does  not  directly   regulate  or  command  an  organisation   to   improve  
its performance but it will be involved with PWA in cases where policy 
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directly affects Thai citizens. The degree of MoI involvement depends on 
the Minister at that time.  Normally, the MoI is mostly involved with the 
budget  plan  that  needs  to  be  approved  each  year  …Personally,  I  think  the  
MoF is more suitable to help as well as shape SOEs in improving 
efficiency.” 
 
According to one PWA executive (B1_002), 
“MoI  works as a coordinator between PWA and other agencies in case it 
has a policy or project that needs to be done together. For example, the use 
of a smart citizen identification card to register with PWA and the 
employment of military maps for planning in water  pipe  networks  etc.” 
 
Similarly, POST participants mentioned that the MICT is not very active in POST 
policy or business strategy. However, sometimes the Thai government might assign 
POST to do a business related project or an ad-hoc project, which POST has the ability 
to accept or reject. For example, in 2010, the Thai government assigned POST to do a 
micro-finance project that employed the concept of Grameen Bank to examine the 
provision of financing to low-income citizens.  The project was rejected by POST after a 
year of further investigation (Interview record: A1_006). Participants questioned the 
MoF and line ministry roles towards SOEs. Some participants requested the agencies 
increase their effort as well as support for SOEs, while others think that the agencies 
should decrease their involvement in SOE business and management. 
 
According to a POST executive (B2_001), 
“One   of   our   management   problems   is   that   government   agencies   do   not  
support us enough. They tend to regulate us instead of helping us. ” 
 
Also, a POST executive (B2_005) stated,  
“The  MoF  is  not  supposed  to  be  involved  in  SOE  activities  too  much…It  
should act like a shareholder and should not interfere in our business 
management.” 
 
There are other related government agencies that also have authority to approve as well 
as  monitor  many   of   PWA’s   and   POST’s   plans   and   operations;;   for   example, National 
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Economics and Social Development Bureau (NESBD) for approving investment plans, 
Public Debt Management Office (PDMO) for approving long-term loans as well as bond 
issuing plans etc. The roles of various government agencies sometimes overlap and 
cause more work for SOEs. For example, PWA is required to report its performance to 
most of the mentioned agencies above, but using different forms as well as data sets. 
One of the departmental directors (B1_105) experienced in working with government 
agencies stated,  
“There   is   inadequate   integration   between   government   agencies,   which  
leads  us  to  duplication  of  work.” 
 
Also, according to a PWA director of Office of Corporate Communication and 
Customer Relations, 
“Due  to  the  infamous  red  tape  in  the  bureaucracy  system  ….  as  well  as  too  
many government agencies to deal with, sometimes we have to use our 
connections  to  accelerate  our  work.” 
 
However, participants from POST are not very concerned about overlapping roles of 
government agencies. Participants stated that POST does not have a major investment 
plan, and recently the budget is mostly related to operations and does not need financial 
funding, so there is little to no pressure from NESDB and PDMO.  
 
The other method for government agencies to become involved with SOEs is sending 
their representatives to be members of boards of directors. Currently, PWA has eleven 
members on its board of directors with the PWA governor as a member and secretary of 
the board while POST has at least five members with a representative from the MICT 
as a member and secretary of the board. Amongst members, normally at least two are 
from a line ministry and the MoF. The rest of the members are from related ministries 
and the director pool, for which the MoF provides the suitable candidate list. However, 
the representatives from government agencies also can be affected by politics. More 
importantly, a board of directors is subject to change when the line minister changes. In 
practical terms, members of board of directors who are assigned for political reasons 
will resign or will be forced to resign from their positions. 
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According to one PWA executive (B1_001),  
 “…   the  MoI  may   influence PWA in selecting members of the board of 
directors.  …  However,   I   think   the  candidate   list   from  the  director  pool   is  
still   inadequate   …   and   in   many   circumstances,   candidates   are   selected  
depending  on  which  political  side  they  belong  to.” 
 
According to one POST executive (B2_005), 
“The   Director   Pool   system   is   a   good   system   for   finding   independent  
members of the board of directors. However, political intervention leads 
SOEs to get pseudo independent members. Our board of directors is not 
frequently changed when compared to other SOEs such as CAT Telecom 
Public Company Limited and TOT Public Company Limited (which are 
also under the MICT). The change of Minister from a different political 
party can lead to the change of board of directors and the change of 
management  team.” 
 
The frequency of changing the members of the board of directors as well as the 
inadequate qualifications of individual members specifically in the industry in which the 
SOE is located can affect any decision made by the board. 
 
As we saw in chapter 3 section 3.5, the structure of a field can be unpredictably 
fragmented when the different interests are difficult to balance (Greenwood et al., 
2011). The other problem in bureaucratic structure is the conflict between government 
agencies, as each agency is structured to achieve a different value (Tulis, 1987).  In 
Thailand there is evidence of SOEs being influenced by numerous government agencies 
with conflicting interests and different demands. The conflicts cannot always be 
resolved and they affect the SOE in positioning itself in the industry as well as its 
strategies and operations. 
 
At the time the interviews took place, many participants from POST and the 
government agencies, both the  MoF and  the MICT, mentioned that there was a 
conflict over the POST business plan for the logistics business, which the MoF 
disapproved by claiming that the plan may not follow the constitution of the Kingdom 
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of Thailand and its related laws. Similar to courier services in the private sector, the 
logistics business plan in POST is a transportation and distribution service that requires 
the  expansion  of  POST’s  network  and  hubs.      Recently,  many  private  companies  have  
been offering this service in Thailand. The MoF said that the law prohibits an SOE from 
carrying out a business that the public can do. In this case, the MoF stated that the 
logistics business in Thailand is already well established by private companies. Later 
on, both Ministries asked for a legal opinion from the Office of Council of State. 
However, both sides still interpreted the legal opinion to favour their opposing interests 
(Interview record: A1_003).  As a result, this business plan is still on hold. 
 
According  to  a  MoF’s  representative  on  the  POST  board  of  directors  (A1_006), 
“Recently,   POST planned to expand our business by founding a new 
logistics company to support our core business which follows the 
statement  of  directions  from  the  Thai  Government.  …  POST  proposed  this  
business   plan   to   the   MoF   through   the   MICT….   State   Enterprise   Policy 
Office (one of the MoF agencies), which is in charge of the Thai 
government’s   state   of   directions   of   every   SOE   including   POST,   has  
opposed the idea and did not give a clear explanation or the process for 
POST  to  take  action.    …  This  incident  occurred  because of the change in 
SEPO’s   director.   The   current   director   did   not   agree   with   the   former  
director  about   the  logistics  business.  ….  Even  after  the  Office  of  Council  
State   gave   an   opinion   about   this   circumstance,   SEPO’s   director   still  
insisted on rejecting the  proposal.” 
 
She also gave her opinion about the above incident,  
“At  the  year  end,  each  ministry  has  to  report  its  performance  and  result  to  
the Thai government. The SOE result will be included in the line ministry 
report.  …   These   lead   to   the   view   that the MoF sometimes is not active 
enough or does not pay sufficient attention to the SOEs. In the POST 
problem I mentioned before, the MoF did not follow up the result or take 
any further action, which has resulted in the delay of the project for a year 
already.” 
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This problem was also mentioned by a POST executive (B2_001), 
“For  example  our  proposal  on  logistics  has  been  delayed  because  both  the  
MoF  and  the  MICT  just  asked  each  other  for  suggestions  and  comments  …  
it would be better that only one government agency has authority to make a 
decision.” 
 
On the other hand, in the interviews of PWA participants, the conflict of interests 
between the MoF and the MoI were not mentioned much. One reason is that the Thai 
water sector is also partly regulated by the Water Development Committee, which has a 
Deputy Prime Minister as a chairman, and representatives from both the MoF and the 
MoI   as   the   committee’s   secretary.   However,   according   to   an   MoI   participant,   this  
committee was not active for nearly two years due to some political issues. The other 
reason is that there is no regulatory body for the water sector; therefore, the investment 
plan as well as the water tariff is under the control of PWA. Some PWA participants 
stated that the MoI is not involved much in PWA business and it only passes the PWA 
investment plan or other important documents to other related agencies or higher levels 
such as the Thai cabinet to approve the project. In the off-record informal interviews, 
some participants commented that the MoI just   stamps   the   PWA’s   documents   or  
proposals and passes them through to the authorized agencies. 
 
According to one of the PWA executives (B1_001), 
“The  MoI   is   not   involved  much   in   PWA   activities.   The  MoI   sometimes  
may ask for PWA cooperation in issues that impact   Thai   citizens…The  
MoI may give a policy to PWA but it depends on the Minister at that 
time…  Normally,   the  MoI  only  pays  attention   to   the  SOE  Budget,  which  
has  to  be  submitted  to  the  Thai  cabinet  for  approval  through  the  MoI.” 
 
However, many participants agreed that the MoI also works as a coordinator to 
help PWA in cooperation with other government agencies. 
 
According to one PWA executive (B1_003), 
“The   MoI   is   a   middle   man   in   helping   PWA   to   cooperate   with   other  
government agencies in the case that they are related or assigned together 
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on a project or take some part of the project. For example, PWA has to 
cooperate with departments of provincial administrations in employing a 
citizen identification smart card system to merge with the PWA customer 
database.” 
 
Also, some participants indicated that the different political parties that lead individual 
ministries can cause conflict of interests in government policy for SOEs.  
 
According  to  the  MoF’s  representative  on  the  POST  board  of  directors  (A1_006), 
“…  Sometimes  the  ministers  who  are  from  different  political  parties  may  
not  support  each  other’s  policy.  …as  well  as  the  lack  of  regulatory  body…        
Therefore, it is possible to have a conflict of interests between government 
agencies. For example, the MICT and the MoF can have different goals 
and  interests  for  POST.” 
 
Consequently, the conflict of interests between government agencies can cause delay, as 
well as dissuade SOEs from taking action on a particular project or management 
initiative. 
 
Apart from the conflict of interests amongst government agencies mentioned above, the 
evidence shows that government agencies also employ negotiation methods in order to 
reduce their competing demands. The most used method is to set up a specific 
committee with members from related government agencies; for example, the State 
Enterprise Committee, which is responsible for the development of SOEs, the 
Performance Agreement Committee, which is responsible for the design of SOE 
performance measurement system (PMS) as well as the annual SOE assessment, the 
Public Obligation Service (PSO) committee, which is responsible for PSO design and 
subsidisation etc. (SEPO, 2014). The other frequently used method is to ask for consent 
or approval from particular government agencies. For instance the statement of 
directions has to be approved by the MoF, line ministry and SOE before formalisation.  
Moreover, the conflicts of competing demands can often be solved by following the lead 
of the main agency that is responsible for a particular topic. The practices amongst the 
government  agencies  supports  Greenwood  et  al.’s  (2011)  analysis,  as  a  clear  hierarchy  
amongst institutions in a field can reduce the institutional complexity in organisations.  
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5.3 Institutional Logics  
Thornton et al. (2012) state that there are one or more institutional logics in each 
organisational field. As noted in chapter 3 section 3.4, SOEs are hybrid organisations 
that are typically influenced by multiple institutional logics. Therefore, in this study, the 
findings  provide  the  participants’  perspectives  on  the  core  logics  in  this  field:  the  logics  
of bureaucracy, social activities and commercial operations, along with the other 
institutional logics, the logic of seniority and the logic of unity.  
 
5.3.1 The logic of bureaucracy  
According to Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006), research shows that the logic of 
bureaucracy is one of the logics in public organisations. Similar to prior research, 
bureaucratic logic is one of the key logics in the field of SOEs. In this study, the logic 
of bureaucracy derives from the regulatory system. The legitimacy and rationality of 
this logic come from coercion and the bureaucratic structure of government agencies, as 
well as the bureaucratic hierarchy in organisation (Qiao, 2013; Meyer and 
Hammerschmid, 2006). Also, Thornton et al. (2012) suggest that in changing 
organisations,   the   logic   of   bureaucracy   is   associated   with   ‘structural   (and   cultural)  
inertia’.   Consequently,   the   next   section   will   explain   through   the   responses   from  
participants how SOEs embed the logic of bureaucracy as well as how the logic affects 
the field of SOEs. 
 
According  to  Christensen  et  al.  (2007,  p.  24),  ‘A  bureaucratic  organisational  form  …  is  
marked  by  hierarchy,  division  of  labour  and  routines’.  The  hierarchy  system is about the 
obedient relationship between superior and subordinate positions. The bureaucratic 
hierarchy has both merits and drawbacks for the operation and management of SOEs. 
The merit is that the effect of change in management can be minimised due to the strong 
command in the organisation, while it also can be seen as a problem as it can affect two-
way communication in the organisation. The trouble is also that the greater the hierarchy 
is, the longer the delay period in workflow that may occur.  
 
According to a PWA executive (B1_002), many PWA plans have been delayed due to 
bureaucracy; for example,  
“PWA  is  under  the  MoI’s  management  at  arm’s  length.  As  a  consequence,  
the MoI has responsibility for reviewing our investment projects, which 
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sometimes leads to the delay of projects. Lately, we have tried to accelerate 
our project progress by working in parallel with the MoI. We look for a 
contractor before a project has been approved but the problem is if the MoI 
asks us to revise that project, we have to start the whole bidding process 
again.”   
 
According   to   PWA’s   director   of   Office   of   Corporate   Communication   and  
Customer Relations, 
 “The  hierarchy  system  also  has  a  good  point.  When  we  need  to  implement  
or to adopt a new system, the hierarchy system makes it easier to do so. 
This is because we have authority to command as well as control our 
employees. However, the downside of this hierarchy system is that it can 
discourage our employees from sharing their opinions or pointing out the 
problems in implementing  the  new  system.” 
 
Also,   one   of   POST’s   senior   managers   (B2_208)   showed   his   concern   for   the  
hierarchy system as follows, 
“Even  though  our  employees  always  do  what  we  have  been  commanded  to  
do  …    executives  should  also  consider  POST  resources.  If  not,  employees 
may  show  their  disagreement.” 
 
Participants from POST tend to show their concerns about their organisational 
structure, as it creates a bureaucratic hierarchy. According to a POST vice 
president (B2_), 
“Our  organisational  structure  is  a  functional type and has high hierarchies. 
As a result, many projects have been delayed and there is not sufficient 
time.  …  However, I am also not sure that the business unit structure can be 
more   flexible   and   suitable   for   us….as   it   is   difficult   to   organize   our   back  
offices  and  move  them  into  the  business  unit.” 
 
One POST senior manager (B2_206) stated,  
“We   do   have   a   high   hierarchy,   however   every   time   our   organisational  
structure is adjusted, it seems that the new structure is just to create more 
positions in order to provide our employees with growth and it makes a 
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higher  hierarchy.  …  We  do  not  adjust  our  organisational  structure  based  on  
what  the  organisation  needs  but  on  what  employees  need…Organisational  
structure  is  the  origin  of  the  problem.” 
 
In order to reduce the problem of the bureaucracy system, participants from both PWA 
and POST mentioned the development of individual networking both inside and outside 
the organisation can accelerate the working process. Both organisations also have a 
community or group to enhance the network, which mostly places emphasis on the 
middle-management level. As seen from the interviews, a manager community has been 
formed in both cases. Moreover, Postal College, which is a training centre, can be useful 
for helping POST operational staff to create their network at the beginning of their 
career (Interview record: B2_208).  
 
According to one POST departmental director (B2_103),  
“Individual  networking  can  reduce  working  process  and  time.  It  is  suitable  
for a high hierarchy organisation  such  as  POST.” 
 
It can be concluded that the logic of bureaucracy is one of the core logics in an SOE. As 
SOEs embed the logic of bureaucracy, the logic can influence how SOEs respond to 
different demands from related government agencies as well as how the bureaucratic 
hierarchy in the organisation influences the employees towards the implementation of 
new practices (see chapter 6). The evidence also shows the relation between cases and 
agencies  vary  depending  on  the  agency’s  role  and  the  offered  resources or supports by 
each agency. The commitment of each government agency and its representative to 
SOEs also can have an impact on the change in SOEs. Therefore, SOEs are exposed to 
uncertainty   in   ‘institutional   arrangements’,   which   can   be   influenced   by   government 
agencies and their logics. This can increase the degree of institutional complexity in an 
organisation.  However, evidence also shows that government agencies try to settle their 
competing demands before they regulate or instruct SOEs. Also, the inheritance of a 
bureaucratic hierarchy from traditional types of public organisations affects case study 
organisational structure and how each actor interacts in an organisation.  
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5.3.2 The logic of commercial operations and the logic of social activities 
The SOE organizational form provides a way of structuring part of the public sector that 
holds responsibilities for both social and commercial activity. Both the logic of 
commercial operations and the logic of social activities are core, unavoidable, logics in 
the SOE field. 
 
Derived from the documentary research (see section 4.5, table 4.4), Thailand 
experienced a financial crisis in 1997.  With the negative economic growth projected, 
Thailand   was   required   to   participate   in   the   International   Monetary   Fund’s   reform  
program (Thai Government, 1998, p. 13). To ensure that reform efforts have a solid 
foundation and framework, the Thai government established the state enterprise sector 
reform program, which includes the implementation of PMS in Thai SOEs (SEPO, 
2010).  Accordingly, the gradual transition of SOEs from a social focus to a commercial 
focus has been witnessed along with the reform program.  
 
The findings in this study are similar to many studies on public commercial 
organisations that have to face multiple logics that compete with each other and create 
tension within organisations (e.g. Pache and Santos, 2013; Reay and Hinnings, 2009; 
see more in chapter 3 section 3.4). Also, the evidence shows that these two logics are 
core to organisational functioning, which results in the case study organisations 
experiencing institutional complexity.  
 
In the interviews, participants normally referred to these two logics together; therefore, 
this  part  provides  an   explanation  of   two   logics   through  participants’  views  as  well  as  
how organisations manage these, at times, competing logics. 
 
5.3.2.1 Commercial benefit versus social benefit 
As we see in chapter 3 section 3.4, there are conflicting demands imposed by these two 
logics, such as status of operation (non-profit or for-profit),  ‘profit  destination’  (social  
invested or capital invested) (Pache and Santos, 2013). Since the economic crisis in 
1997, the Thai government has tried to reduce government expenditures. As a 
consequence, the logic of commerce has been more emphasised. Since then, the MoF 
has employed PMS in order to assess SOEs from a variety of perspectives including 
financial performance such as EBITDA and EP. According to one SEPO senior analyst, 
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the MoF intends to increase individual SOE profit by ten per cent each year; however, 
the exact amount will depend on the financial status of individual SOEs and the broader 
economic environment. The other SOE objective is to serve the Thai community; 
therefore, the SOE has to do both social activities and commercial operations. However, 
how each SOE balances these activities depends  on  its  industry  and  also  its  employees’  
perspectives. 
 
PWA is one of the SOEs that are still partly subsidized by the Thai government. The 
government wants to support the PWA investment in expanding the water network to 
rural and other non-profitable areas. PWA claims that due to the social responsibility to 
Thai citizens, some of its services are in non-profitable areas, which leads to its low 
overall profit margin, which produces a conflict with the logic of commercial 
operations. According to one PWA executive (B1_001), 
 “The   required   financial   KPIs   focus   on   profit   or   EBITDA   by   ignoring  
social services to non-profitable areas. Therefore, the government should 
employ the public service obligation concept in order to calculate the true 
potential profit as well as pay us the difference between actual profit and 
potential  profit.  …  This  could  help  to  encourage  our  employees  to  improve  
our  services.” 
 
Participants also note that PWA is responsible for supplying treated water to Thai 
citizens and businesses.  Regarding  PWA’s  statement  of  directions,  PWA  has  to  expand  
its water network distribution in rural areas as one of its state obligations even though, 
due to the low population density, it is difficult to generate profit. According to one 
director (B1_101), 
“SOEs   should   not   be   concerned   only   with   profitability,   but   also   should  
consider  benefits  for  the  community.” 
 
Some participants from POST also pointed out this concern. One of the executives 
(B2_004) stated, 
“Even  though,  the  MoF  as  a  shareholder  should focus on SOE profitability, 
in reality the MoF should try to balance commercial and social benefits as 
well  as  support  SOE  activities,  for  example,  tariff  revision.” 
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However, in POST, the only product that is considered as a social obligation is the letter 
delivery service, for which the price has been fixed by the Thai government, while for 
the other products, such as mail and parcel delivery service, POST can set the price 
tariff by itself.   Also, there are some regulations that POST still needs to follow; for 
example, POST has been required to have a branch in every district in Thailand, which 
affects  POST’s  efficiency.  However,  in  POST  the  logic  of  commercial  activities  seems  
to be influenced more by organisational function than by the logic of social activities. 
This may be because the emergence of new communication technology forces POST to 
improve its services as well as to compete with similar services provided by the private 
sector.  
 
According to an executive (B2_002) 
“Different  from  the  past, recently, we have focused more on our customers 
because we consider money or revenue is very important for our 
organisation.” 
 
On the other hand, in PWA, both logics are core to its function and seem to be treated 
equally. Regarding social activities, PWA has to expand its water distribution networks 
in remote areas as its primary mission and provide service for low-income citizens by 
charging them at a low price. Both activities have been partially subsidised by the Thai 
government and supported through the PSO programme respectively, which helps to 
reduce the financial burden on PWA.  At the same time, PWA also aims to expand its 
water network in high population density areas as well as tourist areas such as Samui 
Island where PWA can employ a different tariff structure. 
 
5.3.2.2 Industry characteristics 
This study considers that the case study organisations are in the field of SOEs, however, 
they are also located in their industry fields. Consequently, it is worth considering the 
industry characteristics here as they can influence the organisations as well as cause 
institutional complexity. According to Reynaud and Thomas (2013), in the utility 
industry profitability has become an important concept for the operator in servicing and 
delivering its product. Reynaud and Thomas (2013) also demonstrate that the 
profitability concept in this sector is complicated and difficult to measure because 
operator profitability is not reliant only on internal decisions, such as investment and 
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optimization of production, but also on external circumstances, such as economic 
regulation and environmental regulation. Regarding PWA, the water tariff structure can 
be approved by PWA itself, however documentary research (see section 4.5, table 4.4) 
shows any change of tariff structure can widely impact Thai citizens; consequently, 
PWA  always   asks   for   the  MoI’s   permission   before   formalising   a   new   tariff   structure.  
The most recent tariff structure has been employed since 2009.  In POST, the Postal 
Commission has fixed the fee for postcard and letter delivery at two baht and three baht 
respectively while the fee for other services depends on a variety of factors. For 
example, all domestic charges for parcel delivery services including normal delivery, 
EMS and super-EMS are fully controlled by POST whereas the charges of international 
EMS  delivery  employ  the  Postal  Union’s  guideline. 
 
This concept of profitability also resembles what happens in PWA. The policies or 
requirements of institutional stakeholders can interfere with the view of commercial 
value in the organisation. For example, in one of the KPIs negotiated in a meeting 
between PWA and MoF, MoF encouraged PWA to increase its profit along with 
reducing water loss rate in the system, addressing the environmental issue as well as 
PWA efficiency. However, according to PWA, the water loss reduction requires 
massive maintenance in the distribution networks across the country, which will affect 
PWA’s   financial   status   as  well   as   profitability.   In   order   to   set   the  KPIs,   PWA  had   to  
negotiate and offer the profit and water loss rate figures that satisfied both parties. 
 
Compared to PWA, POST seems to have a better view of commercial value especially 
in the marketing perspective and customer-oriented perspective. The reasons are that the 
industry characteristics are different. The postal market is quite competitive, while the 
water sector is normally a monopoly. In addition, regarding the emergence of new 
technologies,  the  need  for  change  management  is  required  to  enhance  the  postal  sector’s  
competitiveness and market-orientation, as well as to consider more of what customers 
want (Chan et al., 2006). In many interviews, participants from POST showed their 
optimistic view of economics. They mentioned that it is an opportunity to expand their 
service into the e-commerce market.  
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According to a POST executive (B2_002), 
“In  order  to  generate  and  create  revenue  for  POST,  we  mainly  focus  on  our  
customers and their demands. We do not expect to maximize profit but we 
look for long-term  and  stabilized  revenue.”   
 
A POST senior manager (B2_206) also stated,  
“From   the   booming   of   e-commerce in Thailand, we have expected an 
increase  in  demand  for  parcel  delivery  service…  Consequently,  POST  has  
launched   a   premium   express   service…   cooperated   with   a   famous  
convenience store chain (Seven-Eleven)   …   Customers   can   access   our  
service  more  conveniently.”   
 
Apart from the explanation in chapter 3 section 3.4 of the evidence of multiple 
institutional logics that the emergence of new technology can differentiate the tie of 
institutional logics between POST and PWA, the study context suggests that industry 
characteristics of PWA and POST are capital intensive and labour intensive respectively 
(chapter 4).  
 
Marques (2010) and Abbott et al. (2012) state that the water sector needs a very capital-
intensive network structure to distribute the water supply to consumers. PWA has to 
invest massively in its infrastructure to serve both commercial and non-profitable areas. 
Therefore, PWA has been caught in the complexity between the logic of commercial 
operations and the logic of social activities. For social activities, PWA depends on the 
support of the Thai government. However, the government does not have clear criteria 
for subsidization as well as a public service obligation. Consequently, it is difficult for 
PWA to interpret the real profit that they can generate. As a result, PWA feels uncertain 
about its financial status, especially when compared to other SOEs in the same sector 
such as Metropolitan Waterworks Authority (MWA), which has a benefit of economy of 
scale and density, since its responsibilities lie in metropolitan areas and it does not 
require any subsidy from the government.  
 
According to a Chief Financial Executive,  
 “We  just  want  the  assessors  to  know  the  nature  of  PWA’s  business  so  that 
they will not compare us with MWA in every perspective. They should 
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consider   PWA’s   potential   as  well.  …Normally,   we   have   been   compared  
with   MWA   and   PEA   without   considering   that   we   have   less   funds   …  
Moreover, we have to compete with local governments, which also have a 
high  amount  of  funds  from  the  government.” 
 
Also, one of the executives (B1_004) states,  
“An  SOE  usually  has   to   invest   in  non-profitable  projects…   therefore,  we  
should  just  not  focus  on  accounting  profit  …  For  example,   in  some  areas  
which have hard water we have to invest more in our plants to improve the 
quality of water, which leads to the better health of Thai citizens.  An 
analysis   on   this   kind   of   projects   can   give   us   only   a   negative   result   …  
therefore, it should be better if we can add social benefit in our 
calculation.” 
 
On the other hand, the labour intensiveness in POST does not show much evidence on 
institutional complexity regarding the conflicting interests between the logic of 
commercial operations and the logic of social activities. As a result, in the interviews 
participants focus on the financial issues, especially capital investment in explaining the 
different demands from these two completing logics.  
 
Consequently, the characteristics of the industry can affect the degree of each 
organisation’s   embedded   individual   logics   as   well   as   the   degree   of   institutional  
complexity.  From the evidence, we can conclude that in PWA the logic of social 
activities prevails over the logic of commercial operations. On the other hand, POST 
values the logic of commercial operations regarding the competitive market in the postal 
industry.  
 
5.3.2.3 The use of benchmarking and marketing research 
The commercial view in both case study organisations is still underdeveloped, as 
evidenced by some participants pointing out that their organisation seems to ignore 
doing research on competitors, so they rarely use benchmarks or do their own marketing 
research.  The  MoF  also  has  seen  this  problem;;  therefore,   in   the  SOE’s  PMS,  the  MoF  
requires the SOE to do a report on benchmarking.  
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In the postal sector, Blagojevic et al. (2013, p. 4090) point out that there are no general 
criteria   for   the   design   of   ‘access   to   postal   network’   and   each   country   has   its   own  
approach based mainly on density and regulation to determine the minimum number of 
postal units and to enable competition (Crew and Klendorfer, 1998). The following 
evidence can confirm the statement. 
 
According to a POST executive (B2_001), 
“It   is   difficult   for   us   to   benchmark   with   foreign   postal   organizations 
because our operations are based on different fundamentals, such as 
geography,   organisational   size.  …If  we   use   size   to   compare,  we   need   to  
benchmark   with   New   Zealand’s   Post.   However,   considering   Asian  
countries, each country has a different delivery system but our aim is to be 
the  best  in  Asia.”   
 
Many   participants   also   supported   the   above   executive’s   statement.   They   gave  
some examples such as, 
“It   is   difficult   to   compare   with   other   countries.   For   example,   Singapore  
postal and POST both have two delivery men, but the volume of the 
delivery  items  are  different  regarding  population  density.”  (A  POST  senior  
manager, B2_209) 
 
In addition, a POST senior manager (B2_206), also mentioned, 
“We   have   not   used   benchmarking   in   POST.   I   tried   to   convince   our  
executives to  be  more  concerned  about  our  competitors…It  does  no  good  if  
we  only  know  ourselves  but  not  our  competitors.  …  Moreover,  we  do  not  
need to benchmark directly with other postal companies. We can consider 
other companies that do best in subjective areas such as call centres. We 
can   use   AIS’s   standard   as   best   practice”   (AIS   is   one   of   the  
telecommunication companies in Thailand). 
 
PWA tends to benchmark its performance with other SOEs, especially MWA and 
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA), while the measure of quality of treated 
water is adopted from international standards. However, participants were 
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discouraged from using benchmarking in their organisation for various factors 
such as lack of funds.  
 
According to a PWA executive (B2_001), 
“The  selection  of peer benchmarking depends on the set of measures, for 
example,   in   order   to   measure   the   quality   of   our   water,   we   don’t   use   a  
benchmark but follow the world standard. On the other hand, for the 
quality of services, we normally compare with MWA and PEA depending 
on  what  we  want  to  measure.  For  example,  we  use  PEA’s  performance  to  
compare  our  service  area  and  MWA’s  performance   to  measure  our  water  
quality  and  distribution.”   
 
However, another PWA executive (B2_002) commented on using PEA as 
benchmarking,  
“Even though we can use MWA and PEA for benchmarking, it is not 
completely comparable. Those two organisations have sufficient funding 
for investment and maintenance purposes, but our organisation has only 
made profit for the past few years. As a result, it is difficult for us to be as 
efficient  as  them.”   
 
One SOE characteristic is that it normally operates with few or no competitors, which 
can discourage its view of commercial value. From the interview data, we can interpret 
that SOEs think that it is difficult to find a suitable benchmark from both domestic 
companies and foreign companies because theirs is a unique business and has a different 
business  environment.  The  lack  of  peers  in  benchmarking  can  affect  an  SOE’s  potential  
in doing business.  Importantly, most interviewees appeared unaware that benchmarks 
can be used not only for performance assessment but also for various circumstances in 
order to improve organisational performance.  
 
It can be concluded that the logic of commercial operations can be seen in Thai SOEs; 
however, SOEs still have to serve a community, which embeds the logic of social 
activities, which can impact their profitability, management strategy and operation. The 
greater the conflict between these two logics, the higher degree of institutional 
complexity can be expected. Also, the degree of these two logics that underpin the 
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operation and management in each SOE depends on the characteristics of SOEs, the 
characteristics of the industry where each SOE is located and their organisation, as well 
as other related regulations. Regarding this study, the focus is on the field of SOEs not 
the field of industry, but these characteristics can be implied to affect the case study 
organisations’  degree  of  institutional  complexity.   
 
5.3.3 The logic of seniority 
The logic of seniority is based on Thai culture, which respects seniority, whether in 
terms of age, position or the length of employment period. This seniority culture, which 
differs from Western culture, affects every Thai organization, but especially those in the 
public sector. For example, it is quite difficult for younger staff to engage in debate or 
show disagreement to a manager directly in public, except when it is asked for. In case 
a younger staff member has any suggestion for or disagreement with a manager, 
normally they will discuss it privately. Commonly, the staff member may keep his 
opinion to himself.  
 
According to McCampbell et al. (1999), Thai seniority culture has a negative impact on 
promotional structures, benefits and decision-making. For example, companies promote 
the most senior employee to the higher position instead of promoting by considering 
individual performance. From this, McCampbell et al. (1999) conclude that the 
seniority  culture  affects  the  country’s  competitiveness. 
 
Both PWA and POST try to tone down the seniority culture in their organisations by 
creating more communication channels between executives, managers and employees 
such as site visits, intranet, wire broadcasting, morning talk, etc. According to a director 
of the Office of Corporate Communication and Customer Relations, a recent PWA 
Governor, Mrs. Ratana Kitchawan, planned to site visit every regional office to deliver 
PWA’s  statement  of  direction,  vision  and  mission  as  well  as  to  reduce  the  gap  between 
executives and employees. 
 
According to a Phatumthani branch manager, in the past, it was difficult for PWA staff 
in  each  branch  to  meet  with  executives;;  therefore  he  supports  the  governor’s  idea. 
“The  governor’s  idea  to  visit  branches  in  rural  areas  is  quite  impressive…  
Our staff have enthusiasm and look forward to participating in the event, 
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which  will  be  held  next  week…  This  event   is  also  good  for  us  to  present  
our   ideas   to   improve   our   branch   performance.  …  The   site   visit   gives   an  
opportunity to our staff especially the operation staff in urban areas to meet 
our  executives.” 
 
According to a manager (B1_209), 
“PWA  employs  wire  broadcasting  as  one  of  our  communication  channels  
…  Wire  broadcasting’s  benefit  is  that  it  can  broadcast  information  as  well  
as our   executive  message   to   every   staff  member   in  our  organisation.     …    
Sometime we invite executives to join our live broadcasting to answer 
organisational  hot  issues  such  as  bonus  schemes  or  accounting  statements.” 
 
However, in contrast to McCampbell et al.’s   (1999)   findings,   one   branch   manager  
(B1_206) in an off-record interview stated that even though some employees still claim 
that seniority culture impacts the promotional structure, now PWA is starting to 
consider individual performance more strongly. He gives his case as an example; he 
was promoted to a medium sized branch manager at a young age compared with others, 
due to his performance. However, he still accepts that in order to move to a bigger 
branch he may have to wait for some senior manager to be promoted first, because the 
positive aspect of the seniority system is that a senior manager has more experience, 
which may help in decision-making and leading employees.  
 
In POST, a participant claimed that the class of year in Postal College can be counted as 
one method that creates a seniority system in POST (Interview record: B2_103). 
However, many participants agreed that it also builds individual networking that is 
beneficial to their careers, as previously mentioned. Moreover, aside from the seniority 
system, POST participants mentioned the patron-client system as part of their 
promotional system. 
 
According to a senior manager (B2_204), 
“Our   promotional   system   is   somewhat   all   right.  However,  we   also   count  
seniority as one of the factors.  Also, the patron-client system can be a 
problem  (personal  promotion  cannot  be  fairly  considered).” 
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The   logic   of   seniority   shapes  SOEs’   employees   to   be  more   obedient   to   their   seniors’  
instructions or decisions. However, the senior employees are not always right; 
therefore, many good decisions or solutions may not be mentioned by younger 
employees, which can be considered as a missed opportunity for the organisations. 
Also, in order to reduce the communication gap between employees, both organisations 
tend to create both formal and informal ways of communication and networking in 
order to allow employees to speak their mind.  Conversely, it seems that the networks in 
both case study organisations are mostly for management or upper levels of employees 
such as the branch manager group in PWA, woman executive group in POST etc. while 
no participants mentioned a network that combines members from both management 
and the operational level. As a result, the seniority system still creates a tension in 
relationship between employees at different levels within the organisational hierarchy, 
which may hinder the adaptability of the organisations. 
 
5.3.4 The logic of unity 
As we saw in the previous section, the Thai culture can influence SOEs in many ways, 
such as organisational structure, managerial system and the relationship between the 
individual   and   the   organisation.   Lui’s   (2003)   study   on   unity   considering   two-
generations of employees in Chinese SOEs states that unity in organisations occurs 
when   ‘employees’   desire   to   maintain harmony   and   to   reduce   inequality’   (p.   387).  
Similar  to  Lui’s  findings,  SOEs  in  Thailand  also  aim  for  harmony  in  their  organisation. 
 
Lim (2009, p. 407) states that   in   Asian   society,   ‘harmony   enhancement   represents   a  
genuine concern for relationship harmony and involves feelings of closeness, unity, and 
trust’;;  consequently,  harmony  leads  to  the  avoidance  of  actions  that  will  cause  negative  
consequence or feelings in a relationship.  According to Knutsan et al. (2003, p. 63), 
‘the  highest  Thai  cultural  values  are  those  associated  with  social  harmony’  where  ‘Thai  
people will exhibit high level of rhetorical sensitivity and reflection and low levels of 
noble  self   in   their   interpersonal  communication’   (p.  66).     Knutsan  et   al.   (2003,  p.  68)  
suggest that the best example to emphasise Thai cultural value of harmony is by 
Komin’s  (1990,  p.  695)  statement  that  ‘Good  relations  win  all,  not  tasks’.  Komin  (1990)  
also support the idea that Thais are relationship-oriented especially in the public sector. 
His findings show that the managers of government agencies are strongly concerned 
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about achieving and maintaining good relationships in the workplace. He also claims 
that  ‘in  Thai  cultural  context,  achievement  in  the  Western  sense  does  not  fit’  (p.  701). 
 
Evidence of the logic of unity has been found in both POST and PWA, as interviewees 
from  both  organisations  often  mentioned  ‘harmony’  and  ‘unity’.  However,  the  evidence  
from POST was particularly strong as a consequence of their history. According to 
POST (2013), the corporatization in 2003 was a major turning point for the 
organisation. This was when the Communications Authority of Thailand was split into 
two companies: POST and CAT Telecommunication (Public) Co., Ltd, both of which, 
the MoF still owns a hundred percent of the shares. Many participants who experienced 
that transformation stated that POST faced financial difficulty and everyone tried hard 
to stabilize the organisation. Also, their strong belief in their CEO and executives at that 
time encouraged them to put forward their best effort for the organisation. As a result, 
the unity value was strongly formed as one of the organisational values.  
 
According to a vice president (B2_104), 
“After   corporatization,   POST   was   faced   with   many   problems.   We   all  
thought that our  organisation  had   to  survive   through   this  hard   time…as  a  
result, employees were willing to do everything for the organisation and 
they supported every strategy and practice employed at that time, as they 
believed  it  would  help  the  organisation.  …    ”    
 
Also, at the time of the interview, POST was widely promoting the unity value across 
the organisation through various communication channels, such as wire broadcasting, 
posters and workshops.  
 
According to an executive vice president (B2_005), 
“We  also  have  ‘Unity’  as  one  of   the  measures   that  we  employ  across   the  
organisation...   we   try   to   promote   ‘Unity’   as   our   norm   because   our  
organisation is very large, therefore organisational unity can help all of us 
walk  together  in  the  same  direction.” 
 
Even though some participants commented that employees recruited after that 
transformation period seem less devoted to the organisation, most of them still agree 
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that   organisational   unity   is   still   one   of   POST’s   strong   points.   Consequently,   they  
believe that with this value, the introduction of new management tools or other future 
changes can be done with less difficulty.  Later on, in chapter 7, the logic of unity will 
be discussed as it shapes organisational response towards the incentive system. In brief, 
people in both case study organisations resist changes to the bonus system, as they 
believe the change will destroy the unity in the organisations.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined and discussed the empirical findings in order to identify the 
key institutional logics that occur in the field in which the selected SOEs operate. The 
case  study  organisations’  managers  and  workers  perceptions  and  responses   to  each  of  
the key logics were also discussed. The findings of this research suggest that there are 
three core institutional logics that are embedded in the field: a logic of bureaucracy, a 
logic of commercial operations and a logic of social activity. In addition, two other 
logics were identified that also influenced SOE activities but seem of lesser 
significance. These are the logic of seniority and the logic of unity or community, 
which are specific to and stimulated by the Thai culture and aspects of the culture 
within each SOE. The institutional logics identified in this chapter will be used to frame 
the discussion around institutional complexity in the following chapters, as the logics 
can shape organisational structures and strategies. 
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Chapter 6  
The Implementations of the Balanced Scorecard and 
Economic Value Management in Case Study 
Organisations 
  
6.1 Introduction  
The findings outlined in the previous chapter indicate that State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) as hybrid organizations embed multiple institutional logics. This chapter seeks to 
develop these ideas and explains how multiple logics create institutional complexity 
and affect the development of performance measurement systems (PMS) in Thai SOEs. 
The chapter explores how the case study organisations employ Balanced Scorecard 
(BSC) and Economic Value Management (EVM) techniques. The implementation of 
these two management tools has been required by the Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
which   indirectly   forces   SOEs   to   do   so   through   SOEs’   performance   assessment  
measurement systems.   
 
This chapter provides key information which has been drawn from the documentary 
research and semi-structured interviews about how these performance management 
tools have been implemented in both case study organisations. The findings show that 
the implementation of both EVM and BSC in the selected SOEs has been influenced by 
multiple institutional logics, which lead to institutional complexity in both case study 
organisations. The institutional complexity, as well as other factors, has led to the 
decoupling of EVM from organisational practices while the BSC seems to be more 
broadly accepted.  A comparison of the implementation of the two management tools 
indicates that the interaction and fit of the techniques with established institutional 
logics can influence success or failure in implementation. 
 
The first part of the chapter presents the context of the PMS that has been used by the 
MoF and how it affects the SOEs. This is followed by a description of the 
implementation of BSC and EVM in both organisations. Next, the explanation of 
related issues arising from the co-existing institutional logics as well as how 
organisations employ decoupling and loose coupling as their strategies in order to 
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respond to institutional complexity in the use of the PMS is presented. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with a brief chapter summary.  
 
6.2 State-Owned Enterprise Performance Measurement Systems 
6.2.1 Background 
As mentioned in chapter 1 section 1.3,  the  SOEs’  PMS  has  been  employed  since  1995  
and developed continuously by the State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) in 
collaboration with other government organizations.  In response to the economic crisis 
in 1997, the Thai government was forced by the International Monetary Fund to reform 
SOEs. One result of this is that PMS have grown in importance. They are one of the 
management tools that the  Thai   government  uses   in   evaluating   and   improving  SOEs’  
performance   as   well   as   monitoring   SOEs’   government   policy-based projects (SEPO, 
2012a). 
 
The documentary research on performance measurement system (see section 4.5, table 
4.4) shows that in Thailand, the MoF has adapted some widely accepted BSC concepts 
and   incorporated   them   into   its   SOE’s   PMS   since 1995. The system employs various 
KPIs that cover the four common perspectives of BSC: financial, customer, internal 
process and learning and growth. The performance agreement between the MoF and the 
SOE consists of various KPIs as follows: policy implementation, financial KPIs 
(financial perspective), non-financial KPIs (customer perspective), and business 
management processes as follows: board of directors, risk management, internal 
control, internal audit and information system management (internal process) as well as 
human resource management (learning and growth perspective) (SEPO, 2012a). 
 
Figure  6.1:  SOE’s  performance  measurement  system  in  Thailand 
 
Source: SEPO (2012a) 
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6.2.2 How KPIs are set in the performance measurement agreement  
Regarding the diagram above, KPIs can be separated into three groupings: (1) policy 
implementation KPIs, (2.1) financial and (2.2) non-financial KPIs and (3.1 – 3.4) 
business management process KPIs. Firstly, for policy implementation KPIs,   the MoF 
cooperates with other government agencies such as the Budget Bureau, line ministries 
and other related agencies in order to state the sector and individual statement of 
directions (SODs) by considering the following plans and regulations: the national 
economic and social development plan, SOE business plan, regulations for individual 
industries and other related plans (SEPO, 2012b). Then it identifies the related KPIs and 
their targets for each SOE to try to reflect and respond to the SODs. Normally, KPIs in 
this category cannot be negotiable.  Some of the KPIs have been set at the same 
standard across SOEs such as the efficiency of investment plans, and the 
implementation of EVM, etc.  For other KPIs this is not the case and they are related to 
more organization specific constraints and targets. 
 
Secondly, for the financial, including EVM, and non-financial grouping, each SOE has 
to   submit   possible   KPIs   and   their   targets   and   definitions   to   the   MoF.   The   MoF’s  
representative together with a consulting firm will consider the draft before meeting 
with the SOE. The KPI and its target can be subject to negotiation in this process. 
However, in case any side does not agree with the KPI, the final decision will be made 
by the sub- Performance Agreement Committee (PAC) and PAC respectively (SEPO, 
2012a). The PAC is chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the MoF, and is tasked with 
ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. The committee consists of 
representatives from various government agencies such as the MoF, Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), Budget Bureau. State 
Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) works as a secretary unit of the committee (SEPO, 
2012a). Also in the process, the MoF can ask the SOE to submit more data and 
information related to KPIs as well as make changes to the KPIs used to measure SOE 
performance.  In  this  process,  normally,  the  SOE  will  submit  the  prior  years’  KPIs  with  
some  minor  changes  and  develop  these  to  produce  next  year’s  plan  and  targets.   
 
Next, for business management process KPIs, the Sub PAC on business management 
process will consider the KPIs and their targets each year and provide these to the 
individual SOEs before the beginning of the next assessment year (SEPO, 2012a). The 
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KPIs in this category will be used with every SOE and are non-negotiable. These KPIs 
aim for the improvement in each SOE to close the management gap; therefore, most 
KPIs and their targets remain the same and only some minor definitions and target 
changes may be announced. Finally, the weighting of KPIs in each category is as 
follows (Table 6.1): 
 
Table 6.1: The weighting of KPIs 
Key Performance Indicators Listed SOE 
(weighted) 
Non-Listed SOE 
(Weighted) 
Government policy-based projects  
 
Not measured 20% (+/- 10%) 
Operations 
 
65% 45% (+/- 10%) 
- Financial  
 
- Non-financial 
Internal Process 35% 35% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: SEPO (2012a) 
 
Table  6.2:  The  examples  of  case  study  organisations’  KPIs 
The  examples  of  case  study  organisations’  KPIs  in  2012  are  as  follows:   
Key Performance Indicators PWA 
(weighted) 
POST 
(Weighted) 
Government policy-based projects  
 
18% 15% 
Operations 
 
47% 50% 
- Financial  
 
16% 20% 
- Non-financial 31% 30% 
Internal Process 35% 35% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source:  PWA’s  organisational  performance  report  (2012)  and  POST’s  organisational  performance  report  
(2012) 
 
6.2.3 Performance assessment process 
According to SEPO (2012a), SOEs are required to submit half-year reports and annual 
reports, including related information to the MoF within one month. In case of 
extraordinary situations, the SOE may request an adjustment of a KPI or target. This 
has to be done by the end of the year. Any delay in reports being submitting will affect 
the final score by minus 0.5 point each day to a maximum of 1 point.  
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In the assessment process, the sub-PAC and the MoF may request a site visit and more 
information from the SOE. The results and suggestions will be submitted to the PAC 
within four months and will be published on the website after PAC approval.  The 
approved performance assessment results are reported to the SOE and to related 
government agencies. If the SOE agrees with the result, the Board of Directors has to 
send a consent letter to the MoF within thirty days. Any disagreement on the result can 
be appealed within ninety days. The evidence used in an appeal process has to be new 
and not submitted previously during the assessment process (SEPO, 2012a).  
 
The following sections provide the perceptions of participants on the implementation of 
EVM and BSC, which SOEs have been indirectly forced to implement through a 
compulsory set of measures. Also, the perceptions on other KPIs such as quality of 
services and internal process will be provided. 
 
6.3 Economic Value Management 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Due to the rise and the international use of Economic Value Added (EVA) in the 
private sector, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra recommended this tool to the Thai 
government. As a consequence, in 2003 the Thai government requested the MoF to 
study the potential of applying EVA in the Thai public sector.  Following the 
presentation   of   the   MoF’s   report   it   was   decided   to   begin   implementing   EVA   with  
several State-owned enterprises (SOEs). In late 2003, pilot SOEs including PTT Plc., 
Thai Airways international Plc., and Krung Thai Bank were chosen to be examples of 
how to develop detailed EVA calculations in SOEs (Stern Stewart & co., 2003). 
 
From the documentary research on EVA (see section 4.5, table 4.4), in the introduction 
stage of EVA to SOEs, the MoF contracted with some consulting firms, including Stern 
Stewart & Co. (Thailand) to educate MoF and SOE employees as well as to guide them 
how to implement EVA in their organizations. Also, the MoF set up an EVA clinic 
inside the MoF to help SOEs in any EVA related issue.   
 
In  the  early  stage  of  EVA  implementation,  the  MoF  adopted  the  “Disclosed  EVA”  and  
used a standard adjustment to calculate EVA so it can be used for benchmarking across 
SOEs. In the next stage, as the MoF increased the number of EVA-participating SOEs, 
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the MoF had developed EVA to be more customized in each organisation: ‘Tailored 
EVA’. The figure of Levels of Accuracy of EVA measure is shown below: 
 
Figure 6.2: Levels of accuracy of EVA measure 
 
Source: Stern Stewart & Co. (2003, p. 1) 
 
However,  due  to  the  copyright  issue  the  MoF  has  been  using  the  term  “Economic  Value  
Management”   (EVM)   instead of EVA after they signed a contract with another 
consulting  firm.  Therefore,  from  now  on,  this  thesis  will  use  “EVM”  as  the  name  of  the  
management system and Economic Profit (EP) for the measure.  
 
One   of   the   MoF’s   main   objectives   is   that   SOEs   should implement EVM in their 
organisations from the head office to the EVM centre. An EVM centre should be 
formed   in   each   department   or   business   unit   depending   on   the   SOE’s   organisational  
structure, and finally, to the operational level or product level. The EVM centre is 
responsible for the EP calculation and EVM report for each unit and has to submit its 
report as well as other related issues to head office monthly. The MoF divided EVM 
implementation into three phases and also required SOEs to jointly implement with 
BSC at the same time as follows: 
Phase 1: EVM preparation (until 2006) 
- Seminar and training on the concept of EVM and BSC for SOE executives 
and EVM in-depth training for SOE employees; 
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- EVM development in organisations: information adjustment, historical EVM 
calculation, the study of the setup of the EVM centre in each department or 
business unit, the integration between EVM and BSC at the organisational 
level. 
Phase 2: EVM implementation (2006-2007) 
- EVM centre development: integrate EVM with management process in each 
EVM centre by creating operational driver tree and strategic improvement 
plan; 
- BSC development: the integration between EVM and BSC in EVM centre 
level. 
Phase 3: The integration between EVM and Business Management (starting in 
2007) 
- The integration between EVM and organisational management process: 
employ EVM as one of the decision-making tools in various prospects such 
as the strategic plan and budget plan, investment analysis, resource 
management, etc.; 
- Revised incentive system by considering the integration between EVM and 
rewards for executives. 
(TRIS, 2012) 
 
Accordingly, to accelerate the implementation of EVM in SOEs, the change of 
Economic  Profit   (EP),   called   ‘delta  EP’,   and   other  EVM   related  measures   have   been  
employed as performance measures across SOEs since 2006. However, due to many 
complaints from SOEs about using the delta EP as a measure, the MoF has decided to 
drop the delta EP measure and adopt the difference between target EP and actual EP 
instead. The table 6.3 shows how to employ EP as a measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Table 6.3: How to employ EP as a measure 
EVA Measures 20xx 
Performance Score 1 2 3 4 5 
EP20xx (Actual) – EP20xx (Plan) Lower than 
plan 
 plan  Higher than 
plan 
EBITDA 20 60 100 140 180 
 
EVA Adjustment process 
 
EP 0 40 80 120 160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
EP20xx (Actual) – EP20xx (Plan) -80 
(0-80) 
-40 
(40-80) 
0 
(80-80) 
40 
(120-80) 
80 
(160-80) 
Source: Adapted from TRIS (2012, p. 25-26) 
 
The  other  EVM  measures  for  the  MoF  to  assess  SOE’s  performance  are  mostly  related  
to the degree of EVM implementation. For example,  
1) The top-three executive levels should have an acceptable understanding of the 
EVM concept and calculation, and how to integrate EVM with other tools, 
including how to explain the EVM driver tree etc. 
2) The integration between EVM and BSC or other management tools is used to 
write as well as to revise business plans, investment plans and strategic 
improvement plans. 
3) EVM is used in analysing key value drivers and important investment projects. 
4) EVM is linked to the CEO incentive system and later on for other top 
executives. 
(SEPO, 2010) 
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Figure 6.3: The example of EVM driver tree 
 
Source: Adapted from SEPO (2012c, p. 47) 
 
According to SEPO (2012c), every SOE is required to submit a half-year report and an 
annual report on its KPIs including EVM to the MoF. In addition, after the 
implementation of State Enterprise Performance Appraisal (SEPA) in some pilot SOEs 
including the case study organisations, EVM related measures are not directly shown on 
the requirements but EP has been one of the measures in the results part of the SEPA 
perspectives. 
 
6.3.2 EVM and its components 
Stern  Stewart’s  EVA  or  EP  is  ‘a  measure  of  a  firm’s  operating  profit  less  the  cost  of  all  
capital  employed’  (Stern  Stewart  &  Co.,  2004,  p.  3), which can be simply explained by 
the following formula: 
EP  = Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) – Capital Charge 
Where: 
Capital Charge = Capital x Cost of Capital 
 
The cost of capital is calculated by 
WACC = (%Debt x After Tax Cost of Debt) + (%Equity x Cost of Equity) 
 
The EP calculation involves transforming accounting information into economic 
information by making some adjustments to accounting statements. It is suggested that 
the   adjustments   can   transform   the   organisation’s   accounting   statements, the Income 
Statement and Balance Sheet, to an economic statement, which are a NOPAT statement 
Interests
Revenue
Expense
Gross Profit
Equity Charge
Capital charge
EP
Product 1
Product 2
Labour Cost
Raw Material
Cost
Interests from 
bearing 
liability
Interests from 
Bond
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and a Capital Statement, before using them to calculate economic profit. However, 
there are some criticisms of the adjustments of accounting closer to economic value 
accounting.  Some  of  Stern  Stewart’s  EVA  adjustments  might  push  EVA  back  to  a  cash  
basis accounting and the various systematic biases may remain even after the 
adjustment  process  (O’  Hanlon  and  Peasnell,  1998). 
 
6.3.3 EP adjustments and calculation that the MoF applies for its SOEs 
The MoF has recommended that SOEs employ a standard set of adjustment items as 
follows: interest expense, provisions, gain/loss on foreign currency transactions, non-
interest bearing liabilities, economic tax, construction in progress, operating lease, 
goodwill, minority interest, asset revaluation, unusual items and reserves (SEPO, 
2012c). However, to customize EVA for individual SOEs, an SOE can use other 
adjustment items by asking permission from the MoF.  
  
In the WACC calculation, Cost of Debt (Kd) should represent the interest payments that 
creditors expect for investing debt capital to reflect the correct organisational Kd. 
However, the MoF allows SOEs to calculate Kd by using the average interest of 
interest-bearing liabilities.  
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has been employed to determine Cost of 
Equity (Ke):   
Ke = Risk free rate + (Levered Beta x Market Risk Premium) 
 
in which the risk free rate, market risk premium and unlevered beta for each industry 
have been given by the MoF as follows:  
 
Table 6.4: The MoF guideline of important factors using in EVM calculation 
 2008 2009     2010 2011 2012 
Risk Free Rate 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Market Risk Premium 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 
Unlevered Beta: Water sector 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Unlevered Beta: Logistics services 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Source: SEPO (2012c) 
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6.3.4 The key information related to EVM issues of both case study organisations 
This section summarises the key information related to EVM issues and the economic 
profit in both case study organisations which can be seen in the table 6.5 and 6.6. 
 
Table 6.5: The key information related to EVM issues 
Economic Value Added Provincial Waterworks 
Authority 
Thailand Post 
EVM centre - 10 Regional offices 
- 1 Head office 
- 10 Regional Postal Bureaus 
- 2 Metropolitan Postal 
Bureaus 
- 1 Cost centre at Head office 
Cost Allocation Partially Partially 
Capital Investment High Low 
Leverage Ratio High Very Low  
Government Subsidy for Investment Yes No 
Social Obligations Yes 
- Low water tariff for 
residential users 
- Expanded distribution 
network to low intensity area 
Yes 
- Fixed price at 3 baht for 
sending a letter 
 
Table 6.6: The economic profits of case study organisations 
Economic Profit 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
PWA 436 865 338 986 
POST (573) (874) (708) (230) 
Note: The 2012 figures are the targets EP 
Source:  PWA’s  organisational  performance  report  (2012)  and  POST’s  organisational  performance  report  
(2012) 
 
6.4 How Organisations Respond to the Institutional Complexity Based on the 
Implementation of EVM 
It is common for SOEs to embody multiple institutional logics (Dacin et al., 2010). 
Many researchers have shown that public organisations need to deal with multiple, and 
at times, conflicting institutional ideals - such  as  ‘market’  and  ‘social  welfare’  logics  in  
social  enterprise  settings  (Pache  and  Santos,  2013),  ‘a  logic  of  business  like  health  care’  
and  ‘a  logic  of  medical  professionalism’  (Reay  and  Hinings,  2009).  We saw in chapter 
5 that the case study organisations are embedded with multiple logics. In particular the 
logics of commercial operations and of social activities prevail and the EVM concept is 
mainly influenced by the logic of commercial operations. According to Greenwood et 
al. (2011), organisations experience institutional complexity when they are embedded 
with incompatible institutional logics. This section provides evidence on the 
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coexistence of competing logics, which creates institutional complexity, as well as the 
use   of   decoupling   as   strategy   that   shape   SOEs’   actions in responding to the use of 
EVM.  It is suggested that the complex nature of this context results in the avoidance of 
EVM in the organisations, in order to minimise potential conflict. The findings of the 
interviews show a decoupling of EVM from other organisational practices. This section 
will describe the problems created by the conflicting logics by presenting the findings 
in the following themed sections. 
 
6.4.1 The decoupling of EVM from other recent practices 
Dambrin et al. (2007, p. 174) state   that   the   occurrence   of   decoupling   is   ‘an   attempt  
developed  by  internal  coalitions  to  resist  the  new  logic’.  We  also  saw  in  chapter  5  that  
SOEs experience institutional complexity regarding the two core institutional logics: the 
logic of commercial operations and the logic of social activities. The evidence in this 
section also supports these statements, as both cases experience difficulty in the use of 
EVM, as it is a concept which originated in the private sector. The strong commercial 
logic of EVM leads to social benefits being ignored in the calculation of EP. The social 
activities can result in negative EP, but this measure is unable to reflect whether or not a 
new investment can add social value to a local community.  For this reason, many 
participants expressed resistance to the use of EVM. 
 
Firstly, many interviewees appeared to experience a conflict between two logics due to 
the ignorance of social benefits in the concept of EVM. Some of them complained that 
it is difficult to distinguish between commercial and social services, which results in the 
avoidance of the use of EVM. 
 
A divisional manager (B1_202) mentioned,  
“Even  though,  EVM  is  a  good  management  tool,  we  cannot  maximize  the  
usefulness of it due to the characteristic of an SOE, which is also to focus 
on   the  benefit   for   the  community.  ….  Recently,   it   is  difficult   to  calculate  
the social benefit accurately as well as to clearly separate whether an 
investment  project  is  a  commercial  one  or  social  one.” 
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Moreover, a POST vice president (B2_004) provided his opinion that 
“The  POST  operation  process  cannot  be  done  in  just  one  process.  It  has  to  
work through the distribution networks, which can be the profitable route 
or the social route. Therefore, we cannot use EVM, which considers 
mainly the revenue. The MoF should consider the balance between 
commercial  and  social  aspects.” 
 
Secondly, the coexistence of competing institutional logics creates contradictions for 
the  case  study  organisations’  employees   in  serving   their   interests.     Employees   in  both 
organisations expect the targeted financial returns while also aiming to serve Thai 
citizens through their social activities. The concept of EVM, however, does not take 
benefits to society into account.  Both organisations considered that social activities can 
generate a negative economic profit. This was especially the case for PWA, which has 
vast investment projects and, as a result, the EP figure cannot represent the actual 
performance of the SOE.  In regular operations, many SOEs, including the case study 
organisations, have both commercial and community responsibilities. Both PWA and 
POST have a social obligation to serve Thai citizens. For example, the PWA has to 
expand its distribution networks to rural areas, which cannot generate enough income to 
cover the investment and operation cost, as well as serve treated water to residential 
customers at a low tariff structure, while POST has fixed the normal letter price at 3 
baht since 2004. Therefore, many participants perceive that the expected low income 
from social projects can have a negative effect in the calculation, especially when 
considering the amount of value added as a signal of performance improvement. For 
example: 
 
A PWA divisional manager (B1_201) said,  
“It   would   be   better   if   we   can   calculate social benefit accurately and 
accumulate it in our EP to show the positive result of the social investment 
project.”   
 
According to POST (2012), POST has not had any capital investment project in 
the past few years; however, participants also expressed their concerns on this 
issue. 
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A POST executive (B2_104) stated,  
“I   support   the   use   of   EVA…,   but   the   head   office   and   the   MoF   should  
include  social  benefit  in  a  calculation  model.”   
 
Regarding the problem of social benefit calculation, negative EP can be expected on 
social investment projects, which causes the demotivation for the use of EVM in SOEs. 
Even though the social benefit issue in EP calculation is a major concern for many 
SOEs, until now the MoF has not provided any satisfactory solution to solve the 
problem.  The calculation guideline in the past five years has only minor changes and 
does not mention how to take the social benefit into account.  
 
Next, Stern et al. (1996) claim that the EVA concept might be employed by 
organization for its managerial decision-making.  In Thailand, one aim of the 
introduction EVM to SOEs is to employ EVM and its driver tree to analyse the 
organisational performance as well as to use it as a tool in the decision-making process. 
Conversely, due to the problems in the calculation of social benefits mentioned before, 
many participants perceive that EVM cannot reflect the real value of an organisation or 
its investment projects.  One PWA executive (B1_001) explained,  
“EVM   is   just   a   tool   which   mainly   focuses   on   asset   utilisation by 
employing an opportunity cost concept without considering other benefits 
such as social benefit, which is commonly considered as one of the key 
factors  on  making  an   investment  decision   in  SOEs.  …  As  a  result,   it  can  
lead to narrowing down the number of alternative possible options in 
investment  projects.” 
 
A few participants from regional offices claimed that EVM can be used as one of 
various tools for analysing asset utilization but they did not mention the use of EVM in 
their decision-making in investment projects. In addition, many participants stated that 
in  practice,  they  only  report  the  EP  figure  in  order  to  fulfil  the  MoF’s  requirement.  They  
also insisted that they cannot use only EVM for making decisions in any investment 
project due to the  missing   social   benefit   data   because   it   can  mislead   the   executives’  
decisions. 
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A PWA executive (B1_001) stated,  
“EP   is   just   one   of   the   financial   performance   measures   just   like  
EBITDA. However, EP is a tool that cannot explain all the benefits of 
the investment project or other organisational activity. In my point of 
view, EP focuses on an opportunity cost by ignoring other factors. As a 
result,  it  cannot  represent  the  whole  picture  of  our  business.” 
 
A PWA department director (B1_101) mentioned, 
 “Our  investment project normally involves both commercial and social 
distribution systems for which the cost is inseparable. Therefore, EP of 
the project may be negative and it is difficult to use this negative figure 
to  explain  to  our  employees.  ….  Moreover,  PWA as an SOE should not 
consider mainly profit, but also has to analyse the impact on the 
community…As   a   result,   we   employ   EP   as   one   factor   to   make   a  
decision  on  our  projects.” 
 
Although a small number of participants claimed that EVM is employed as one of the 
financial figures used to make a decision on project investment, the interviews and 
documentary analysis suggest that EVM is rarely employed in their decisions. The 
managers are concerned more with some financial figures and ratios such as EBITDA, 
and Return on Assets because the traditional financial figures are easier for them to 
explain to executives as well as staff.  Also, regarding their organisation investment 
plans submitted to the Thai government in 2010-2012, both organisations did not 
include EVM in their investment analysis, as it is not required by NESDB.  NESDB, 
not   the  MoF,   is   the  main   agency   in   considering   SOEs’   investment   budget;;   therefore,  
SOEs   prefer   to   follow   NESDB’s   investment   plan   guidelines,   which   include,   for  
instance, financial calculations such as NPV, return on investment, payback period etc. 
and cost-to-benefit ratio which takes some social benefit and factors into account. 
 
A POST divisional manager (B2_101) also confirmed that 
 “…  as  for   the   investment  project,  we  depend  more on financial ratios 
that are required by NESDB such as payback period, return on 
investment and benefit to cost ratio. EP is just used as supporting data 
for  our  project  analysis  report.” 
140 
 
A participant from NESDB (A1_004) explained why NESDB did not consider 
EP as requirement figure in its investment plan guideline. He stated, 
“The  recent  platform  is  sufficient  and  can  provide  enough   information  
for  our  (SOE  investment  plan)  approval  process.” 
 
The  evidence  from  both  organisations  supports  O’Hanlon  and  Peasnell’s   (1988)  study  
that   organisations’   managerial   decisions   should   not   be   based   solely   on   EVM.  
Furthermore, Chen and Dodd (1992) and Biddle et al. (1997) also argue that EVA could 
not entirely replace traditional accounting measures; as a result, organizations should 
consider employing both EVA and accounting measures. This evidence supports 
Rompho’s   (2009)   statement   that   even   though   the   EVM   concept   can   be   adopted   in  
public sector organisations, the difficulty is in how to evaluate the social benefits. As a 
result, it is difficult to integrate EVM with other recent practices. In addition, the 
evidence shows that both organisations experience institutional complexity due to the 
conflict between the logic of commercial operations and the logic of social activities. 
Regarding the existence of the logic of social activities in SOEs, using EVM alone may 
lead organisations to inefficient decisions on social services and investment projects 
and mislead SOEs in compliance with their social missions. As a result, both PWA and 
POST tend to decouple EVM from other recent practices in order to minimise its 
effects. 
 
6.4.2 Inconsistent  stakeholders’  demands 
We saw in chapter 5 section 5.2 that the structure of the field of SOEs is fragmented, 
which results in them being faced with instability and inconsistent demands from 
institutions and affects the degree of institutional complexity within the organisation. 
Also,   according   to   Greenwood   et   al.   (2011,   p.   345),   ‘an   organisation’s   responses   to  
institutional complexity will be affected by its dependence upon important institutional 
actors’   (see   also   chapter   3).      This   section   provides   evidence   on   the   inconsistent  
demands from stakeholders.  
 
After the introduction of State Enterprise Performance Appraisal (SEPA), it seems that 
the MoF reduced the importance attached to the level of the implementation of EVM, 
which leads to the decreased interest in the use of EVM in both the MoF and the SOEs. 
Furthermore, without continuous force or pressure from outside such as the MoF, there 
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is a possibility that the tool will be dropped. Also in the case study organisations, some 
participants supported this statement by showing their concern about the existence of 
EVM in the future.  
 
A PWA departmental director (B1_107) confirmed the threat of the emergence of SEPA 
to EVM. 
“EVM   is   not  well   implemented   in  PWA  and  now  we   are   shifting   our  
focus  to  SEPA”. 
 
The evidence shows that there is some lack of organisational commitment, and so the 
case study organisations do not put sufficient effort into implementing EVM. As noted 
in chapter 3, Greenwood et al. (2011) state that institutional complexity increases when 
the institutional demands are inconsistent and unpredictable. Many participants claimed 
that the MoF always introduces new tools or systems, and later on the measures to 
assess SOE will change to support the new system. As a result, SOEs have to put effort 
and resources into developing the new system. For example, after the introduction of a 
new   PMS,   SEPA,   the   MOF’s   pressure   for   the   implementation of EVM seems to 
decrease,  which  also  affects  the  SOEs’  perception  in  continuing  the  EVM  system.     
 
The director of SOE assessment bureau SEPO said, 
 “The  MoF  has  promoted  the  implementation  of  EVM  since  2006.  We  
have assumed that now SOEs should have the potential to continue the 
system with less support from the MoF. It is about time for the MoF as 
well  to  focus  more  on  SEPA.” 
 
Another issue that hinders the use of EVM in investment analysis is that the 
government agencies, NESDB and Budget Bureau, which are responsible for the 
investment plan and subsidization of social investment projects, do not require the 
EVM analysis in their applications. As mentioned in section 6.4.1, the evidence shows 
that the NESDB does not include EVM in its investment plan guideline. This can be 
interpreted as suggesting that NESDB and MoF have different opinions on the use of 
EVM.    Also,  NESDB’s  executive  (A1_004)  shared  his  view  on  the  use  of  EVM  as  one  
of  the  KPIs  in  the  SOE’s  PMS:   
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“A   recent  PMS  created  by   the  MoF   is   somewhat too complicated and 
each SOE has a different context, but the MoF has created a PMS that 
fits all, which can lead to management inflexibility. Some management 
tools such as EVM are not suitable to use across SOEs. The more 
complex the tool, the more wrongly interpreted and implemented. 
Therefore, sometimes traditional financial ratios can be more useful and 
easily  used  to  cascade  the  KPIs  to  departments  and  divisions.” 
 
Many participants expressed the view that case study organisations employ the EVM 
concept in order to comply with the MoF as well as to increase their performance score, 
as this will result in them receiving higher incentives. 
 
A member of the board of directors (A1_006) also confirmed, 
“I   cannot   really   see   that   (case   study   organisation) uses EVM for its 
decision-making. Moreover, I think that due to the lack of executive 
commitment as well as a limitation of accounting system, we cannot 
maximize  the  benefit  of  the  use  of  EVM.  …  Moreover,  compared  with  
the other SOE, of which I am a former member of board of directors, I 
think this organisation has implemented EVM just to meet the MoF 
requirements  as  well  as  to  gain  its  performance  assessment  score.” 
 
Some participants state that EVM is only known within the performance assessment 
division. According to a PWA division manager (B1_202), 
“Our  executives  do  not  pay  attention   to   the  use  of  EVM,  as   it   is  more  
like  another  extra  (hidden)  work  to  comply  with  the  PMS.” 
 
Also, a PWA team leader in the Finance and Accounting department (B1_302) 
stated,  
“Not   many   people   know   about   EVM.      I   think   only   the   performance  
assessment   division   (which   deals   with   the   MoF’s   requirements)   only  
know  about  it….We  are  not  very  serious  about  the  use  of  EVM.” 
 
The evidence shows that neither organisation uses EVM in  practice  but  on  a  ‘ceremonial  
basis’   in   order   to   gain   legitimacy   and   secure   their   incentives   by   following   the  MoF’s  
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requirements. Case  study  organisations’   responded   to   the   inconsistency  of   institutional  
demands by decoupling EVM from other investment plan guidelines provided by other 
agencies that are required to be used when SOEs submit their investment plans to the 
Thai cabinet. This  evidence  supports  Johansson  and  Siverbo’s  (2009)  statement  that  the  
conflict   of   shareholders’   interests   can   lead   to   the  decoupling of models and practices. 
The complexity of EVM was discussed amongst related government agencies. Most 
agencies  such  as  NESDB  and  Budget  Bureau  that  are  responsible  for  SOEs’  investment  
plans and budgets do not employ EVM in their consideration process, while only MoF 
uses  EVM  in  an  SOE’s  PMS.  As  a  result,  decoupling  of  EVM  and  their  investment  plan  
and budgeting appears because there is no coherence between them. 
 
Regarding  SOEs’  embedded  multiple  institutional  logics,  some  of  the  logics,  especially 
the logic of social activities, which competes with the logic of commercial operations in 
which the EVM concept mainly prevailed, lead to the difficulty in the implementation 
and use of EVM in public sector organisations like SOEs. In summary, the evidence 
shows that competing logics and a fragmented structure occurred in the case study 
organisations and led them to a high degree of institutional complexity, which affected 
the implementation of EVM. As a result, in order to minimize the impact of institutional 
complexity, the decoupling of EVM and other practices occurs. Moreover, the 
resistance to the logic of commercial operation can be identified from the evidence, 
which led to the occurrence of decoupling. This follows the finding by Dambrin et al. 
(2007) in the literature. 
 
6.5 Other Factors Contributing to Decoupling Following the Implementation of 
EVM 
During the interviews with SOE participants, it was recognized that at the beginning the 
adoption of EVM in their organisations was in order to gain legitimacy as well as to 
satisfy   the   MoF’s   requirements. The implementation of EVM in the case study 
organisations had been forced though the KPIs set by the MoF, which led them to 
employ   EVM   on   a   ‘ceremonial   basis’   in   order   to   minimize   impact   on   their   recent 
practices. Therefore, evidence of decoupling between EVM and other management 
tools  can  be  detected.  According   to  Johansson  and  Siverbo  (2009,  p.  217),   ‘the  stated  
adoption of management accounting practices is sometimes decoupled from its use, or 
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at least   the   intensity   in   use’.   In   addition   to   the   coexistence   of   institutional   logics  
mentioned before, other factors led to the decoupling as follows.  
 
6.5.1 The influence of actors and organisational network 
Both case study organisations also accept that they faced difficulties in implementing 
EVM. We saw in chapter 3 that the degree of institutional complexity depends on the 
influence of individuals and groups of actors and the logics they support as well as how 
they represent them to the organisation (Pache and Santos, 2010). As SOEs embedded 
the logic of bureaucracy, the cases have a strong command hierarchy; therefore, the 
commitment of executives towards new practices such as EVM is significant and can 
result in the success or failure of the use of practice. Most executive participants, 
especially from PWA, have a background in engineering rather than management; 
therefore, they seem to be less influenced by the logic of commercial operations. As a 
result, many executive participants disregard the benefits of EVM and perceive EVM as 
merely a financial figure. 
 
According to a PWA executive (B1_001),  
“EVM  is  just  one  of  the  measures  which  is  similar  to  EBITDA.  It  is  an  
insignificant  tool  …  the  concept  is  so  narrow  as  it  ignores  the  overview  
of business by focusing  on  investment  and  its  opportunity  cost.” 
 
Also, a POST executive (B2_002) stated,  
“We  have  already  employed  financial  figures  which  are  not  in  the  form  
of  EVM.  Why  do  we  need  to  calculate  an  EP?” 
 
The evidence shows that there is some lack of executive commitment, so the case study 
organisations do not put sufficient effort into implementing EVM. As some participants 
in PWA mentioned, there are no key teams responsible for EVM. Moreover, it seems 
like PWA set up an ad hoc team for EVM.  
 
A divisional manager (B1_202) mentioned, 
“EVM  seems  to  be  an  additional  task  for  the  PMS  required  by  the  MoF;;  
therefore,  the  use  of  EVM  does  not  add  benefit  to  our  organisation.  …  
However, I think that if the MoF pushed more for the use of EVM in 
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SOEs, it might gain significant attention from our executives and 
employees.” 
 
In response to this concern on organisation commitment towards the use of EVM, the 
director of the SOE Assessment Bureau said,  
“The   MoF   has   been   responsible   for   providing   the   EVM   guidelines   and 
education as well as a EVM help centre for SOEs for more than five years; 
therefore the MoF expects that SOEs should continue the use of EVM 
without  the  need  of  forcing  them  to  employ  it  through  KPIs.”   
 
Alongside the executives, another group of actors is the people who know EVM, 
although limited in number. As mentioned in chapter 3, Greenwood et al. (2011) call 
this  group  of  actors  a  ‘social  referent’  and  their  influence  and  capability  can  reinforce  a  
particular demand in organisation. One director (B1_103) pointed out that PWA officers 
and executives who know how to employ complex tools like EVM are in limited 
numbers. Consequently, such a tool is difficult to deploy in the organization.  
 
In both case study organisations, EVM has been employed for nearly a decade, and 
although many employees have heard about EVM, nearly all participants at the 
operational level and supervisor level as well as some branch managers did not have 
any knowledge of EVM. Only some executives such as the chief financial officer and 
related employees, especially in the accounting and finance departments and strategic 
planning departments, which are responsible for the MoF - PMS and assessment, can 
explain the EVM concept in brief.  Amongst these people, a limited number of people 
can adapt the EVM concept and calculation to their organisational contexts. 
 
A PWA departmental director (B1_107) mentioned, 
 “Recently,   only   a   small   number   of   people   have   knowledge   about   EVM  
and only a few of them can use and calculate EVM efficiently. Therefore, 
transferring  knowledge  of  EVM  is   limited.  …  Due  to  the  branch  network  
across the country, it is also difficult to educate our employees about EVM 
to  make  it  usable.”   
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According to Lounsbury (2001), the networking between employees in an organisation 
is one of the mechanisms that tend to promote a logic to become established in an 
organisation. The degree of the perception of the complexity of the EVM problem also 
depends on the effort of organizations to communicate and educate their employees. 
However, regarding the limited number of social referents, it is difficult to spread the 
knowledge of EVM as well as its logic through organisational networks, which results 
in the avoidance of the use of EVM. The evidence in both case study organisations 
shows some lack of communication and inadequate training for their employees. For 
example, one of divisional manager (B1_204) said,  
 “I  have  heard  about  EVM  but  I  really  don’t  know  how  to  calculate  it,  as  
well  as  use  it.”   
 
A POST employee (B2_304) said, 
“I heard some of my colleagues mention EVM before, but I think the 
tool  is  so  complicated  and  difficult  to  understand.” 
 
According to a POST performance report (MoF, 2012), even staff in the EVM centre 
have not reached an acceptable knowledge level of EVM concepts and calculations. 
Consequently, the MoF recommended that POST has to educate and communicate the 
importance of the EVM system and how it helps to improve the organisation to 
international standards.  
 
Regarding the evidence, it can be concluded that the power and capability of actors as 
well as the organisational structure or network are the organisational attributes that can 
influence the organisational responses towards the use of EVM. Accordingly, the lack 
of potential actors and network in our cases led the organisations to resist the use of 
EVM  and  employ  it  on  a  largely  ‘ceremonial  basis’. 
 
6.5.2 The problems of using EVM at regional offices 
As we saw in chapter 2, there is some literature support for the use of EVA as a 
management tool at a divisional level or product level, such as Hartman (2000), and 
Shrieves and Wachowicz (2001). However, Zimmerman (1997) and Woods et al. 
(2012) focus the prospective problem of cost sharing and target costing due to the 
complexity of the calculation of cost of capital. They highlight that cost sharing and 
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target costing can be a hindrance to the implementation of EVM at divisional level. The 
evidence from the SOEs supports their statement, as in implementing EVM into 
regional offices or the EVM centre as required by the MoF, the allocation cost and 
transferring cost need to be identified. However, both PWA and POST have failed to do 
so and they have employed some dummy cost allocations in the EVM calculation. Both 
PWA and POST have set up a cost centre in which unidentified costs are put. The 
example evidence includes the following. 
 
A POST executive (B2_004) said 
“As   I  mentioned  before   that  our  business   cannot  be   completed   in   just  
one business unit, the problem is we cannot allocate cost in our recent 
accounting   system   …   the   cost   of   implementation   of   EVA   or   of  
adjusting  our  accounting  system  is  not  worth  it.  …  Our  business  is  not  
services but network management; therefore, the assets are somewhat 
inseparable  and  cannot  be  allocated  to  each  business  unit.  …  In  POST, I 
think that the allocation cost should consider service or geography area; 
however,  the  suitable  method  is  the  one  with  less  problems.” 
 
PWA calculates the allocation cost using the drivers as follows: the volume of treated 
water sales, the volume of treated water production, the portion of employees and 
project expenses (MSI, 2007). However, in the EVM implementation stage, due to the 
inadequate cost allocation criteria, some costs cannot be allocated from the head office.  
 
A PWA executive (B1_002) mentioned, 
“The  implementation  of  EVM  is  insufficient  because  our  cost  allocation  
system is inadequate. We still use dummy figures to calculate cost in 
each  branch.” 
 
POST explained that the organisational structure is a functional type, not a business unit 
type, so it is not worthwhile to revise or develop a new system. Considering the 
operating income structure for each regional office, the revenue consists of revenue 
from  POST’s  four  major  businesses.  The  lack  of  a   transfer  price  in  POST  also  affects  
each  bureau’s  income  stream.  Therefore,  the  originating  location  of  the  mail  being  sent  
can charge full the revenue into their account.  For example, both North and South 
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metropolitan postal bureaus together can generate nearly sixty per cent of POST 
revenue (approx. 5,000 million baht each), while most regional postal bureaus hardly 
generate revenue more than 800 million baht. According to POST performance report 
(MoF, 2012), the problem of not being able to allocate cost to each EVM centre results 
in the head office doing the EVM calculation for both the organisation level and the 
EVM centre level.    
 
Participants from POST also mention the problem of cost allocation as follows. 
A POST executive (B2_002) stated, 
“The  use  of  EVM  in  our  organisation  is  more  theoretical than practical. 
Our organisational structure is a functional type, not a business unit 
type. Even though our structure divides responsible areas such as 
regional offices one to ten, our delivery service has to be done with the 
network.  …Therefore, calculated EP cannot represent the real situation. 
For example, regional offices that do more delivery to end-customers 
will have more expenditures and can show negative EP, whereas  
offices that do more services at the beginning of the delivery network 
will  generate  more  revenue.” 
 
The cost allocation and transferring cost problem also leads to the delay of the 
EVM report in POST. As one of the vice presidents (B2_109) said,  
“The   accounting   system   in   POST   is   highly   centralized   and   the   EP  
calculation including  the  allocation  cost  are  normally  done  manually.  …    
And it is difficult to calculate. As a result, our EVM report is usually 
delayed  by  two  months.” 
 
Regarding the evidence, the use of EVM at the divisional level seems to have been seen 
as impracticable, which resembles the study by Zimmerman (1997). From the above 
evidence, inadequate allocation and cost transferring can be seen in both cases.  In order 
to follow the EVM guideline, the case study organisations tend to allocate their cost 
bases to their business units; however, this may not prove practicable for every SOE. 
Both organisations also claimed that they have set up EVM centres in every regional 
office; however, in reality, the EVM centre is just a pseudo centre that is placed under 
the accounting   division   in   order   to   comply   with   the   MoF’s   requirement.   They   use  
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separate templates to calculate EVM for reporting but do not further integrate the EVM 
system with other systems.  This shows that SOEs employ the concept of EVM in order 
to gain legitimacy benefits from the MoF. However, the cost-sharing problem makes 
EVM impracticable at the regional level and this results in the decoupling of EVM from 
other accounting practices. In addition, the MoF has not considered the allocation and 
transferring cost issues within the organisation as critical because it has focused more on 
overall organisational EP. As a result, case study organisations have given limited 
attention to EVM at the regional level. Moreover, a participant from the MoF (Interview 
record: A1_011), said that the allocation method and other related to accounting issues 
that do not directly affect the organisational EP should be managed and controlled by 
SOE itself because the accounting systems in SOE are different and the MoF should not 
interfere.  
 
In summary, the MoF introduced EVM to SOEs in 2003 and started using EVM and its 
implementation  process  as  measures  to  assess  SOEs  in  2006  in  order  to  improve  SOE’s  
performance to the private sector level.  Apart from institutional complexity caused by 
the  competing  institutional  logics  that  make  SOEs’  perceptions  towards  EVM  different  
from private sector organisations, it can be concluded that to gain legitimacy from the 
MoF is a main rationale for the case organisations to adopt EVM. Recently, both case 
study organisations have employed EVM to meet the MoF requirements so it can be a 
plus for their performance measurement scores. Therefore, some participants show their 
concern that the willingness to use EVM may decrease after the MoF shifts its focus to 
a new PMS or management tool. Furthermore, EVM is not promoted for use by other 
government agencies that are related to the SOE investment plan and budget.  Also, the 
case  study  organisations  are  aware   that   the  MOF’s  demand  for   the   implementation of 
EVA is inconsistent, which may increase the degree of institutional complexity that 
affects the use of EVM.  In addition, the evidence shows that there are other factors that 
decoupled the EVM from other recent practices. These are the limited number and the 
capability of social referents as well as an insufficient organisational network to educate 
the  complex  concept  of  EVM  through  the  organisations.  Also,  the  MoF’s  demand  that  
EVM is implemented in sub-business units (in both cases, the regional level) is 
considered impractical and with many limitations. Consequently, EVM has been treated 
as   a   ‘ceremonial   basis’,   and   as   a   result   the   decoupling   between   EVM   and   other  
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practices can be seen in both cases by making the EVM work independently and not 
interfering with other systems.  
 
6.6 Balanced Scorecard 
Along with the introduction of EVM in 2006, the MoF planned to promote the use of 
the BSC as the next step in the performance management development, by requiring 
SOEs to integrate BSC with the EVM driver tree and planning to link them with an 
incentive system in the future. However, unlike the implementation of EVA, the MoF 
did not provide any support for the implementation of BSC for SOEs. This is because 
the MoF believed that most SOEs would have some background with BSC and some of 
them had already employed BSC as one of their management tools.  
 
In the implementation of BSC, the case study organisations are required to set up a 
specific  division  to  deal  with  the  SOE’s    PMS  as  well  as  other  related  management tools 
such as EVM. This division is normally under the strategic planning department and 
works as a key contact point and data collector between the MoF and the organization. 
To   cope  with   the  SOE’s  PMS,   both   the  PWA  and  POST  have   implemented   the  BSC  
model to manage the established/approved set of KPIs.  
 
The KPIs from the Performance Agreement with the MoF are the key measures that 
have to be distributed directly to the responsible departments. Normally, the assigned 
targets for each department are more difficult than the agreement. According to a POST 
executive (B2_002), 
 “We   implement   BSC   and   use   KPIs   to   measure   each   department’s  
performance  where  some  KPIs  follow  the  measures  given  by  the  MoF.”     
 
This is to assure that the organisation can reach the MoF targets. For some KPIs, which 
have more than one responsible department, the targets will be cascaded based on their 
potential and historical data. Additional KPIs have also been employed by considering 
each   department’s   context   as   well   as   regarding   some international and domestic 
standards.  
 
In PWA, the organisational KPIs will be assigned and cascaded to responsible deputy 
governors, and then each department and regional office has to countersign the 
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performance agreement with the organisation.  The form of agreement is similar to the 
MoF performance agreement but KPIs have been arranged under four perspectives of 
BSC. The targets also have been divided into five levels and scored from 1 (worst) to 5 
(excellence). This scoring system is also used to assess divisional performance. Each 
department and division is required to sign a performance agreement with an 
organisation at the beginning of the year. According to an executive (B1_002), 
“The   governor   and   each   deputy   governor   have   to   sign   a   performance 
agreement. Then, each deputy governor also has to sign the agreement 
with  his  assistant  governors  and  department  directors.  …  By  employing  
KPIs based on the BSC concept, it can help us in explaining 
performance  targets  to  our  subordinates.”     
 
The KPIs at the  divisional  level  can  be  related  to  the  division’s  task  and  also  depend  on  
the requirements of the head of the department. Consequently, the KPIs can be few in 
one division and up to thirty KPIs in another division. Some participants complained 
that heads of department assigned them too many KPIs, some of which are not related to 
their division. In addition, the divisional BSC also represents the   head   of   division’s  
individual BSC targets.  According to a PWA divisional manager (B1_201), 
 “We  focus  on  the use of BSC However, in my point of view, we have 
many departments and divisions for which it is difficult to balance and 
distribute the measures. Some divisions may have only five KPIs while 
another division has thirty measures. All of these depend on the 
executive. I personally want to measure the main KPIs that are related 
to our work; however, recently the supporting jobs are also taken into 
account and set as our measures. I will try to negotiate with the 
departmental head for the following year KPIs for the sake of my 
employees.”     
 
 The system that has been established at POST also has a resemblance to that in use at 
PWA,   as   the   organisational   and   departmental  KPIs   are   derived   from   the  MoF’s  KPIs  
and   POST’s   business   plan,   however,   in   POST,   each   department and division is not 
required to sign any performance agreements.  
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According to a POST departmental director (B2_103), 
“We  are  not  required  to  sign  a  performance  agreement,  but  we  have  to  
submit a half-year  report  and  annual  report.” 
 
The strategic planning department is responsible for gathering and monitoring each 
department’s  performance  regarding  the  MoF’s  KPIs  and  the  other  standards  employed  
in each department are not included. The KPIs used in each department and division 
have to be approved by the superior level. The implementation of BSC in POST is far 
behind PWA. Many participants state that POST has implemented BSC at the 
departmental level; however, there is no clear evidence of how POST uses the BSC, in 
decision-making, at the divisional level. 
 
In addition, due to limited access to the documents, the researcher cannot identify the 
scoring system and how POST has implemented BSC at the departmental level. The 
researcher only had access to a business plan that assigns the KPIs of each department 
and organisational goals. However, one participant (B2_307) did mention following the 
scoring system (where targets are scored from 1 (worst) to 5 (excellence)), which is 
similar to that used by PWA. 
 
6.7 Institutional Complexity and Multiple Logics Affect the Organisational BSC 
Similar to EVM, organisations faced difficulty in implementation due to institutional 
complexity. An effect of the fragmented structure discussed in chapter 5 can also be 
seen in the use of BSC, as it creates a high degree of institutional complexity. The 
organisational BSC has been based on the statement of directions (SODs), which was 
introduced as a new approach of BSC in order to make the relationship between 
objectives, measures and targets more efficient and can be more useful as a strategic 
management tool (Cobbold and Lawrie, 2002) (see more in chapter 2). However, after 
adopting this new approach, many participants expressed their displeasure in the SODs 
provided by the MoF, even though the SODs have been approved by the line ministries 
and SOE before being released. According to a PWA departmental director (B1_103), 
 “SODs   for   our   organisation   are   too   generic   and   not   specific.  
Government agencies should have clear policy and conform with other 
agencies.” 
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According to a POST executive vice president (B2_002), 
 “Recent  SODs  are  too  broad.  It  is  like  a  homework  assignment  that  we  
need to answer. The SODs are written more theoretical but not 
practical.” 
 
The Thai government sometimes creates an urgent policy or new policy and requires the 
SOE to comply with it, such as microfinance in the postal branch can lead to KPI 
changes or adding new KPIs between assessment years. Changes and unclear signals 
about government policy can lead to confusion within the SOEs and affect their strategic 
plans as well as organisational BSC. All in all, participants from both case study 
organisations state that SODs from government are too generic and sometimes the 
policies from government agencies are not synchronized.  Also, the conflict of interests 
between government agencies, which can be seen in various circumstances (chapter 5 
section 5.2), creates institutional complexity in the case study organisations.  
 
The institutional complexity regarding the conflict of the logic of commercial operations 
and the logic of social activities also shows in the KPIs. In the implementation and use 
of BSC, there are multiple logics involved in creating KPIs as well as individual 
responses to the KPIs. Most participants state the problem in the implementation is 
based on the issues around the KPIs, as they reflect both commercial and social 
activities. Kaplan and Norton (1992) develop the BSC approach by trying to balance 
between financial and non-financial measures as well as organisational actions and 
strategies.  
 
We saw in chapter 2 that many researchers in the field criticized the original BSC, as it 
is difficult to justify the choice of indicators. Also, another problem is that an excessive 
number of indicators tend to be used in public sector organisations (Aidemark, 2001). 
The documentary evidence suggests that SOEs suffer from the excessive number of 
indicators, as they need the indicators to answer both social and commercial activities.    
 
According to a POST executive (B2_003), 
“Recently,   the   BSC   used in our organisation has too much detail, 
whereas it should be used to see a big picture of our organisation. Then, 
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when  we  deploy,  we  will  set  the  activities  or  work  plans.  …  Moreover,  
BSC  does  not  need  to  balance  all  four  perspectives.” 
 
According to a PWA departmental director (B1_106), 
 “The  KPIs  required  by  the  MoF  sometimes  conflict,  such  as  EBITDA  
and the reduction of water loss rate, which has to use money. As a 
result, instead of using KPIs to drive the organisation, in reality, if we 
focus on EBITDA,  we  might  neglect  the  preventive  maintenance.” 
 
The finding suggests that some departments experience around thirty KPIs in their set of 
measures  and  some  of  them  do  not  relate  to  the  department’s  activities  that  result  in  the  
negative perceptions towards   the   system.   This   supports   Rautainen   and   Jarvenpaa’s  
(2012, p. 182) study that showed when a unit considers that a PMS is not relevant in the 
context   ‘manipulation   may   occur   and   be   entangled   with   buffering   or   avoidance   of  
evaluation’. 
 
From the interviews, it can be seen that different departments in the organisation embed 
or prioritise KPIs differently. This can be interpreted as a reflection of their commitment 
or alignment with different institutional logics; consequently their responses to common 
measures are not uniform, as they interpret similar KPIs differently.  Also, each 
department has its own set of KPIs, which are derived from its responsibility and related 
organisational standards as well as well-known standards or guidelines. For example, 
the information technology department focuses on improving data security and 
organisational networks and processes while the financial and accounting department 
focuses on financial stability. Alongside the common KPIs assigned by the organisation 
such as EBITDA, water pressure, water loss rate, budgeting etc., which the users 
question as to usefulness, each department tends to develop and employ its own set of 
KPIs.  According to a POST senior divisional manager (B2_211), 
“Some  KPIs  are  used  across  the  organisation, but some of them are not 
related  to  our  work;;  for  example,  the  organisational  budgeting  KPI.  …  
However, we also have a KPI on logistics post which is our 
responsibility.” 
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Also, according to a PWA executive (B1_004), 
“Regarding   the   Governor’s   policy, some KPIs are used to measure 
every department such as water loss rate and EBITDA. As a result, 
some departments disagree with this policy. For example, the 
accounting division disagrees with the use of water loss rate to measure 
divisional performance.” 
 
To solve the problem that some cascaded KPIs are not linked with departmental goals, 
many departments in both organisations also employ various standards that they think 
match their responsibilities as their KPIs and target improved performance. Although 
they sometimes have not used those targets as their KPIs in the BSC model, they use 
them for monitoring performance only. For example, in POST, according to executive 
vice presidents (B2_002) and (B2_003) respectively,  
“POST  already  has  our  own  standard for our delivery system. Also, we 
as a member of Universal Postal Union (UPU), have to follow UPU 
standards  as  well  …  We  also  employ  some  systems  that  are  suitable  for  
each   department’s   responsibility   such   as   Control   Objective   for  
Information and related Technology framework (COBIT) and The 
Committee  of  Sponsoring  Organizations  of  the  Treadway  Commission’s  
guideline  (COSO).” 
 
“To  assess  our  quality  of  services,  we  employ  UPU  standard  …  which  
is more reliable than using benchmarking with other postal locations 
with  different  geography  and  density.” 
 
However, according to a vice president assistant (B2_210), 
“UPU  assesses  and  also  reports  on  our  performance.  …  We  also  try  to  
benchmark   with   other   Postal   organisations   …   However,   we   did   not  
employ them as our KPIs but as a performance target to improve our 
quality.” 
 
Both case study organisations claim that they employ related international standards 
such as COBIT as guidelines for improving departmental operations. However, each 
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organisation tends to abandon such   guidelines   when   they   conflict   with   the   MoF’s  
requirements in order to sustain their legitimacy. 
 
At the departmental level, both organisations allow each department to set its own 
measures and targets to reflect its responsibility. Lipe and Salterio (2000) commented 
that organisations tend to focus on common over tailored measures, which can affect the 
usefulness of BSC.  For example, a vice president (B2_104) and a senior manager 
(B2_201) spoke about the use of the ISO standard as one guideline that POST follows. 
“We   also   employ   ISO   guidelines   for   our   EMS   service   but  we   do   not  
register  with  ISO  because  the  fee  is  very  expensive.” 
 
“We  employed  ISO  before  because  it  is  a  well-known standard in order 
to  improve  our  image  as  well  as  create  branding.” 
 
Also, according to a PWA executive (B1_003),  
“We should select a few KPIs that are considered as core to 
organisational and departmental functions. The rest should not be used 
to assess the performance but used instead for supporting departmental 
work.” 
 
According to a PWA departmental director (B1_106),  
“We should distinguish between organisational KPIs and in-process 
KPIs. The organisational KPIs should be measured using the outcomes, 
while in-process KPIs, such as the quality of water, should comply with 
standards  or  guidelines.” 
 
Even though each case study organisation tailored its set of KPIs for individual 
departments regarding its responsibility, the evidence shows that they do not take the 
tailored KPIs seriously but use them as a reminder for the minimum standard as well as 
a way to improve their image. 
 
In summary, institutional complexity affected the identification and acceptance of KPIs 
in the SOEs due to a lack of common agreement. This can be seen as a consequence of 
conflicting institutional logics. These multiple logics and different responsibilities in 
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each department in the organisations were apparent in both case study organisations and 
affected the set of KPIs used in them.  The massive number of KPIs resulted from the 
multiple logics, which were sometimes considered as unrelated to individual 
departments. This can produce incentives to avoid the BSC or make its use inconsistent 
across different departments. In order to avoid the complexity of KPIs, case studies 
tended to use other standards as milestones but excluded them from the set of KPIs.  
 
6.8  Organisational BSC Loosely Coupled from Organisational Strategic Plan and 
Budget Plan 
Due to the pressure from the MoF, both organisations employed a BSC model across 
their organisation. However, it seems that the usefulness of the BSC has not reached 
organisational expectations. It has been suggested that this is due to a lack of integration 
with other systems along with other perhaps less significant issues.   
 
In the interviews, participants pointed out more problems with the set of KPIs. 
Regarding the performance agreement with the MoF, both case study organisations have 
a set of measures to comply with as well as adding their own organisational measures to 
ensure that the whole set of measures can cover the necessary activities to drive the 
organisations to their goals.  
 
We saw in chapter 2 that Umashev and Willett (2008) and  Kaplan and Norton (2001a) 
have both stated that many public sector organisations employ the BSC in order to 
address the communication of their strategic themes throughout the organisation. 
However, the case study organisations do not sufficiently link the KPIs with their 
strategies due to a variety of problems. In PWA, the perceptions of participants from 
different departments towards the integration with the strategic plan vary depend upon 
each  department’s  responsibility.   
 
According to a PWA division manager (B1_203), 
“The information system master plan is linked with the organisational 
strategic plan and the KPIs.” 
 
On the other hand, according to a PWA departmental director (B1_107),  
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“Our KPIs are not linked with our strategic plan. Recently, we focused 
only  on  financial  figures  ….  The  other  problem  is  that  the  KPIs  adopted  
from  the  MoF’s  KPIs  do  not  reflect  our  situations.”   
 
Also, according to a PWA division manager (B1_204), 
“The KPIs and their targets have been distributed to responsible 
departments and divisions. However, most of the KPIs targets are 
different from the plan targets….  As  a  result,  we  do  not  know what the 
real  expected  targets  are.”   
 
While in POST, the corporate strategy department has provided a guideline of required 
KPIs  to  each  department;;  however,  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  the  participants’  perceptions  
on the integration between BSC and the organisational strategic plan. According to a 
POST departmental director (B2_103), 
“We   have   to   do   the   operational   plan   and   business   plan   but   at   the  
departmental level, we cannot see the whole plans and how they are 
connected   with   BSC….The   targets   of   KPIs   have set from the 
organisational strategic plan and we have to do a follow-up  report.” 
 
Further, a second POST departmental director (B2_104) stated, 
“We   try   to   make   our   departmental   BSC consistents with the 
organisational strategic plan. The corporate strategy department guides 
us with what set of KPIs we need in our department, and later on, we 
have  to  think  of  the  targets  and  other  possible  related  KPIs.” 
 
As mentioned before, both case study organisations employ the commonly used four 
perspectives from the BSC concept to distribute KPIs from organisational targets to 
each  department   and  division   respectively.  Therefore,   they   normally   adopt   the  MoF’s  
set of KPIs as the compulsory KPIs for the whole organisation with some additional 
KPIs that relate to a department  or  division’s  activities.  The  KPIs  contains  both  social  
and commercial related KPIs caused by the two different logics embedded in SOEs. In 
order  to  gain  legitimacy  over  their  employees,  the  adaptation  of  the  MoF’s  set  of  KPIs  
helps executives to more easily explain to their employees why individual KPIs need to 
be assessed.  
159 
 
According to a POST executive (B2_002),  
“Our   organisation   has   to  work   in  many   aspects;;   therefore,   some  KPIs  
may suit one of the aspects but not others. However, when we need to 
create or implement something new (which is also related to the MoF 
‘requirement’),  we  refer  to  our  employees  that  we  have  to  comply  with  
the  MoF’s   demand.   This   helps   us   to   reduce   the   resistance   to   change  
from  our  employees.” 
 
However, case study organisation  evidence  suggests   that   the  MoF’s  set  of  KPIs   is   too  
subjective  and  not   related  much   to   the  organisations’  core  business.   In   addition,   some  
participants  state  that  their  organisation  employs  the  MoF’s  set  of  KPIs  as  a  supplement  
while using their own KPIs as the main measures to assess their performance.  
According to a PWA executive (B1_001),  
“PWA  has  our  own  set  of  organisational  KPIs  which  are  derived  from  
our strategic plan. Most of the KPIs are not from the performance 
agreement signed with the MoF. However, we have about fifteen 
strategies and each of them also has many support plans so we deploy 
the core strategies as our assessing KPIs, but for the others we focus on 
monitoring  them  from  time  to  time.” 
 
However, according to a POST executive (B2_002), 
“We   have   assessed   our   performance   for   the   continuity   of   the  
organisation.  It  is  not  related  to  the  assessment  by  the  MoF.  The  MoF’s  
set of measures is kind of our homework. It does not much relate to our 
core business. For example, one of KPIs from the MoF is to increase the 
number of customers in our Pay at Post service. However, the MoF does 
not consider that the locations of competitors such as SevenEleven (a 
convenience store chain) or banks are normally better than ours. Also, 
customers can pay their bills at the ATM. While banks can use the fee 
revenue  to  invest  more,  POST  cannot  do  something  like  that.” 
 
The   evidence   shows   that   the   loose   coupling   of   the   MoF’s   set   of   KPIs   and   the  
organisational-owned KPIs has occurred. Both the organisational strategic plan and the 
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MoF’s   set   of  KPIs   follow   the   statement  of  directions;;   therefore,   both   the  organisation  
and the MoF have similar goals.  
 
However,   interviewees   felt   the   lack  of  understanding   in   the  SOE’s  context   sometimes  
misleads the MoF in the design of KPIs as well as their targets.  As a result, participants 
perceive   that   some   of   the  MoF’s  KPIs   do   not   increase   organisational   value   and  may  
distort the plans or operations of the organisation.  
According to a POST executive (B1_004),  
“One  of  the  KPIs is the reduction of water loss rate in our distribution 
system. However, it does not consider whether this is worth the 
investment or not. It is fine to invest in some branches such as the 
Samui branch or Phuket branch, which have high production costs. 
However,  for  the  other  branches,  it  may  not  be  worthwhile.” 
 
A PWA division manager (B1_202) also added her comment on this topic:   
“If  you  see  our  past  performance  assessments,  we  failed  in  the  reduction  
of water loss rate KPIs because we considered that the water loss rate 
assigned  by  the  MoF  is  not  the  optimal  option.” 
 
Many participants mentioned conflicts between KPIs. According to a PWA 
departmental director (B1_106), 
 “The  KPIs  required  by  the  MoF  sometimes  conflict,  such  as  EBITDA  
and the reduction of water loss rate which has to use money. As a result, 
instead of using KPIs to drive the organisation, in reality, if we focus on 
EBITDA,  we  might  neglect  the  preventive  maintenance.” 
 
Also, according to a POST vice president (B2_101), 
 “The   financial   KPIs   include   profit   and   cost  …   The   basic   concept   of  
using profit as a KPI is that profit meets the target or not. However, the 
profit target has increased every year, but in reality the business is like a 
curve  that  can  increase  or  decrease…for  example,   this year, we do not 
have  a  big  event,  Euro  champion  cup,    but  they  use  last  year’s  profit  as  a  
base   target.   …   The   increase   of   the   targets   can   be   a   problem   in   the  
future.” 
161 
 
One example of an inadequate target is the quality of water treatment KPI, for which the 
PWA can get an excellent score every year without putting in more effort. According to 
a divisional manager (B1_201), 
“Some  KPI  targets  are  too  difficult  and  discourage  me.  I  try  to  solve  the  
problem by asking for an adjustment of the weight of calculation of that 
KPI.  On  the  other  hand,  some  KPIs’  targets  are  too  easy,  for  which  we  
do not need to put any effort to achieve, such as quality of treated 
water.” 
 
Also, redundant KPIs can be seen in both POST and PWA; for example, the MoF has 
used EBITDA as a standard measure for every SOE and at the same time it also 
employs Economic Profit as a KPI as well as the volume of specific services in POST. 
These redundant KPIs can cause management inflexibility in an SOE. According to a 
vice president (B2_101),  
“Some KPIs are redundant with each other such as EP and EBITDA. 
Both KPIs have the same objective. However, this year, the EBITDA 
has  been  removed  from  our  set  of  KPIs.” 
 
Aside   from   the  MoF’s   set   of  KPIs,  most  of   the   organisational  KPIs   in  both   cases   are  
from their business plan or budget plan. According to a POST senior manager (B2_201), 
“Our  strategic  plan  provides  lead  and  lag  KPIs,  which  are  more  related  
to  our  activities  than  MoF’s  KPIs.” 
 
However,  participants’  opinions  in  both  organisations  on  the  use  of KPIs in order 
to support organisational strategic plans are divided. According to a PWA 
departmental director (B1_107), 
“The   good  KPIs   are   supposed   to   connect   the   organization   goals   from  
top   to   bottom   so   our   organisation   can   benefit   from   the   system…  
However, recent KPIs do not link with our organisational strategy. 
Now, the process seems to focus on financial figures and work 
backwards  to  strategy.” 
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On the other hand, a PWA divisional manager (B1_202) stated,  
“The  KPIs  do  have  a   connection  with  our  plan and the distribution of 
KPIs  to  departments  is  also  linked.” 
 
Moreover, different from the implementation of EVM, in employing BSC in their 
organisations, participants found that there is not much difference between the former 
system and BSC because both of them are based on the assessment through KPIs. 
According to a PWA divisional manager (B1_201),  
“BSC   is   similar   to   our   former   PMS   that   used   KPIs   to   assess   the  
performance.” 
 
The case study organisations employ BSC and distribute KPIs to each department as 
well  as  each  division,  even  though  they  do  not  use  BSC  to  drive  SOE’s  performance  as  
it should be. 
 
According to a POST executive vice president (B2_005), 
“BSC  is  just  a  system  in  our  strategic  plan  but  for  me,  I  don’t  use  BSC  
as a management tool. I still  use  budgeting  control.  …  I  know  that  BSC  
is a useful tool but the problem is my subordinates do not clearly 
understand the BSC concept, which takes time to educate them. As a 
result, we cannot cancel the budgeting control system and use only BSC 
in our  organisation.” 
 
Also, according to a PWA employee (B1_301), 
“I   think   that   we   should   employ   BSC   and   use   KPIs   more   seriously.  
Recently, it seems like KPIs are only written on paper and we still do 
not  use  it  efficiently,  standardized  and  systematically.” 
 
The delay of the performance agreement process between organisation and department 
also impacts the usefulness of BSC. Instead of driving performance improvement, 
employees who now know the half-year result can set the targets that favour them. 
According to a PWA executive (B1_002), 
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“We   experience   a   delay   in   signing   an   agreement   between   executives  
and departments. Sometimes, the delay takes more than six months. 
Therefore,  our  organisation  tends  to  set  the  measurable  targets.” 
 
In contrast to the implementation of EVM (see section 6.5.1), the group of social 
referents for the BSC is large and has the capability to convey the concept of BSC 
across their organisation. Both organisations have included sessions on the BSC in their 
training programmes and, as a result, most employees know the basic concept of BSC, 
which helps in deploying it in the organization.  Also, the BSC has been more accepted 
amongst   employees   compared   to   the   EVM,   as   its   concept   is   similar   to   the   MoF’s  
performance assessment system and is considered to be not too complex.  Although 
some of the executives expressed their disagreement on the use of BSC, they do not 
demand to replace the BSC with another system. 
 
According to a PWA executive (B1_001), 
“The  BSC  is  not  a  useful  tool.  It  is  just  tell us to view the organisation 
regarding four perspectives. From what I know, many countries do not 
use BSC any more. In reality, some departments do not need to fulfil all 
four perspectives. They just need to focus on the important or related 
perspectives   only…   Actually,   we   should   clearly   understand   our  
organisation’s  missions  so  we  can  serve  our  organisation  as  a  whole  and  
the   focused   perspective   should   be   based   on   stakeholders.   …   Even  
though I think BSC does not work with our organisation, we do not 
need another system to replace it. We should adjust the system to be 
more  suitable  to  our  organisation.” 
 
The perceptions of participants on the integration of KPIs and their organisational 
strategic plan as well as budget plan are divided and depend upon which department 
they work for.  The loose coupling from other practices can be seen, as some 
departments see that the KPIs are coupled with the organisational strategic plan while 
others do not. From the evidence, it can be concluded that BSC is loosely coupled with 
other organisational practices; however it is not adopted on a ceremonial basis, as we 
can see many involvements from both organisations in the implementation of BSC.  It 
can  be  seen  that  both  organisations  try  to  follow  the  MoF’s  demands  on  KPIs  while also 
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employing their own KPIs in order to integrate better with their own strategies.  In 
addition, compared with the implementation of EVM, the implementation of BSC 
seems to have less resistance from employees. This may be a result of organisational 
attributes such as social referents and network and its similarity to their former 
performance  measurement  practice  which  developed  from  SOE’s  PMS. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the PMS in the two SOEs by focusing on the implementation of 
EVM, the   BSC   and   the   SOE’s   PMS.   The   impact   of   multiple   logics   embedded   in  
organisations contributes to institutional complexity, which subsequently affects the 
development of PMS in the case study organisations. The responses from these cases to 
institutional complexity in implementing the management tools EVM and BSC vary 
depending   on   the   tools   themselves   as   well   as   participants’   knowledge   and   former  
experiences in dealing with the demands from institutions like the MoF and other 
government agencies.  The response strategies used in both cases are decoupling and 
loose coupling in order to cope with the demands while minimizing the impact to their 
practices.  
 
The  other   findings   from   interviewees’  perceptions   reveal   that   there  are   several   factors  
that can hinder the implementation of EVM. Due to SOE characteristics, it is difficult to 
apply the EVM concept in these SOEs. Both case organisations have very significant 
social goals in addition to any commercial objectives. The complexity of EVM and the 
limited number of social referents are also a burden to educating employees, which also 
discourages the use of EVM in each organisation. As a result, many participants agree 
that they rarely use EVM for decision-making. Consequently, the adaptation of EVM in 
both case study organisations decouples from the other practices. As a consequence it 
can be argued that the adoption of EVM is largely ceremonial and based on the need to 
comply with the demands of the MoF. 
 
The BSC, on the other hand, has been widely accepted in both organisations due to the 
capability of social referents and the similarity between the BSC and the more recent 
PMS. The perceptions of participants are mainly related to the set of KPIs and the 
targets employed in the scorecards. The excessive number of KPIs mentioned result 
from the multiple logics prevailing in the organisations and the demands from 
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institutions.    The  BSC  system  may  be  coupled  or  decoupled  from  both  the  MoF’s  KPIs  
and   the   individual   organisation’s   strategic   plans.   So  while   some   individual units and 
departments may view the BSC positively, others seem to be less keen to use BSC 
measures.  The findings, described in this chapter, of the use of the BSC might best be 
described as loosely coupled, rather than fully coupled or decoupled, or as described by 
Nor-Aziah  and  Scapens  (2007,  p.  214)  ‘distinctive  but  still  responsive’  to  other  practices  
in the organisation. The evidence shows that both case study organisations intend to 
integrate the BSC with other practices such as budget plan and strategic plan; however, 
the degree of the coupling with other practices depends upon each departmental 
perspective towards the BSC and the set of KPIs. 
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Chapter 7  
The Relationship between the Incentive Systems and 
Individual Balanced Scorecards 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a detailed investigation of the incentive system in the context of 
individual performance assessment in the two case study organizations: the Provincial 
Waterworks Authority (PWA) and Thailand Post (POST). The results are mainly drawn 
from semi-structured interviews with various groups of participants, from employees to 
executives, in various departments of the case study organizations, as well as some 
participants from the Ministry of Finance (MoF), which is responsible for the SOE 
bonus system. The participants from the case study organizations provide evidence on 
the perceived relationship between the incentive system and the individual performance 
assessment system. In-depth documentary research (see section 4.5, table 4.4) provided 
a significant amount of background information and detailed criteria of the incentive 
system and the individual performance assessment system as well as some insight 
issues which can be used to support the findings. 
 
In chapter 5, emphasis was focused on institutional complexity, which is partly a 
consequence of the environment within which SOEs operate. We argued that SOEs are 
hybrid organisations facing multiple logics particularly in relation to commercial 
operations and social activities, as well as being subject to the more typical coercive 
and mimetic pressures. In this chapter the main focus is on the incidence of normative 
pressure,  which   concerns   the   actions   of   ‘social   actors’   influenced   by   the   institutional  
logics towards the relationship between the incentive systems and the individual 
balanced scorecards (BSC) where the terms of individual BSC in this study refers to the 
employee performance assessment employed the concept of BSC. 
 
This chapter first describes relevant aspects of the context of the incentive systems in 
the SOEs. Then, the individual performance assessments in both organisations as well 
as the problems that occur in the use of both systems are provided. The institutional 
logics   that   influence   the   responses   from   the   organisations’   employees and shape the 
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systems will be explained. The avoidance of the integration between recent practices on 
individual assessment and individual BSC is also discussed in this chapter. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with a brief chapter summary. 
 
7.2 Incentive System  
7.2.1 SOE Incentive System  
In 1995, the Thai cabinet approved an SOE performance measurement framework that 
consists of a performance measurement system (PMS) and its related systems, including 
an incentive system (SEPO, 2013). According to SEPO (2004), the Thai government 
believes that an incentive system is one of the key tools that can encourage an SOE to 
improve its efficiency and effectiveness and to achieve its goals and targets. The main 
objective of the SOE incentive system is that the system should be a performance based 
system and compatible with the public sector in order to support recruitment and keep 
the   potential   workforce.   SOEs   that   participated   in   the   SOE’s   PMS   received   both  
financial incentives and non-financial incentives. Financial incentives consist of bonus 
incentives and salary advancement incentives, while non-financial incentives consist of 
SOE rewards and flexible management. However, since the introduction of the SOE 
incentive system in 1995, only the non-financial incentive   system,   called   the   “SOE  
Award,”  has  been  developed  continuously.  As  for  the  financial  incentives,  some  minor  
changes in the calculation formula can be seen over the past two decades, but they have 
not had much effect on the structure of the incentive schemes. 
 
The documentary research (see section 4.5, table 4.4) shows that in the SOE incentive 
system, SEPO divides SOEs into 3 groups: commercial, non-commercial and tariff 
controlled groups. However, both SOEs in the commercial group and profitable SOEs 
in the tariff-controlled group employ the same incentive system that will be explained 
later. In addition, some corporatized SOEs and some large SOEs, especially SOEs in 
the financial sector, have not been required to employ the SOE incentive system. Their 
individual incentive systems can be created to be compatible with the market, which 
normally results in higher benefits and bonuses for their employees compared with the 
SOE incentive system. However for some SOEs in this group, such as Government 
Housing Bank, Metropolitan Electricity Authority and POST, their incentive systems 
are  still  under  the  MoF’s  control,  which  might  be  using  either  the  SOE  incentive  system  
or their own bonus system. 
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Both of the case study organisations belong to commercial groups, even though POST 
has been corporatized since 2003 and its tariff structure has been regulated by the Postal 
Commission.  Therefore, the SOE incentive system described in this chapter will be 
based mostly on the commercial group criteria.  
 
7.2.1.1 Financial incentives 
7.2.1.1.1 Bonus system 
According to SEPO (2013), the bonus system has been based on historic assessment 
scores   of   the   SOE’s   PMS   by   the  MoF.      The   bonus   system   has   been   used   with   two  
groups of people: SOE employees and executives except the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and a board of directors. The board of directors (or an executive committee) is a 
committee within that organization which has the authority to make decisions and 
ensures that these decisions are carried out (Board of Directors, 2015). As for CEOs, 
their bonus system is based on the CEO’s   contract   with   the   individual   SOE.   The  
contract is confidential; therefore, this study focuses on the bonus system for the 
employee groups and a board of directors group. 
 
The tables below show the financial amount bonus calculation criteria of each group. 
Furthermore, all of the commercial group, the tariff controlled group and profitable 
SOEs in the non-commercial group are using the following bonus system. 
 
Employee Bonus criteria  
At score: 3.00, the maximum financial amount of the bonus is not greater than nine per 
cent  of  SOE’s  net  profit  for  bonus  calculation  and  also  not  greater  than  five  months  of  
the  organization’s  average  salary.  
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Table 7.1: Employee bonus criteria 
Performance score Percentage of net profit* The maximum multipliers of 
organisation average monthly 
salary 
5.0 (excellent) 11.00 8.00 
4.5 10.50 7.00 
4.0 (Good) 10.00 6.00 
3.5 9.50 5.50 
3.0 (Normal) 9.00 5.00 
2.5 8.50 4.50 
2.0 8.00 4.00 
1.5 7.50 3.00 
1.0 7.00 2.00 
Source: SEPO  (2013,  p. 9) 
Note: Net profit has to be adjusted for bonus calculation  
 
The example of employee bonus calculation can be seen on the table below.  
 
Table 7.2: The example of employee bonus calculation 
 Organisation A Score 3 Score 4.5 
(1) Net Profit (Mil.Baht) 2,000 5,000 2,000 10,000 
(2) Percentage of net 
profit for bonus 
calculation 
 
9.00% 
 
9.00% 
 
10.50% 
 
10.50% 
(3) Bonus Cap   
(1)x(2)  
 
180 
 
450 
 
210 
 
1,050 
(4) Average  monthly 
salary 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
(5) The maximum 
multipliers of average 
total salary 
 
5.00 
 
 
5.00 
 
 
6.50 
 
 
6.50 
 
(6) The maximum bonus 
(4)x(5) 
 
500 
 
500, 
 
650 
 
650 
(7) Actual Bonus received 
(the lower one between 
(3) and (6)) 
 
180 
 
450 
 
210 
 
650 
(8) Actual multipliers of 
average monthly salary 
(7)/(4) 
 
1.8  
 
4.5 
 
2.1 
 
6.5 
 
In addition, in case that the actual multiplier of average total salary is lower than one 
but the organisation has enough profit, the total amount of employee bonus will be 
equal to the average total monthly salary. 
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Table  7.3:  A  member  of  board  of  directors’  bonus  criteria   
Performance score Percentage of net profit for bonus calculation 
5.0 (excellent) Base bonus + 100% of Base Bonus 
4.5 Base bonus + 75% of Base Bonus 
4.0 (Good) Base bonus + 50% of Base Bonus 
3.5 Base bonus + 25% of Base Bonus 
3.0 (Normal) Base bonus(1)(2) 
2.5 Base bonus - 25% of Base Bonus 
2.0 Base bonus - 50% of Base Bonus 
1.5 No bonus 
1.0 No bonus 
Note:  1) Base bonus is 3% of net profit for bonus calculation with 60,000 baht at maximum 
 2) Every addition of 1,000 million baht in net profit for bonus calculation, the base bonus will 
increase by 10,000 baht 
Source: SEPO (2013, p. 10) 
 
The  example  of  board  of  directors’  bonus  calculation  can  be  seen  on  the  table  below. 
 
Table  7.4:  The  example  of  board  of  directors’  bonus  calculation 
 Organisation A Score 3 Score 4.5 
(1) Net Profit (Baht) 900,000’s 2,000,000’s 900,000’s 2,000,000’s 
(2) Total base bonus at 
3% 
(1)x0.03 
 
27,000’s 
 
60,000’s 
 
27,000’s 
 
60,000’s 
(3) Number of members 10 10 10 10 
(4) Maximum bonus for 
each member 
(2)/(3) 
 
2,700’s 
 
6,000’s 
 
2,700’s 
 
6,000’s 
(2) Base bonus cap per 
each member 
60,000 60,000  60,000 60,000 
(3) Add bonus cap for net 
profit over 1,000 Mil. 
baht  
0 30,000 0 30,000 
(4) Actual base Bonus per 
each member 
(2)+(3) 
60,000 90,000 60,000 90,000 
(5) Add bonus based on 
organization 
performance 
0 0 45,000 
(60,000x0.75) 
67,500 
(90,000x0.75) 
(6) Actual bonus received 
per member (4)+(5) 
60,000 90,000 105,000 157,500 
(7) Total bonus paid 
(6)x(3) 
 
600,000 
 
900,000 
 
1,050,000 
 
1,570,000 
Note:  The above example shows the simple calculation; however, in reality the chairman and vice 
chairman of a board of directors will receive a bonus more than other members by 25% and 
12.5% respectively.  
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7.2.1.1.2 The percentage of total annual salary increase 
The percentage increase that can be applied to total salary by an SOE is also based on 
the PMS as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 7.5: The percentage of total annual salary increase 
Performance score The percentage of total salary increase (maximum) 
Net Profit Net Loss 
5.0 (excellent) 8.50 7.50 
4.5 8.25 7.25 
4.0 (Good) 8.00 7.00 
3.5 7.75 6.75 
3.0 (Normal) 7.50 6.50 
2.5 7.25 6.25 
2.0 7.00 6.00 
1.5 6.75 5.75 
1.0 6.50 5.50 
Source:  SOE’s  performance  measurement  system  manual  (SEPO,  2013.  p.  63) 
 
Following the Asian Economic Crisis in 1998, the  Thai  cabinet  approved  a  ‘temporary’  
measure to modify the advancement salary system. This salary system considers only 
the profit or loss of SOEs, and profitable SOEs can increase the amount of annual salary 
paid by seven per cent whilst loss-making SOEs can increase it by six per cent. Since 
the imposition of this modification, the percentage of salary increase no longer has this 
planned  connection  with  the  SOE’s  PMS  (see  Table  7.5  above),  even  though  it  is  still  
one of the criteria that is stated in the MoF document. The reasons why SEPO still 
publishes the percentage of total annual salary increase criteria are: (1) the criteria are 
still valid, and (2) the recent practice has been claimed as a temporary one, so the MoF 
can drop it anytime. For example,   organisation   A’s   average   monthly   salary   is   100  
million baht. If organisation A has made a profit, it can increase total monthly salary to 
107 million baht. But if organisation A has a net loss, it can increase total monthly 
salary to 106 million baht. However, if the table above is applied in this situation, 
organisation A can increase average monthly salary between 105.5 million baht to 
108.5 million baht.  
 
7.2.1.2 Non-financial incentives 
7.2.1.2.1 SOE performance ranking system 
Since 1997, the Thai cabinet made the submission of SOE performance reports and 
annual performance rankings to the MoF compulsory. This information is then 
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published in various media to promote and recognize excellent SOE performance.  
According to SEPO (2012), since 2005, an SOE award has been introduced and held 
annually for the following purposes: to promote the excellent SOEs, to encourage 
SOEs’   employees   in   improving   their   efficiency   and   to   create   a   process   and  
communication channel for the public in monitoring SOE performances.  
 
The types and criteria of awards have been developed continuously from three types in 
2005 to nine types in 2014; they can be categorised as follows: 1) excellent SOE, 2) 
excellent board of directors, 3) organisational management, 4) organisational 
development, 5) excellent CEO, 6) information disclosure, 7) innovation, 8) CSR, and 
9) Special award. The criteria of the first six types of SOE award are based on the result 
of KPIs compared with norms or benchmarks and additional performance related 
reports from the SOE and significant incidents. The innovation and information 
disclosure awards are based on projects submitted by each SOE. At the end of the 
process, the SOE award committee will visit and interview the short list candidates for 
the final decision.  Moreover,  SOEs  who  get  an  excellent  board  of  director’s  award  and  
an organisational management award three years in a row will receive an SOE honour 
award.  Regarding the case study organisations, both POST and the PWA received the 
awards as follows: Organisational Development Award in 2005, and Individual 
Innovation in 2011, respectively.  
 
7.2.1.2.2 Flexible management 
According to SEPO (2013), there are some compulsory sets of regulations and rules 
focused   on   an   SOE’s   operation   and   management.    Therefore, an SOE which has 
participated in a PMS will receive some exemptions from the regulations and rules, and 
if its performance is better than score 4 (Good SOE), more regulations will be waived, 
such as re-designing its organizational structure without permission needed from the 
MoF, or an increase in its maximum limit on operating budget may be approved by the 
board of directors and CEO, etc. However, once an SOE has dropped from the Good 
SOE group, the received advantage of flexible management are not taken back.  
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7.2.2 Case study organization incentive systems 
7.2.2.1 PWA individual performance assessment and incentive system 
In the PWA, the incentive system is carried out by the Human Resources Development 
department. The PWA claimed that its individual performance assessment has been 
employed since 2009 and the core competency assessment has been added as one of the 
criteria since 2010. The performance report will be used to consider the level of salary 
increase and promotion.  According to PWA’s   organisational   performance   report  
(2012), the range of incentives is as follows: 
1) Promotion  
2) Pay   raise   (in  February  or  March  each   year):   the  PWA  employs   the  MoF’s  
standard   grading   payment   system   called   a   single   ‘pay   spine’,   which   is   a  
traditional public payment structure (Thorpe and Homan, 2000, p. 145).  The 
pay structure divides salaries into 58 grades, which have been used across 
the organisation from operation staff to vice-chairman.  Each grade also 
divides into many steps of salary raise. An excellent employee can increase 
his salary by two steps of pay per annum at maximum, while a normal 
employee can get at least one step. 
3) Bonus (normally in April each year): Bonus criteria can be divided into 2 
groups. Firstly, the executive group receives 90% of their bonus from 
organisational performance and another 10% from individual performance. 
Next, the employee group will receive the same proportion based on their 
average salary across the organisation.  
 
For instance, referring to the example of employee bonus criteria, 
Organisation A can generate a bonus at 1.8 times the total average monthly 
salary.  
 
Table 7.6: The example of employee bonus received in an organisation 
 Executive B Employee C Employee D 
(1) Monthly salary (Baht) 100,000 30,000 20,000 
(2) Actual multipliers of average 
monthly salary 
1.8 1.8 1.8 
(3) Bonus received 
(1)x(2) 
Between 162,000 
and 180,000 
depending on 
individual 
performance 
assessment 
54,000 36,000 
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4) Development plan (in the fourth quarter): The individual development plan 
will be based on a competency gap, especially for under-performing 
employees. 
 
Moreover, the performance assessment report will be used to consider the talent group 
to join the high potential training courses. 
 
According to the PWA (2013b), the PWA plans to revise its incentive system by 2016. 
The plan will be more of a performance based incentive system that includes both 
financial and non-financial incentives. 
 
7.2.2.2 POST individual performance assessment and incentive system 
From   POST’s   organisational   performance   report   (2012),   it   can   be   seen   that   POST’s  
incentive system has a resemblance to that of PWA. The financial incentives consist of 
bonuses and potential salary increases, of which only the salary increase using the 
MoF’s   standard   grading   payment   system is based on individual assessment. Thailand 
Post generates individual bonuses using the average salary bonus figure given by the 
MoF across the organization.  This is similar to PWA but both executives and 
employees receive the same multipliers of average monthly salary. 
 
For non-financial incentives, POST has a variety of rewards for its employees; 
however, none of them is linked with individual assessment. For promotions, individual 
assessment is one of various factors. POST plans to include improvement of non-
financial incentives in its human resource plan for improving employee motivation 
(POST, 2013). 
 
In   conclusion,   both   the   PWA’s   and   POST’s   incentive   systems   mostly   base   their  
financial incentives on the SOE incentive system. Nonetheless, the MoF has opened the 
way for them to create their own incentive systems as long as the total amount of 
incentive expenses does not exceed the approved financial amount. Salary increases and 
promotions are claimed by both organisations as performance-based incentives along 
with   supervisor’s   judgment   through   core   competency   assessment   and   individual  
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qualification. The table below shows the comparison of the individual performance 
assessment process and the incentive systems in the case study organisations. 
 
Table 7.7: The comparison of individual performance assessment process and incentives in 
case study organisations 
Incentive Based on individual performance assessment and core competency 
assessment 
PWA Thailand Post 
Bonus Yes 
 
 
 
 
No 
Executive group: 90% from 
organisational performance 
and 10% from individual 
performance 
 
Employee Group: same 
proportion based on their 
average salary across 
organisation 
No Same proportion based on 
their average salary across 
organisation 
Grading 
payment system 
Yes Minimum: 1 step  
Maximum: 2 steps 
Yes Minimum: 1 step 
Maximum: 2 steps 
Promotion Yes  Yes  
Award No  No  
Source: PWA (2012) and POST (2012)   
 
The   next   part   will   provide   participants’   perspectives   on   the   incentive   systems   in   the  
case study organisations. 
 
7.3 Problems Found in the Recent Bonus System 
7.3.1 Problematic bonus formula  
The recent SOE incentive system uses a bonus formula linked with adjusted net profit 
and SOE performance score. Therefore, there are some disadvantages for low net profit 
SOEs and net loss  SOEs.  The  following  tables  show  each  organisations’  bonuses  in  the  
past four years. 
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Table  7.8:  PWA  and  POST’s  bonuses 
PWA 2010 2011 2012 2013 
(1) Performance Score 4.4747 4.3563 4.0472 4.4635 
(2) Adjusted net profit for 
bonus calculation 
2,541.62 2,867.40 1,907.41 3,886.84 
(3) Organisational average 
monthly salary 
 
159.50 160.06 169.59 174.66 
(4) Actual Bonus received 
(2)x(Bonus rate from 
performance score) 
 
266.23 
(3)x(10.4747) 
 
302.12 
(3)x10.3563 
 
197.97 
(3)x10.0472 
 
406.77 
(3)x 10.4635 
(5) Ideal Bonus 6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 
(6) Actual Bonus 1.67 months 1.89 months 1.17 months 2.33 months 
 
POST 2010 2011 2012 2013 
(1) Performance Score 3.7303 3.3923 3.9993 4.1885 
(2) Adjusted net profit for 
bonus calculation 
1,268.72 1,106.59 611.97 1.381.52 
(3) Organisational average 
monthly salary 
 
467.17 484.17 495.55 515.04 
(4) Actual Bonus received* 
 
467.17 484.17 495.55 515.04 
(5) Ideal Bonus 5 months 5 months 6 months 6 months 
(6) Actual Bonus 1 months 1 months 1 months 1 months 
Note:  When   the   amount   of   bonus   from   the   calculation   is   lower   than   organisation’s   average   monthly  
salary,  then  the  bonus  is  equal  to  organisation’s  average  monthly  salary. 
 
According to the performance score, the case study organisations have been categorized 
in the Good SOE group (score above 4.0) and the Normal SOE group (score above 3), 
which can receive up to six months bonus and five and a half months respectively; 
however the actual bonuses in both case study organisations are approximately one 
month to two months.  
 
This is because the organizational average salary is high compared with the net profit. 
Participants show that as a low net profit organisation, the recent incentive system could 
discourage such an organization to achieve a higher assessment score. The problem is 
also stated by an ex-member of a board of directors, (A1_010) who said that this is 
problematic in terms of the connection between the recent incentive system and the 
SOE’s  PMS.   
“When  a  low  profit  margin  SOE  can  maintain  at  least  a  score of 3 in the 
SOE’s  performance  measurement,  a  bonus  system  could  not  be  used  to  
encourage the SOE to improve their efficiency. In contrast, the system 
sometimes  may  be  harmful  for  further  improvement.” 
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Moreover, she also gave an extreme example for a net loss SOE, such as State Railway 
of Thailand, that cannot receive any bonus. Therefore, she mentioned,  
 “The  MoF  should  consider  or  create  a  more   flexible   incentive  system  
that can support every different type of SOE or at least, can encourage 
SOEs to improve  their  efficiency.” 
 
Many  participants   in  both  cases  note  that   the  nature  of   the  SOEs’  business  affects   the  
organisational profitability. Most participants claim that each SOE has its own 
characteristics and operates in a different industrial sector, which can lead to a 
difference in the likelihood of profit and also place limits on the scale of potential 
profitability.   
 
With limits on revenue and possible profit, PWA normally achieves only the minimum 
multiplier bonus rate, namely a one-month bonus. The PWA has employed a cross-
subsidy tariff between social and commercial customers and tends to maintain its tariff 
at around four per cent return on assets (PWA, 2009). Another circumstance is that even 
though the PWA tariff can be set by the approval of the board of directors, the tariff 
structure is indirectly controlled by the Ministry of Interior and is difficult to change 
due to the political and social concerns. One PWA executive (B1_001) mentioned, 
“The  water  tariff  is  designed  as  a  cross-subsidy tariff structure between 
residential and commercial consumers with lower rate of return on 
investment even after including a financial subsidy from the 
government. We have to operate in small to medium water plant sites 
in rural or suburban areas. A different story can be told by the 
Metropolitan Waterworks Authority, which can gain profit from its 
economy of scale. Also, there are some SOEs like MWA that can gain 
more bonuses while putting out less effort when compared with low 
income  SOEs  like  PWA.” 
 
This statement also has been supported by other employees. One of the PWA divisional 
managers (B1_204) also added, 
“Using  one  bonus  scheme  procedure  for  all  SOEs  which  have  their  own  
unique characteristics can be considered as wrong management. To 
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encourage SOEs, different bonus schemes should be applied to suit 
individual  SOEs  or  at  least  to  suit  a  group  of  similar  types  of  SOEs.” 
 
As a labour intensive organisation, POST has also typically only been able to achieve a 
one month bonus. Regarding the bonus system, it is difficult for POST to increase the 
amount of bonus, even though it can achieve the highest performance measurement 
score. According to an POST executive vice president (B2_002), 
“The   bonus   system   is   terrible.   Even   though   we   work   harder,   it   is  
impossible   that   our   bonuses   will   increase…Therefore,   we   try   to  
provide   other   incentives  which   do   not   oppose   the  MoF’s   criteria   for  
our  employees.” 
 
Also, according to another POST executive vice president (B2_005), 
“Even   we   do   our   best,   we   cannot   receive   a   bonus of more than two 
months. Even though the system has been used across SOEs, without 
considering the difference between SOEs, the so-called fair system is 
totally  unfair.” 
 
PWA’s  chief financial officer also mentioned this problem,  
“Due   to  our   intensive labour force, there is a slim chance for PWA to 
get a multiplier bonus figure of more than one or two months, which 
somewhat  affects  organisational  performance.” 
 
As a result, some participants state that, employees can be demotivated by the bonus 
system and some have an intention to maintain organization performance at a certain 
score in order to trade-off between the effort to improve performance and the bonus 
received. For example,  
“Our  job  is  to  improve  organisational  efficiency  even  if  after  we  surpass 
a certain performance score and can maintain our bonuses. However, it 
could be better if the MoF would consider our hard work by giving us 
more  bonuses.”  (A  PWA  divisional  manager,  B1_206) 
 
“Recently,   I   heard   some   employees   complain   about  why   they   have   to 
work hard for improving the performance score. Even though we get a 
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score  of  four  or  five,  our  bonus  is  still  one  month.”  (A  POST  executive  
vice president, B2_005) 
 
“The  PMS  helps  us  to  reflect  our  performance.  However,  even  if  we  get  
a better score, the bonus is still the same. If we can have more bonus, 
it will motivate us  to  put  in  more  effort.”  (A  POST  divisional  manager,  
B2_201) 
 
In order to curb this problem, on July 2, 2013, two weeks after the interview sessions, 
the Thai government approved a new incentive procedure for net loss SOEs, under 
which they can receive a one-month bonus scheme fully funded by the Thai 
government when they achieve a certain performance score (at least 3.5) (Thai 
government, 2013). However, this approval may create another conflict for low profit 
SOEs like the PWA and Thailand Post, as they have to fund the bonus by themselves, 
as mentioned by one of SEPO officers (A1_011).  
 
Accordingly, Ashworth et al., (2007) commented that regarding coercive pressures, the 
changes in organisations come from the political pressures rather than technical 
influence. The bonus incentive system is a requirement by the MoF; therefore, SOEs 
tend to comply with the system, even though they realize that there is a problem with it. 
The evidence suggests that the bonus system, as currently administered, does not 
effectively motivate the SOEs to improve their performance, as both case study 
organisations experienced no change or a small increase in their bonus even if they 
could achieve a significantly higher performance score.  Regarding this problem, many 
participants suggested that the bonus system is not suitable to employ across different 
SOEs   in   different   industries,   as   well   as   referring   it   as   the   “unfairness”   system.  
According to Lawson (2000; see also Blazovich, 2013), an inappropriate incentive 
system design in the selection of performance measures and reward is likely to distort 
organisational performance.   
 
The amount of bonus that an SOE can generate is based on the performance against its 
KPIs as considered in the context of the performance agreement signed with the MoF 
and  overall  SOE  profitability.  Judging  from  the  case  study  organisations’  situations,  it  
seems   that   the   link   between   the   SOE’s   PMS   and   the   bonus   formula   acts   as   a  
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disincentive to low profitability SOEs like PWA and POST. Therefore, even if this kind 
of SOE gets a high performance score, there is not much difference in the financial 
amount of bonuses. Consequently, this circumstance may discourage employees from 
improving organisational efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
7.3.2 The free rider problem  
The free rider problem occurs in the case study organisations because of the inadequate 
link between the individual PMS and the incentive system. This study focuses on the 
problem of the bonus system and pay raises. According to Merchant and Van der Stede 
(2007), group rewards have gained increasing attention in the business world 
(Blazovich, 2013; Stiffer, 2006) as a way to increase the cooperation of employees from 
across the organisation. The literature suggests that both individual and group 
incentives can improve organisational efficiency (Roman, 2006). On the other hand, 
group rewards can affect employee motivation as well as create a free rider problem. 
The finding in this study also shows that the free rider effect occurs in Thai SOEs due 
to the use of equal bonuses across the whole organisation.   
 
The recent bonus systems in both case study organisations are representative of the 
systems employed in most Thai SOEs. The cases have employed a group reward system 
whereby every employee has the same bonus based upon their monthly salary. This 
means that even if an employee gets an excellent score on his individual assessment, he 
has the same bonus as another employee who gets the least score in the organisation.  
As a result, individual performances cannot be led by the bonus system. According to 
some executives and managers, the free rider problem can be seen. A PWA executive 
(B1_104) pointed out,   
“We  know  that  using  the  same  bonus figure can raise a free rider issue. 
However,  it  is  difficult  to  change  the  bonus  system.”   
 
The evidence shows that case study organisations are concerned that the current bonus 
system   can   affect   their   employees’   motivation   and   performance.   Even   though SOEs 
cannot   change   the  MoF’s   bonus   system,   they   have   control   over   the   design   of   bonus  
distribution inside their organisation.  Both SOEs have employed a similar group-based 
reward system, which is a traditional bonus system in Thai SOEs; as a result some 
participants complained about a free rider problem and a lack of motivation in the 
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interviews. The next section will explain why the case study organisations still preserve 
the existing recent bonus distribution system. 
 
7.4 The Actions and Responses of Social Actors and Organisations towards the 
Incentive System 
We saw in chapter 2 that in order to improve organisational performance many 
organisations have employed an incentive system integrated with a PMS called a 
performance based incentive.  According to  O’Connor   et   al.   (2011,   p.   10),   there   are  
political constraints on human resource management of SOEs; therefore, a direct impact 
on  ‘the  effectiveness  of  the  control  mechanism’,  which  includes  rewards  and  penalties  
for performance, has been expected.   
 
In Thailand, the MoF claims that financial incentives can be one of the driving factors 
in persuading an SOE to improve its efficiency and effectiveness (SEPO, 2013); 
however, there are no penalties for underperforming SOEs.  In this section, institutional 
logics and pressures that affect the actions of the case study organisations and 
individuals are presented.  
 
Chapter 3  presented  an  institutional  logic  perspective  that  showed  ‘the  actions  of  social  
actor’   or   ‘individual   behaviour’   can   lead   to   ‘institutional   persistence   and   change’  
(Thornton  et  al.,  2012).  Also,  Scott’s   (2014)  normative  pillar  explains   that   in  a  given  
situation, a social actor may consider appropriate behaviours towards a particular 
situation ahead of his own interests. This can be called  ‘the  logic  of  appropriateness’,  in  
which the actors consider the relations, obligations and consequences before making 
decisions or taking any actions (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 30).  
 
During the interviews in the SOEs, it was recognized that most of the participants 
perceived that the current incentive system was well suited to the organizational 
environment. The influence of the logic of unity, the logic of bureaucracy and the logic 
of appropriateness were important, even though there are many factors affecting 
employees’  motivations,   such  as   a  problematic   bonus   formula,   and   a   free   rider   effect  
mentioned in the previous section.   
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According   to   Thornton   and   Ocasic   (2008,   p.   111),   ‘logics   shape   individual   and  
organisation  action’  where   ‘individuals   are  members of multiple social groups with a 
collective  identity’,  which  later  develops  into  institutional  logic  embedded  by  the  group.    
We saw in chapter 5 that one of the institutional logics in the field of SOEs is the logic 
of unity. In the interview, participants expressed their concern about the possibility that 
changes in the incentive system may create intra-organisational conflicts.  As a 
consequence, in order to maintain a harmonious environment, they preferred to 
maintain the bonus system without making any changes to reflect individual 
performance. 
 
Many participants noted that there are a variety of incentives that can be used to link 
individual performance; therefore, a link with the bonus system is not necessary. The 
meaning of the bonus for this group is somewhat like a reward for working with the 
organization for a whole year instead of a reward for achieving a goal or giving an 
outstanding performance. Therefore, they think that every employee should receive the 
same reward in order to maintain unity in the organisation. Moreover, as a members of 
a labour union, many participants from the operational level stated the difficulty of a 
change in the incentive system without agreement from the labour union.  For example,  
 
“Everyone  thinks  that  bonuses should be distributed equally; therefore, 
if we integrate the bonus system with an individual performance 
assessment,  it  is  impossible  that  labour  union  will  accept  it.”   
(A PWA departmental director, B1_106)  
 
 “In   our   organization,   a   harmonious   working environment is more 
important than the competitive nature of those in the private sector. 
Getting the same bonus across the organization will keep a positive 
atmosphere  in  our  work  place.”   
(A PWA employee, B1_310)  
 
 “Everyone  in  the  organisation  receiving the same bonus is a good thing. 
If someone gets only one month while another one get two months, it 
would  create  a  conflict.”  (A  Senior  Manager,  B2_205) 
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“Receiving  the  same  bonus  is  suitable  because  if  the  organisation  gives  
a bonus depending on individual performance, everybody will fight for 
it   and   they  may   assess   their   performance   to   favour   themselves.”   (A  
POST employee, B2_304) 
 
The evidence that the logic of appropriateness is embedded in this situation is that 
unlike the employees, the management teams from both cases expressed concerns about 
other incentive system problems. However, it is difficult for them to change the bonus 
system, as they expect strong resistance from the employees and unions. Therefore, 
they still maintain and employ the recent incentive systems. As a result, PWA tends to 
adopt the performance-based bonus at the executive level only, but it is still perceived 
to be inadequate and does not seem to affect motivation much.  The Director of the 
Office of Corporate Communication and Customer Relations stated, 
“If   we   need   to   improve   our   performance,   we   have   to   create   a  
competitive environment in our organization. However, it is difficult 
to  change  people’s  mindset  on  our  bonus  system.  My  suggestion  is  we  
have to create a new financial incentive system based on individual 
performance like a bonus system in the private sector. But under the 
condition  that  it  needs  to  change  the  term  ‘bonus’  to  something  else  to  
reduce  resistance  to  change  from  the  employees.” 
 
Also, a PWA executive (B1_004) agreed,  
“If  we  employ  individual  scorecard  to  linked  with  a  bonus,  it  may  lead  
to  a  protest  by  employees.” 
In PWA, according to one of the participants in the Human Resources Management 
department, for the top three levels, the bonus is calculated using 90% of the multiplier 
of individual salary and 10% based on individual performance. Accordingly, due to the 
small proportion based on individual performance, the executives pay less attention to 
it.  
 
Furthermore, the evidence also shows that the logic of bureaucracy and the logic of 
appropriateness also influence the decision to maintain the current system. 
Consequently, many participants perceive that the recent incentive system is a common 
rule across SOEs; therefore, it is natural and legitimate to comply   with   the   MoF’s  
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demand by employing the system without complaint. Only a few participants 
acknowledged that the individual SOE can decide how to distribute the bonus within 
the organisation after the MoF has approved the aggregate amount of the pool. The 
bonus scheme rules do not require all employees to receive the same amount across 
organisations. 
 
It can be concluded that case study organisations value the logic of unity and the logic 
of bureaucracy, which puts pressure on the organisations to preserve the current 
incentive system. Such pressures mainly stem from the operational level employees as 
well as labour unions.  Both managers and operational employees appear aware that any 
change to the bonus system may lead to intra-organisational conflict; therefore, the 
logic of appropriateness plays a key role for the actions towards the incentive system as 
they  consider  the  ‘relations  and  obligations  to  the  others’  in  this  situation  (Thornton  et  
al.,  2012).  This  also  can  be  explained  by  Scott’s  (2014)  normative pillar, as mentioned 
in chapter 3 section 3.3, which plays a main role in the actions of both managers and 
employees, and which stresses the importance of the logic of appropriateness. However, 
it is also possible to interpret that both case organisations take the incentive system for 
granted, as the system is being used by many SOEs. Consequently, employees perceive 
that the recent incentive system is correct for their organisation and a change in the 
system is not required even though most participants stated that there are several 
problems that can hinder the organizational performance. 
 
7.5 Employee Performance Assessment System 
This part provides the information on the individual assessment process in case study 
organisations. Both organisations employ individual balanced scorecard (BSC), which 
was recommend by the MOF and competency gap to evaluate employee performance.  
 
7.5.1 Provincial Waterworks Authority 
The PWA (2013a) states that the PWA has employed an Individual BSC model using 
KPIs that are consistent with organisational KPIs to assess employee performance. The 
following steps illustrate how each employee creates his BSC and how it can be used 
together with the incentive system. 
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Step 1: Individual Balanced Scorecard 
Between October and December each year, an employee has to create his/her individual 
BSC under the criteria provided by the Human Resource Development department. The 
KPIs will follow four perspectives of BSC and have to relate to the organisational 
strategy and departmental KPIs. In addition, the KPIs also consider ad-hoc tasks as well 
as routine work. The scorecard has to be submitted to supervisors and superior 
supervisors for their approval as follows: 
 
Table 7.9: The individual BSC approval level 
Position Supervisor Superior supervisor 
Governor Board of Directors  
Vice-Governor Governor  
Assistant Governor Vice-Governor Governor 
Director Assistant Governor Vice-Governor 
Manager Director Assistant Governor 
Team Leader Manager Director 
Officer Team Leader Manager 
Source: Adopted from PWA (2012) and POST (2012)  
 
Step 2: Performance Review 
1) Organisational peer review committee reviews the KPIs at the beginning of the 
year. 
2) Supervisor has to review employee performance every quarter but no report is 
required. 
 
Step 3: Performance assessment 
Annual performance assessment takes place between October and December. The 
assessment has 2 parts, which are: 
1) Individual KPIs (90% weighted) using step 1, and  
2) Core competency assessment, which includes integrity, service mind and 
result orientation (10% weighted), judging by supervisor (80% weighted), and self-
assessment (20% weighted). 
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Step 4: Performance report 
1) Each employee will receive a performance report and comments from their 
supervisors. All employee performance scores will be published on the bulletin 
board and intranet.  
2) Each department has to rank its employees using both individual performance 
and core competency assessments on step 3 and submit a report to the Human 
Resources Development Department by December each year. 
3) The Human Resources Development Department records the employee annual 
performance assessments and reports to related executives. 
 
The performance report will be used as one of the factors to consider the level of salary 
increase and promotion for employees. 
 
7.5.2 Thailand Post  
POST’s   individual   assessment   system   has   a   resemblance   to   the   PWA’s.      POST’s  
performance agreement report (2012) states that its transparent and fair assessment 
process on the link between individual assessment and the organisational incentive 
system helps to increase employee satisfaction and to boost employee loyalty to the 
organization. Recently, POST (2013) has employed KPIs and core competency to 
assess its employees, which is one of the factors used to consider the annual promotion 
and salary increases.  The step of individual assessment is similar to PWA steps 
explained above. The assessment has two parts, which are:  
1) Individual KPIs are based on four perspectives of BSC, which cascades from 
the organisational KPIs to department, division and individual respectively. 
The individual KPIs also consider individual responsibility as described in 
job descriptions and other involved projects or tasks. 
2) The core competency for individual assessments includes integrity, service 
mind, unity, result orientation and change capability.  
The proportion of KPIs and core competency is 60% and 40% respectively.  
 
In   conclusion,   both   the   PWA’s   and   POST’s   employee   assessments   are   based   on  
individual BSC and Competency gap evaluation.  The table below shows the 
comparison of the individual performance assessment process and the incentive systems 
in the case study organisations. 
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Table 7.10: The comparison of the individual performance assessment process and 
incentive system  
Employee 
Performance 
Assessment 
PWA POST 
 Weighted  Weighted 
KPIs Using four perspectives 
of BSC 
90 % Using four perspectives 
of BSC 
60% 
Core 
competency  
- Integrity 
- service mind 
- result orientation 
10% 
 
- Integrity 
- service mind 
- unity 
- result orientation 
- change capability 
40% 
Source: PWA (2012) and POST (2012)  
 
7.6. The Avoidance of the Integration between Individual BSC and Other 
Practices  
According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2007), the literature on the use of 
performance-based incentives, integration of BSC approach and incentive systems, and 
monetary incentives, indicates that such systems have gained popularity in the public 
sector (see chapter 2). In Thailand, the MoF also has promoted the implementation of 
performance-based incentives in SOEs. In the past five years, both case study 
organisations have tried to integrate their incentive systems with individual performance 
and this appears to indicate that the implementation of the performance-based system in 
SOEs is still not effective.  As we saw in chapter 3, the avoidance response (Oliver, 
1991) tends to occur with institutional stakeholder multiplicity, content constraint and 
uncertainty of environmental context. Resistance to the integration of the incentive 
system with individual BSC occurs in both case organisations as a result of two main 
problems, which are the uncertainty of the use of individual BSC and its inconsistency 
with current organisational practices. 
 
The  MoF’s   intention   of   recommending   that   all   SOEs   adopt   an   individual   assessment 
tool was intended to help the SOE improve their incentive systems and especially the 
grading and bonus systems.  The motivations for both the organisations to adopt 
individual BSC are financial and legitimacy, because by adopting the system, the 
organisations  can  gain  a  higher  performance  score,  which  can  help  their  organisations’  
image, as well as for PWA, the increased organisational performance score can also 
raise the amount of organisational bonus approved by the MoF. However, avoidance 
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behaviour from stakeholders in the organisations can also be seen in the case study 
organisations. 
 
Firstly, some participants state that there is the potential for unfair judgments in an 
individual BSC system, which could create the perception of unfairness and increased 
uncertainty.  Uncertainty could result from using individual BSC in integration with the 
salary system because of its influence on pay raises, and bonus payments. The reasons 
are the difference in employed KPIs, and assessors as well as the KPIs that depend on 
the whole division or department performance, not individually as in the individual BSC 
concept.  These   lead   to   indifference   on   employees’   individual   scores  who  work   in   the  
same department or division. According to a PWA divisional manager (B1_204),  
“Our concept is working in teams. Therefore, most members in the same 
division have a similar scorecard and get the same score. Therefore, it is 
difficult to use performance assessment in order to consider any incentive 
or rewards for employees.” 
 
A PWA employee (B1_309) states,  
“…  Moreover,  it  is  impossible  to  compare  employees  who  have  the  same  
job or activity, but they create different KPIs and targets. Therefore, 
PWA  should  create  some  standards  for  us  to  follow.” 
 
Recently, both PWA and POST individual performance assessment has been more 
based on a competency gap and superior judgment such as sick leave, personal leave 
and  others   to  consider  each  employee’s  incentive.  They  rarely  rely  on  individual  BSC  
because of the difficulty in distinguishing individual performance from team 
performance, as mentioned above; in addition, the degree of using individual BSC also 
depends on supervisors. For example, a PWA employee (B1_304) stated, 
“It  is  difficult  to  distinguish  individual  performance  from  employees in 
the same division because the KPIs used to assess them are similar 
with little or no difference. As a result, a manager has to use other 
statistics such as arriving late, or personal leave as the factors to make 
a decision on promotion and others.” 
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 “We  have  a  problem  of  the  weight  percentage  between  competency  and  
KPIs because it involves an incentive system. Recently, it seems that 
we focus more on competency assessment and pretend to be fair but in 
reality,  it  is  not.”  (A  POST  vice  president,  B2_109) 
 
Also, a POST employee (B2_305) mentions about biased treatment from a superior: 
 “Our   promotion   and   pay   raise   depends   on   an   individual   person.   If  we  
have   been   asked   whether   it   is   fair   or   not,   it   has   never   been   fair…   In  
addition, it is based on individual judgment. He can be biased toward his 
favourite  person.” 
 
However, to reduce the unfairness judgment, the PWA has a set of committees in each 
job field to set some standard KPIs and to provide a guideline for the assessors.  The 
other reason for the occurrence of the unfairness perceptions in both case study 
organisations is that they cannot provide a proper performance feedback for their 
employees. The feedback can be a one-to-one session with their superior if requested. 
However, despite the size of the PWA, less than one per cent of the employees have 
appealed their result. According to some participants, this may be due to a strong culture 
of obedience in the organisation. 
 
Secondly, due to the inadequate performance based incentive, it is difficult for a 
manager to explain how the pay raise on the grading payment system is distributed 
amongst the employees; therefore, many managers employ a rotation system along with 
other criteria in order to reduce the conflict raised through the distribution. The rotation 
system can be explained by the following example. If employee A gets two steps this 
year, next year, A will get one step and B will get a chance to increase his salary by two 
steps.   
 “The   integration   of   the   grading   payment   system   and   employee  
performance assessment is a good thing, but because of other factors, 
we   still   have   to   use   a   rotation   system.”      (A   PWA   departmental  
director, B1_107)  
 
“I  think  we  still  use  rotation  system  in  nearly  the  whole  organisation  …  
however, how the rotation system work depends on each department. 
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Some persons get two steps every other year, the others may get two 
steps  every  other  two  years.”  (A  POST  employee,  B2_305) 
 
 However, it should be noted that some managers do not agree with maintaining the 
rotation system. 
“In   the   past,   we   graded   our   employees   by   using   a   rotation   system.  
Recently,  we  tried  to  consider  more  employee  performance.  …  I  think  
we should employ competency assessment for considering the pay 
raise and promotion while individual BSC is used to assess employee 
performance  annually.”    (A  PWA  executive,  B1_004)   
 
Next, similar to the organisational action towards the promotional system, the logic of 
seniority plays as one of the factors that lead to the avoidance of the integration of 
individual BSC and the   employee’s   promotion   system.   Due   to   the   sensitivity   of   this  
topic, interviewees did not allow this content to be recorded, but did allow written 
records (Interview records: B1_204, B1_206, B2_206). It is clear that both case 
organisations are influenced by   the   seniority   system,   especially   in   the   employee’s  
promotion system. Although both organisations are concerned with individual 
performance of candidates, interviewees also mentioned that promotion in their 
organisation was also based on the seniority of candidates. Some participants, mostly in 
PWA, agreed that promotion by seniority is acceptable because seniority is one of the 
organisational norms and many believe that the senior employees in their field are 
supposed to be more experienced.  On the other hand, the perceptions of participants 
from POST show some slight difference, as they also agree on the seniority system but 
as a more business-like organisation, the employees tended to show their disagreement 
and   question   the   system.   One   of   POST’s   vice-presidents mentioned that recently 
recruited employees pay less attention to the seniority system and sometimes they ask 
for clearer explanations of the promotional criteria.  From all of these points, clearly 
many employees resist integrating individual BSC with the organisational incentive 
system. As a result, the avoidance of the use of individual BSC as a regular practice is 
expected in both case study organisations.  
 
As mentioned before, both case study organisations still assess performance using non-
financial  measures  and  superiors’   judgement  but  do  not  use   individual  BSC.     Also,  as  
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mentioned in section 7.2.2, both case study organisations do not attempt to link 
individual performance with a financial incentive and there is no punishment for the 
ones who underperform. In PWA, the adoption of individual BSC seems to be better 
than in POST, as it uses a performance-based system with their executives. In PWA 
more emphasis was placed on the use of individual BSC, as ten per cent of an 
executive’s  bonus  incentive is based on individual performance assessment.  However, 
according to one of the participants in the Human Resources Management Department 
(B1_205), for the top three levels, the bonus is calculated using 90% of the multiplier of 
personal salary and 10% based on personal performance. Accordingly, due to the small 
proportion of pay based on individual performance, it does not affect the amount of 
bonus received and the executives pay little attention to it.  
 
Also, the success or failure of the implementation also depends on the commitment from 
executives.  Many participants mentioned that the adaptation of individual BSC was 
done   in   order   to   comply   with   the   MoF’s   requirements.   This   explains   the   lack   of  
commitments within both SOEs to the use of an individual BSC.  The organisations are 
adopting   the   system   to   comply   with   the   minimum   MoF’s   requirement   to   gain  
legitimacy, but do not exhibit any real commitment to the system.   
 
In PWA, some executives still doubt the usefulness of the individual BSC. Therefore, it 
affects the development of the system in the organisation. One executive (B1_003) said, 
“I  am  not  interested  in  the  using  BSC  in  our  organization.  However,  as  
it was recommended by the MoF, we hired a consulting firm to study 
it and to help us in implementing BSC in our organization. However, 
after five years of implementation, I still cannot see the advantage of 
this  system  compared  to  our  former  system.”     
Also, according to a PWA executive (B1_001),  
“The concept of individual BSC has been employed because PWA tried 
to fulfil the MOF checklist to increase our performance score. We can 
consider   that   it   is   indirect   pressure   from   the   MoF…I   think   the  
individual BSC is not useful because before we employed the system, 
our human resources development department just followed what the 
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consulting firm suggested without really researching on our 
employees.”     
 
The other problem that has challenged the implementation of an individual BSC is that 
there is no motivation for employees. Employees perceive that individual BSC is 
another workload that is not related to their recent job and does not give them any 
benefit. As a result, some participants mention that they just do as told, which leads to 
the under-development of the individual BSC system in the organisations. 
For example, 
 “Many  of   our   operation   employees   cannot   use   a   computer;;   therefore,  
they  cannot  do  their  individual  scorecards…Some  managers  solved  the  
problem  by  doing  scorecards  for   the  employees.”  (A  PWA  divisional  
manager, B1_206) 
In conclusion, the findings suggest the strategic response, as suggested by Oliver (1991), 
which occurred in the adoption of individual BSC is avoidance. The evidence shows 
that both organisations do not intend to integrate the individual BSC with other systems 
such as   the   bonus   and   promotion   systems.   The   participants’   perceptions   towards   the  
individual BSC are quite negative. Many problems are identified including a lack of 
clear criteria for the set of KPIs and that their targets led to subjective judgement from 
the superior level in individual promotion and pay raise, the rotation system, the 
influence of the logic of seniority, and the lack of executive commitment. Even though 
PWA has employed a performance-based incentive system using individual BSC for its 
executives, only ten per cent of the bonus has been applied, which does not have much 
impact on recent practices.  As a result, both case study organisations have implemented 
the  individual  BSC  to  comply  with  the  minimum  MoF’s  demands.   
  
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the use of incentive systems and employee performance 
assessment as well as the integration between these two systems. The evidence reveals 
that organisational actions in regard to the development of an incentive system are 
influenced by the logic of unity and the logic of seniority as well as the norm of the 
rotation system on pay raises. Both case study organisations prefer not to change the 
incentive systems already established in order to avoid intra-organisational conflicts; 
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therefore, they preserve the systems despite having little faith in them.  This chapter 
also pointed out some practical problems in the bonus system. A problematic bonus 
formula also impacts the bonus received in medium size SOEs and labour intensive 
SOEs. It is difficult for them to get a higher bonus even though they can outperform and 
get high performance scores. The free rider effect also can be seen in both cases 
because the integration between employee performance and incentives is still 
inadequate. The evidence shows  that  only  PWA’s  executive  incentive  has  shown  a  link  
with individual performance, but it has still been considered as unsuccessful. Both case 
organisations appear to have adopted individual BSC in order to comply with the 
MoF’s  recommendations,  as  available evidence indicates a lack of commitment to the 
use of these individualised performance measures. 
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Chapter 8  
Findings and Discussion  
  
8.1 Introduction  
This study adapts existing frameworks to explain the nature of institutional complexity 
in State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). This chapter presents a discussion of the main 
findings from the previous three chapters based on institutional theory and institutional 
logics to provide an overview of the case evidence. In particular it draws upon 
Greenwood  et  al.’s  (2011)  institutional  complexity  framework,  together  with  Besharov  
and  Smith’s  (2014)  types  of  multiplicity  within  organizations.     
 
This chapter is comprised of four main sections. The next section briefly considers the 
overall findings in the development of performance measurement systems and related 
underpinning systems that have been the focus of this research. The third section 
examines institutional complexity. Fourth, the key responses of SOEs to the 
implementation of performance measurement systems are provided. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with a brief summary. 
 
8.2 Contextualising the Findings in terms of an Institutional Complexity 
Framework 
This research study examines performance measurement systems and incentive systems 
that have been affected by institutional complexity in hybrid organisations.  We saw in 
chapter 3 that Battilana and Dorado (2010) define a hybrid organisation as an 
organisation that combines different institutional logics. Therefore, by nature, hybrid 
organisations tend to experience contradictions amongst the logics that they embody 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 2006; Battilana and Doradi, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013; 
Besharov and Smith, 2014).  Thai SOEs can be considered as hybrid organisations 
because they are embedded in competing multi-institutional logics such as the logic of 
bureaucracy, the logic of commercial operation and the logic of social activity etc. 
(chapter 5).   
 
This research has set out to explore the institutional complexity and organisational 
responses in the development of performance measurement systems in Thai SOEs from 
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an institutional theory perspective.  The motivation for doing this research comes from 
a concern about how Thai SOEs as hybrid organisations can deal with the multiple 
institutional logics they face.  This chapter discusses and reviews the findings from the 
performance measurement systems (see chapter 6) and incentive systems as well as 
individual BSC (see chapter 7), which have been affected by multiple institutional 
logics   (see   chapter   5).  Greenwood   et   al.’s   (2011)   institutional   complexity   framework  
has been employed as a guideline in order to explain the phenomenon.  
 
Figure 8.1: Institutional complexity framework 
 
 
 
Source: Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 324) 
 
Greenwood et al. (2011) propose an institutional complexity framework to explain how 
multiple logics affect hybrid organisations. The framework focuses on how 
organisations respond to aspects of field structure, organisational attributes and 
institutional complexity. This study focuses on institutional complexity and 
organisational   responses.   Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)   framework   has   also   been  
employed to better explain the types of multiplicity within organisations and/or the 
degree of institutional complexity.  
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Figure 8.2: Types of logic multiplicity within organisations 
 
 
 
Source: Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 371) 
 
8.3 Institutional Complexity 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 319, p. 334), the degree of organisation-
experienced institutional complexity varies depending on organisational characteristics 
such  as  ‘structure,  ownerships,  governance  and  identity’  as  well  as  ‘the  structure  of  the  
organisational   fields’.  According   to  Thornton  and  Ocasic  (2008,  p.  106),   ‘institutional  
logics may develop at a  variety  of  different  levels,  for  example  organisation,  markets  …  
and   organisational   field’.   This   research   focuses   on   the   institutional   logics   in  
organisations and organisational fields (institutional field) with an emphasis on SOEs.  
 
8.3.1 Field-level structure/ institutional field 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011), institutional complexity occurs in organisations 
as a consequence of the complexity and structure of the organisational field in which the 
organisation is located.  They also note that research on organisation fields emphasizes 
the  difference  between  ‘mature’  and  ‘emerging’  fields,  while  some  studies  also  compare  
fields  by   analysing  degree  of   ‘fragmentation’,   ‘formal   structuring’   and   ‘centralisation’  
(see chapter 3 section 3.5).  
 
8.3.1.1 Evidence of multiple logics 
According to Dacin et al. (2011), it is common for organizations, including social 
enterprises, to embody multiple institutional logics. According to Greenwood et al. 
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(2011), some researchers assume that a mature field contains one  ‘dominant  logic’,  or  if  
it is comprised of multiple logics, the relationship between logics has to be predictable, 
while an emerging field experiences the complexity of multiple logics.  Dacin et al. 
(2010) explain that at field-level,  the  ‘local’  logics have been encoded. In chapter 5, we 
saw that the case study organisations were strongly influenced by multiple logics 
particularly relating to bureaucracy, commercial operations and social activities or 
obligations. As a result, the case study organisations have faced institutional complexity, 
which demands that organisations perform well both economically and socially and at 
the  same  time,  be  at  government  arm’s  length  in  serving  the  Thai  community.   
 
This   finding   is   similar   to  Pache  and  Santos’s   (2013) studies on social enterprises that 
show organisations need to deal with market logic and social welfare logic. Similar to 
Reay and Hinings (2009), they studied the co-existence   of   two   competing   logics:   ‘a  
logics of business-like  health   care’   and   ‘a   logic   of  medical   professionalism’.  The   two  
studies show that public commercial organisations have to face multiple logics that 
compete with each other and create tension for the organisation in the field.  The 
evidence shows that case study organisations as one type of public organisation also 
face three dominant logics that are core to organisational functioning. As a result, the 
coexistence of multiple logics leads the case study organisations to experience 
institutional complexity. For example, we saw in chapter 5 section 5.3 that the case 
study organisations experienced conflicting demands between the logic of commercial 
operations and the logic of social activities which require them to improve their 
profitability while also requiring them to invest in non-profit projects. Also, in chapter 6 
section 6.4, while a strong commercial logic supported the use of EVM, the lack of a 
social logic or imperative in EVM made both organisations reluctant to implement the 
technique.  
 
In conclusion, the findings indicate that the field of SOEs is confronted with multiple 
institutional logics that sometimes compete with each other. The findings on the 
contradictions of institutional logics, which can lead to institutional complexity, 
reflected the prior research on multiple institutional logics and competing logics 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2004; Lounsbury, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2011; Besharov and 
Smith, 2014).  The relationship between logics will be explained in the following 
sections. 
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8.3.1.2 Influence of changing stakeholders and fragmentation of the case 
context/field  
Greenwood et al. 2011 explain that emerging fields experience uncertainty in 
‘institutional  arrangements’,  which  subsequently  leads  to  them  being  influenced  by  the  
actors and logics from other fields (Maguire et al., 2004).  Regarding the characteristics 
of public sector organisations, SOEs have to deal with various stakeholders (Brignall 
and  Modell,  2000)  as   the  SOE’s   stakeholders  were  described   in  chapter  1 section 1.3. 
The most influential group are the policy-making bodies, which consist of a variety of 
government agencies.  
 
A high degree of institutional complexity results from a fragmented structure in a field 
in which there are different interests that are difficult to balance (Greenwood et al., 
2011).  In chapter 5, the conflict of interests between government agencies as well as 
their overlapping roles can be seen to impact in a variety of circumstances. For example, 
the   conflict   between   the   MoF   and   the   MICT   on   POST’s   future   business   caused   its  
investment project to be delayed. Also, in implementing EVM, one important factor that 
affects   the   case   study  organisations   is   a   lack  of   consistency   in  MoF’s  policy,   as  MoF  
often introduces new systems or tools to SOEs; as a result, it discourages SOE 
commitment (see chapter 6 section 6.4).  
 
The perceptions of participants regarding the hierarchy of power also support 
Greenwood   et   al.’s      (2011)   statement   that   a   clear   hierarchy   amongst   institutions   in   a  
field can reduce the institutional complexity in an organisation,   since   ‘competing  
demands’   can   be   negotiated   by   the   higher   level   actors   or   enforced   by   the   dominant  
actors. The evidence shows that the institutions take their lead depending on their role; 
therefore, most of the time, the conflict between government agencies has been solved 
before a demand or command is given to SOEs. Some concrete evidence is a statement 
of directions for each SOE as can be seen in the MoF agreement with other government 
agencies (see chapter 5). This also can be seen in the requirement to implement EVM 
and BSC; both systems had been discussed in the Performance Assessment Committee, 
which has representatives from a variety of government agencies (see chapters 5 and 6). 
Also, when considering the influence on SOEs of performance measurement systems, 
participants from the case study organisations and other government agencies agree that 
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the  MoF  is  the  key  responsible  organisation;;  therefore,  they  normally  respect  the  MoF’s  
decision (see chapter 6 section 6.4).  
 
In an environment of consistent and predictable sets of competing institutional demands, 
organisations show their ability to develop appropriate structures and practices in order 
to respond to institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011).  Even though the case 
study organisations face different demands from their stakeholders, the findings explain 
that both case study organisations know how to respond to such demands; for example, 
both organisations have a division that has responsibility mainly for responding to the 
MoF’s  performance measurement system. This division also deals with the introduction 
or implementation of new management tools in the organisation, which it has been both 
directly and indirectly forced to adopt by MoF, such as EVM and BSC (chapter 6). 
Also, some members of the SOE board of directors, which is similar to an executive 
board in a private organisation, are from related government agencies such as the MoF, 
the line ministries, or NESDB, and as a result many concerns or conflict issues have 
been solved within the organisation. 
 
The findings in this study are consistent with Pache and Santos (2010) and Greenwood 
et al.  (2011): fragmentation increases institutional complexity. However, in the field of 
Thai SOEs, there are a variety of mechanisms that help to reduce the degree of 
institutional complexity. For example, some of the SOE board members are 
representatives from related government agencies; therefore, some of the conflicts can 
be solved within the SOE (See chapter 5 section 5.2). Also, there are many committees 
such as the Performance Agreement Committee of which the members are from both 
public and private sectors and has a Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance as a 
chairman,  consequently,   the  problems  related  to  SOE’s  PMS  can  be  solved  within this 
committee (See chapter 6 section 6.2).   As   a   result,   participants’   perceptions   of  
institutional demands are somewhat controllable because they know what each key 
stakeholder wants.  On the other hand, it is also possible that some conflicts between 
institutions still occur and give rise to complex environmental pressures  (see chapter 5 
section 5.2).  
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8.3.2 Considering types of logic multiplicity within an organisation  
Regarding the discussion on multiple institutional logics and the fragmented field, this 
section   seeks   to   identify   the   degree   of   institutional   complexity   through   ‘the   type   of  
logics   multiplicity   within   organisations’   by   employing   Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)  
framework,   which   is   developed   from   Greenwood   et   al.’s   (2011)   framework.   The  
framework has distinguished the types of organisations by employing the degree of 
compatibility and the degree of centrality (see chapter 3 section 3.5). In this regard, it 
helps the researcher to better explain institutional complexity within organisations. As 
the field-level structure related to SOEs has been discussed in Section 8.3.1 above, this 
section focuses on the impact of the institutional complexity in different industry fields. 
Their distinctive industry characteristics help to explain the difference of complexity 
between   cases.   This   section   also   employs   Greenwood   et   al.’s   (2011)   organisational  
attributes as well as other related factors to explain the complexity.  
 
8.3.2.1 The low to moderate degree of compatibility 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 318), organisations generally face multiple 
logics  that  may  or  may  not  be  compatible.  However,  in  Besharov  and  Smith’s  (2014,  p.  
367)   study,   ‘a   compatibility’   not   only   concerns   the   relationship   between   institutional  
logics   but   also   ‘the   instantiations of logics imply consistent and reinforcing 
organisational   actions’.   According   to   Besharov   and   Smith   (2014)   ‘Organisation-level 
practices   and   characteristics’   can   impact   the   degree   of   compatibility. The findings 
support their statement, as the case study organisations have different characteristics, 
which can impact the compatibility between multiple logics differently. In chapters 4 
and 5, the key characteristics of the two cases have been provided. This part focuses on 
the following characteristics: the types of SOE, the component of board of directors and 
the industry characteristics.  
 
Firstly, the types of SOE can influence the degree of compatibility. Both organisations 
are fully owned by the Thai government, but the difference is that PWA is a legal entity 
under the Ministry of Interior while POST is a company that has MoF as the only 
shareholder and is under the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology 
(see chapter 4). Consequently, POST has to operate under a variety of laws such as 
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corporate law, tax law, etc., as well as the government regulations for SOEs and is more 
exposed to external and dynamic environments than PWA.  
 
Secondly, we saw in chapter 5 section 5.2 that the composition of the board of directors 
can influence the degree of intervention by government agencies and politics, which 
leads to institutional complexity. The members are from a variety of related government 
agencies and director pools, as well as assigned by politics. In addition, the board of 
directors is subject to change depending on electoral outcomes. There is no clear 
evidence about how the composition of the boards of directors is related to the 
compatibility of the organisation. However, some participants agreed that a board 
member that has knowledge and reputation have influence over other members on some 
specific topics. Most recently, all members of PWA board of directors are from the 
public sector, while members of POST board of directors are from both public and 
private sectors. Therefore, the logics that each member of board of directors is tied to 
can be different; as a result, the degree of compatibility in PWA seems to be greater than 
that in POST.  However, by considering the political intervention, POST board of 
directors is not as frequently changed compared with other SOEs (SEPO, 2015). 
 
Thirdly, the industry characteristics also need to be mentioned, as they can distinguish a 
different degree of compatibility between case study organisations. After examining the 
two case study organisations, the semi-structured interviews show many instances of 
multiple logics, which also come from the industry field in which the case study 
organisations are located.  Marques (2010) stated that due to the economies of scale of 
water supply and the expense of duplication, a single provider is more efficient than 
several providers, thus water service can be considered as a natural monopoly. PWA as 
a single provider in its responsible area does not have a potential competitor; therefore, a 
major concern of PWA is to expand the water distribution network. However, its tariff 
cannot be set on a commercial basis, as it has the responsibility to serve water to Thai 
citizens (see chapter 5 section 5.3).  
 
On the other hand, the postal service in many countries still has reserved monopoly 
power in some of its services, although the emergence of new technologies such as the 
internet, and the expansion of globalization, as well as environment initiatives and social 
responsibility have accelerated the pressure for the postal sector to change its services 
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and management (Borenstein and Becker, 2004; Zairi, 2000; Bravo, 1995). This claim 
also shows in POST. The reserved monopoly power in POST is a standard mail delivery 
service in which the price has been fixed at three baht per letter by the regulator (see 
chapter 5 section 5.3). However, regarding technology change and corporatization in 
2003,   POST’s   activities   focus   more   on   customer-oriented and market-oriented 
initiatives, as the evidence shows that POST tends to be more proactive in serving its 
customers (see chapter 5 section 5.3).   Examples   of   POST’s   activities   are   the  
development of a distribution network for parcel delivery, its marketing plan for both 
retail and wholesale customers and the business plan of Logistics Company. The 
conflicts of competing logics also can be found in POST, as it has had to expand its 
branches as well as networks to remote areas that are not profitable, while as a public 
company it could focus on metropolitan areas such as Bangkok, which has high 
customer density. 
 
According to Lander et al. (2013), the competing logics present contradicting demands; 
hence the firms recognize the different degree of each logic. Regarding the difference in 
industry characteristics mentioned in chapter 5, the two case study organizations 
emphasize their activities differently.  According to Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 367-
368;;   see   also   John   and   Dunn,   2007),   professional   institutions   can   influence   ‘the  
availability   of   members   who   carry   particular   logics’.   From   the   perspective of the 
industry field, POST recognizes Universal Postal Union (UPU) as a professional 
institution in mail service, as they follow UPU guidelines as well as cross country mail 
profit sharing criteria (see chapter 5 section 5.3 and chapter 6 section 6.7), while PWA 
does not follow any professional institutions specifically.  
 
Regarding the industry fields mentioned above, it can be concluded that PWA as an 
organisation in the utility industry seems to be more strongly engaged by the logics of 
social activity more than the logic of commercial operations, while POST seems to 
value the logic of commercial operations more highly. From the findings, we can 
assume that degree of compatibility in PWA is lower than that in POST. However, by 
considering the use of EVM, which has a strong commercial logic, both organisations 
have a similar response as they decoupled the EVM from other practices. The important 
factor that led to decoupling is that EVM does not take into account social activities, 
which is one of the   SOE’s   responsibilities   (see   chapter   6   section   6.4). This supports 
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Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)   statement   that   ‘compatibility   is   lower   when   there   are  
inconsistencies  regarding  the  goals  of  organisational  actions’. 
 
Fourthly, apart from the explanation in chapter 5 in the evidence of multiple institutional 
logics that the emergence of new technology can differentiate the tie of institutional 
logics between POST and PWA, the study context suggests that industry characteristics 
of PWA and POST are capital intensive and labour intensive respectively. In chapter 5 
section 5.3, regarding the capital-intensive  characteristic,  PWA’s   investment  decisions  
have been affected by the complexity between the logic of commercial operations and 
the logic of social activities. However, the degree of compatibility of PWA also depends 
on support by external actors. In this case, the Thai government has partially supported 
some investment projects that can be declared as social projects but it does not have 
clear criteria for subsidising these public service obligations where the tariff for the 
customer group is not covering commercial costs.  Consequently, it is difficult for PWA 
to interpret the real profit that organisation can generate. This can affect the degree of 
compatibility in PWA. Moreover, the effect of capital intensiveness in PWA to the 
degree of centrality will be discussed in the next part about resource dependency. On the 
other hand, the labour intensiveness in POST does not show much evidence of impact 
on the degree of compatibility.  
 
According to Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 367-368), the factors that influence 
compatibility at the organisational level are hiring practices and socialization where the 
relationship  between  members  and  ‘the  degree  of  interdependence’  can  affect  the  degree  
of  compatibility.  This  concept  is  similar  to  the  Greenwood  et  al.’s  (2011)  organisational  
attributes on the organisational structure. 
 
The networking between employees in an organisation is one of the mechanisms that 
introduce a logic into an organization (Lounsbury, 2001). Also, the interdependence 
between employees can develop the compatibility of the logics (Besharov and Smith, 
2014). However, the degree to which an organisation is committed to a particular logic 
can vary (Greenwood et al., 2011). Both cases have many channels through which to 
create a network in organisations, such as the branch manager group in PWA and Postal 
College   in   POST.   The   strong   ties   between   employees   can   affect   an   organisation’s  
action. For example, the logic of unity can represent strong ties in the structure, which 
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helped POST to reduce the difficulty of organisational transformation after 
corporatization (see chapter 5 section 5.3). On the other hand, the high value attributed 
to showing unity in POST can both add to and detract from the compatibility, 
depending on what goal the organisation is aiming for. 
 
According  to  Greenwood  et  al.  (2011),  the  influence  and  capability  of  a  ‘social  referent’  
who can give voice to institutional logics in order to reinforce a particular demand in an 
organisation as well as increase logic compatibility (Besharov and Smith, 2014) and the 
number of the referents also affect reinforcement. One SOE characteristic is 
bureaucracy, which is based on a strong command hierarchy; therefore, it is possible for 
the case study organisations to enforce their demands, such as the implementation of 
EVM, which requires every regional office to set up an EVM centre. The evidence in 
chapter 6 section 6.5 suggests that the low level of response from employees to the 
implementation of EVM is, at least in part, due to the small number of referents who 
themselves often have limited knowledge of it. On the other hand, the organisational-
wide BSC has been supported by a significant body of people knowledgeable in the use 
of performance measures and this has helped in its implementation and acceptance (see 
chapter 6 section 6.7).  
 
Besharov and Smith (2014) state that the characteristics of organisational members can 
impact the degree of compatibility  as  ‘they  selectively  draw  on,  interpret  and  enact’  the  
logics they carry. We saw in chapters 5 and 6, regarding cases embedded in the logic of 
seniority and the logic of bureaucracy, many participants agreed that the most powerful 
group is the executive   group.      They   believe   in   their   executives’   vision   and   tend   to  
follow  the  superior’s  command.  Accordingly,   the  response   to   the  co-existing logics is 
based on the CEO and her management team (see chapter 5). Also, some PWA 
participants explained that there has been a slight focus shift from an operation view to 
a management view because the most recent governor has a background in finance and 
management while the former governors were from an engineering background. As a 
result, the governor is concerned more with organisational development.  
 
In conclusion, the degree of compatibility in both organisations should be low to 
moderate. In this case, the degree in PWA is slightly lower than that in POST because 
PWA seems to struggle more between the core logics: the logic of social activities and 
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the logic of commercial operation. Also, compatibility is affected by organisational 
structure because both case study organisations have a variety of networks between 
organisational members; however, by comparing both cases, POST seems to be more 
efficient than PWA in managing logics.  The close relationship or interdependence 
between members in an organisation should help to develop a higher degree of 
compatibility of multiple logics (Besharov and Smith, 2014). However, the strong 
seniority system, and the relationship between employees, especially at different levels 
of hierarchy, can affect the degree of compatibility between the two main logics.  
 
8.3.2.2 The moderate degree of centrality 
Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 369)  define   ‘centrality   as   the  degree  of  which  multiple  
logics   are   each   treated   as   equally   valid   and   relevant   to   organisational   function’.  They  
suggest that the degree of centrality depends on the number of core logics that guide the 
organisational operations and functions: the more core logics involved, the higher 
degree of centrality.  
 
In SOEs, there are three core logics: the logic of bureaucracy, the logic of commercial 
operation and the logic of social activities that instantiates organisation core activities 
(see chapter 5). Also, the findings show that case study organisations experienced 
problems of fragmentation, especially in their views between commercial and social 
activities, which were already discussed in the evidence of multiple institutional logics. 
 
 According   to   Besharov   and   Smith   (2014),   ‘Organisation-level practices and 
characteristics’  can  affect  the  degree  of  compatibility,  while  ‘resource  dependence’  and  
organisational mission and strategy can influence the degree of centrality. Both the 
PWA mission and vision focus on the quality of water and services to Thai citizens, 
which are based on the logic of social activities and the logic of commercial operations 
while the statement of direction provided by the Thai government also includes the 
improvement of PWA efficiency and effectiveness (see chapters 5 and 6). From this, 
even though the co-existing logics can be considered as the core logics in the SOE field, 
PWA seems to engage and have stronger ties to the logic of social activities than to the 
logic of commercial operations. On the other hand, the POST vision focuses on being 
“the  leader  in  postal  business”  and  POST’s  strategic  plan  also  focuses  on  four  business  
areas (see chapter 5), accordingly POST considers the logic of commercial operations as 
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the most important core logic along with the other logic. From the mission and vision, it 
can be assumed that the degree of centrality of POST is lower than PWA. However, 
both organisations also have more than one institutional logic that is core to 
organisational function.  
 
The resource dependency described in Besharov and Smith (2014) is similar to 
Greenwood  et  al.’s  (2001)  view  of  ownership  as  one  of  the  key  organisational  attributes.  
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Oliver (1991), an organisation tends to 
respond to the demand of the actor or institution that provides its critical resource. Both 
PWA   and   POST   show   their   response   towards   the   MoF’s   demands   for   the  
implementation of EVM, BSC and individual BSC because by implementing these 
practices, cases can gain higher performance scores, which results in a higher bonus 
being received (see chapters 6 and 7). Regarding capital intensiveness, PWA needs a 
subsidy from government as well as to use government guarantees for its loans; 
therefore, PWA tries to meet the requirements and criteria set by Budget Bureau, Public 
Debt Office Management and Office of the National Economic and Social Development 
Board (see chapters 5 and 6).  On the other hand, POST does not require any subsidy or 
loan guarantee; therefore, such organisations do not have much influence on POST. This 
is similar to Lounsbury (2001), which shows that the universities shape their responses 
depending on the preference of the institutions that are funding them.  
 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 345), the definition of ownership is the power 
of a group in an organisation that can lead how the organization responds to institutional 
complexity   and   the   organisation’s   tendency   to   be   affected   by   ‘its   dependence   upon  
important   institutional   actors’.   The   evidence   on   ownership   also   can   be   seen   in   the  
implementation of EVM and individual BSC; if executives do not support the use of a 
new practice in an organisation, then employees show less concern for the system (see 
chapters 6 and 7). The other powerful group in this context is the labour union. We saw 
in chapter 7 that many participants expressed their concern about the possibility of 
changing the bonus system because resistance to change can be expected from the 
labour union.  Moreover,  regarding  PWA’s  regulation,  the  head  of  the  labour  union  has  a  
right to be an observer in executive meetings if they have a labour related issue.  
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From all of these issues, it can be concluded that for PWA and POST at the organisation 
level, the degree of compatibility and centrality are low to moderate, as both 
organisations value one logic more than the others. PWA has been more influenced by 
the logic of social activities while POST has been driven by the logic of commercial 
activities regarding their missions and goals. However, by comparing both cases, PWA 
seems to have a slightly higher degree of centrality because it still requires a subsidy and 
other supports from Thai government as well as approving its investment projects for 
both commercial and social projects. 
 
8.3.2.3 Considering types of logic multiplicity within organisations 
From the analysis of the factors that influence the degree of compatibility and the degree 
of centrality, PWA and POST can belong to both the contested type and the estranged 
type   of   organisation   in   Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)   framework.   However,   PWA’s  
position is closer to the contested types regarding a higher degree of centrality when 
compared   with   POST.   This   finding   supports   Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014, p. 375) 
suggestion   that   ‘the   type  of   logic   change  at   the   field   level  may  depend   in  part  on   the  
nature  of  logic  multiplicity  within  organisation’. 
 
Figure 8.3: The types of logic multiplicity within organisations in case study organisation 
 
Source: Adopted from Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 371) 
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From   the   figure   above   it   can   be   seen   that   ‘contested   organisations’   and   ‘estranged  
organisations’  arise  when  organisations  have  a   low  degree  of  compatibility,  as   is      the  
case in both of the organisations studied, which are significantly influenced by the 
logics of bureaucracy, of social activity and of commercial operations. These are their 
core logics. The diverse objectives inherent in these logics can lead to conflict in 
various aspects of the organisation affecting mission, strategy, structure and other core 
activities because of the low consistency in organisational actions (see chapters 5 and 
6).  Second,  ‘estranged  organisations’  have  a  primary  logic,  but  they  still  experience  the  
effect  of  ‘subsidiary  logics’:  in the case of PWA the logic of seniority and the logic of 
unity. 
 
POST is more close to the estranged type since it focuses more on commercial 
operations, as stated by many participants. PWA seems to struggle between the two 
competing logics: the logic of social activities and the logic of commercial operations. 
Consequently PWA is depicted as largely occupying the top left quadrant in figure 8.3. 
This seeks to indicate that PWA is more strongly split by the conflicting aims resulting 
from the logics of social activity on the one hand and of commercial operations and 
bureaucracy on the other. The different degree of compatibility and centrality of the 
institutional logics in both case organisations occurs as a response to their individual 
organisational attributes and industry characteristics. For example, PWA benefits from 
its natural monopoly while POST has a partial monopoly in its business and has been 
affected by the emergence of new technology.  PWA, which has been subsidised by the 
Thai government, experiences a high degree of political intervention in comparison to 
POST. Moreover, both organisations also experience the effect of other logics, which 
are the logic of unity and the logic of seniority (see chapter 7).  
 
From our findings and discussion in this chapter, the researcher has combined 
Greenwood   et   al.’s   (2011)   and  Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)   frameworks   to   illustrate  
institutional complexity in Thai SOEs.  
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 Figure 8.4: Institutional complexity in Thai state-owned enterprises 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 324) and Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 371) 
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institutional logics are the fundamental materials that shape institutional complexity. 
The degree of compatibility and centrality of these multiple institutional logics then 
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the institutional complexity facing the organisation can be further influenced by 
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influence and capability of key individuals. In this study, the findings show that the 
organisational responses are decoupling and loose coupling of the EVM and BSC from 
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incentive systems which are presented in the next section. 
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8.4 Organisational Responses  
According to Greenwood et al. (2011), an organisational response to institutional 
complexity   depends   on   whether   emphasis   is   on   ‘organisational   strategies’   or  
‘organisational  structure’.  This  study  focuses  on  the  strategies  adopted  by  organisations  
in order to handle institutional complexity. This study seeks to explain a typical 
organisational response in the case study organisations to performance measurement 
systems and incentive systems. Regarding the case study context and the findings 
chapters, the two case study organisations were somewhat similar because they share 
SOEs’  characteristics  and  pressures  as  well  as  the  same  embedded  institutional  logics;; 
however, they also differ in many aspects as pointed out in the types of logic 
multiplicity within the organisations.  Therefore, their actions towards the new practices 
are similar yet different. 
  
8.4.1 Responses to the implementation of economic value management 
We saw in chapter 6 that the original ideas of the use of both EVM and organisational 
BSC were from MoF; later on, they were forced to implement both tools through the 
KPIs set by the MoF. Both organisations experienced difficulty in the use of EVM 
regarding its strong logic of commercial operation while ignoring the logics of social 
activities which are also embedded in the field of the SOEs. Due to the conflict between 
the two logics, it proved difficult for the case organisations to integrate EVM with their 
practices. 
 
 As discussed in chapter 2, Kaplan and Norton (1996) pointed out that EVA might 
discourage organizations from investing in a new project of a prime business division; 
therefore, it is better to measure project performance in terms of free cash flow rather 
than in terms of EVA. Both organisations considered that such activities could generate 
a negative economic profit, especially PWA, which may have many capital intensive 
investment projects. Consequently, the negative EP is not felt to fairly represent the 
actual performance of the SOE.  In these circumstances, the organisation may be 
discouraged from making a decision to invest in socially oriented projects. In the 
interviews, many participants expressed their discomfort with the use of EVM where the 
social benefit is not taken into account (see chapter 6 section 6.4). 
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There is some literature support for the use of EVA as a management tool at a division 
level or product level, such as Hartman (2000), and Shrieves and Wachowicz (2001). 
However, Zimmerman (1997) and Woods et al. (2012) highlight the prospective 
problem of cost sharing and target costing due to the complexity of the calculation on 
cost of capital. Therefore, the use of EVA for performance management at a division 
level seems impracticable (Zimmerman, 1997).  
 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011), inconsistent demands from institutions can affect 
the   degree   of   institutional   complexity.      Many   participants   perceived   that   the   MoF’s  
demands on the use of EVM may change over time. Also, apart from the MoF, other 
government agencies do not require SOEs to use EVM. As a result, the case study 
organisations have no real intention to implement EVM but just to comply with the 
MoF’s  requirements  in  order  to  acquire  a  higher  performance score. 
 
My   findings   suggest   that  EVM  has   been   treated   on   a   ‘ceremonial   basis’   in   both   case  
study   organisations.   According   to   Greenwood   et   al.   (2011,   p.   350),   an   ‘organisation  
gives only ceremonial and symbolic commitment to certain logics while preserving a 
core   identity’.  Also,   the   decoupling   between  EVM  and  other   practices   occurs   in   both  
cases.  This  support  the  Meyer  and  Rowan’s  (1997)  and  Dembrin  et  al.’s  (2007)  assertion  
that  decoupling  happens  when  an  organisation  adopts  new  practices  on  a   ‘ceremonial’  
basis in order to minimise the impact on recent practice as well as to construct the 
‘right’   organisational   image   and   recognition   and   ‘legitimize   them   in   their   social  
contexts’  to  help  the  organisation  have  a  ‘privileged  access  to  resources’  (Kasperskaya, 
2008, p. 365).  
 
8.4.2 The responses to organisational BSC  
The BSC has been commonly employed in the public sector, even though many public 
organisations have experienced some difficulties using the original BSC due to the fact 
that the objective in the public sector is typically not primarily financial (Umashev and 
Willett, 2008). This study considers SOE as one type of public sector organisation; 
however, an SOE also embeds the logic of commercial operation. Consequently, the 
implementation of BSC in the case study organisations might not be expected to cause 
such severe problems compared to the other types of public sector organisations.  
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In chapter 6 section 6.6, similar to EVM, organisational BSC has been employed in 
order   to   comply   with   MoF’s requirement. However, the difference is that both 
organisations are more engaged with the use of BSC compared to EVM due to the 
similarity   with   the   MoF’s   performance   measurement   system,   which   assesses  
organisations using KPIs. Also, most of the organisational and department KPIs are 
adopted   from   MoF’s   set   of   KPIs   and   are   derived   from   the   statement   of   directions.  
However, regarding the characteristics of public organisations, the case study 
organisations experienced excessive numbers of KPIs that covered both commercial and 
social goals. The institutional complexity that occurs regarding the goals from the 
competing institutional logics are difficult to balance and hence, there is sometimes 
conflict. As a result, there is evidence of loose coupling in the use of the BSC. While the 
case study organisations employ the BSC and establish KPIs for each department as 
well as each division, they exhibit some lack of integration with other practices and 
decision tools.  
 
Also, some KPIs acquired from the MoF do not accord with those used in the 
organisation. This suggests a lack of understanding by the MoF in the SOE context. The 
development of BSC in both cases also follows these steps, as recently they have had a 
statement of directions (SODs) provided by MoF and a strategy map in order to better 
reflect organisational goals. Recent strategy maps of both organisations have been 
written by following the recent KPIs required by MoF, although many participants 
claimed that some of these KPIs could not represent actual organisational activities and 
performance. Therefore, doubt about the use of organisational BSC still occurs. This 
finding confirms that loose coupling occurs when formal rules conflict with actual work 
practices (Orton and Wick, 1990), as BSC fails to identify some of the organisational 
performance measurements, which leads to a gap of transforming a strategy plan into 
action (Norreklit, 2000). However, the finding in this study contradicts the statement of 
Norreklit (2000) that criticises BSC, as it ignores the importance of institutional 
stakeholders. This incident can be interpreted as occurring due to the strong tie with the 
logic of bureaucracy. Also, at the departmental level, some PWA departments 
experience the same problem, as some of their KPIs do not   relate   to   the  department’s  
activities. This problem leads to the avoidance of BSC (see chapter 6 section 6.7). This 
supports   Rautainen   and   Jarvenpaa’s   (2012)   study   that   showed   when   a   unit   might  
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consider that a performance measurement system is not relevant in the context, it may 
become entangled with buffering and escaping the system. 
 
Jenson   (2001)   critiqued   the   concept   of   ‘balance’,   because   the   use   of   the   BSC   in  
organizations could lead to disputes over the trade-offs when multiple dimensions of 
performance cannot all be maximized. The findings support this statement, as case study 
organisations still doubt the merits of balancing four perspectives of BSC and they point 
out that most of the conflict between KPIs occurs from the co-existence of the logic of 
social activities and the logics of commercial operations. 
 
In contrast to EVM, the use of organisational level BSC by organisational employees is 
more widespread.  The number of social referents for the BSC and their networks along 
with   the   BSC’s   relative conceptual simplicity resulted in lower resistance from 
employees. The   participants’   perceptions   of   the   use   of   the   organisational   BSC   are  
divided depending on how their department responded to its integration with other 
practices; therefore, the BSC can be coupled in some parts of the organisation but 
decoupled elsewhere. Therefore, this study concludes that the organisational BSC can be 
considered to be loosely coupled to the organisations strategic and budget plans.  
 
8.4.3 The responses to individual BSC and incentive systems 
According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2007), regarding the literature in the field of 
performance-based incentives, the integration of the BSC approach and an incentive 
system, especially monetary incentives, has gained more popularity in the public sector. 
We saw in chapter 7 that the MoF has promoted the implementation of performance-
based incentives in SOEs. Recently, the case study organisations have had similar 
incentive systems as adapted from former criteria used by the Thai government. In the 
past five years, both case study organisations have tried to integrate their incentive 
systems with individual performance, as they believe that the integration can encourage 
employees to improve their performance, as suggested by the literature in this field.  
 
In chapter 7 section 7.4,  the  case  study  organisations’  actions  towards  the  current  bonus  
system can be seen as being divided into two groups. Regarding the logic of unity, many 
participants from the operational level showed their satisfaction with the present system 
where everyone across the organisation receives bonuses equally. They did not support 
214 
 
the organisation changing the system into an individual performance based incentive 
system. While the management and executive groups expressed concerns that there were 
many problems in the present organisational bonus system, they also wished to maintain 
the current system.  An exception was among executives in PWA who supported change 
but felt the labour union and employees would offer strong resistance.  
 
The case study organisations have largely avoided integrating individual BSC (see 
chapter 7 section 7.6) with other evaluation practices. Several difficulties regarding the 
adoption of this performance measure were reported. Firstly, individual or personal 
performance-based measures are contradicted by the existing bonus system whereby the 
organisation gives employees an equivalent monthly bonus across the whole 
organisation. In POST, participants claim that a different monthly bonus will affect the 
unity value of the organisation.  Secondly, the case study organisations employ 
competency assessment and other related factors such as work attendance in considering 
pay raises and promotions. Also, most of the participants claim that their pay raise is 
also   based   on   a   rotational   basis   as   well   as   supervisors’   subjective   judgments.   Lastly,  
promotion is also based on seniority, which is one of the logics in the field of the 
Thailand public sector. From all of these points, many employees resist integrating 
individual BSC with the organisational incentive system. Also, the influences of the 
logic of seniority and the norm of rotation in pay raise lead employees to resistance to 
integrating the individual BSC with the other systems. As a result, the decoupling of 
individual BSC and the regular practices is not surprising. 
 
The avoidance of integration between individual BSC and other practices has been 
clearly seen in both case study organisations.  According to Oliver (1991), the avoidance 
response tends to occur with institutional stakeholder multiplicity, content constraint and 
uncertainty of environmental context. The resistance of integrating the incentive system 
with individual BSC occurs in both case organisations regarding the two main problems, 
which are the uncertainty of the use of individual BSC and the inconsistency with recent 
organisational practices.  
 
According to Thorpe and Homan (2000) and Merchant and Van der Stede (2007), the 
wrong measures and targets as well as the inaccurate judgement of an assessor in 
performance-based incentives can demotivate employees. In chapter 7 section 7.6, the 
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finding supports their statement, as the main concerns about using the individual BSC as 
a performance-based incentive system are the problem of KPI setting and the perception 
of unfairness.  
 
The findings of the research suggest that the strategic responses employed in the case 
study organisations are decoupling, loose coupling and avoidance in order to deal with 
the uses of EVM and BSC as well as the integration of individual BSC and incentive 
system, respectively. The finding also supports the literature in that the majority of 
performance   measurement   research   shows   the   institutional   effects   of   ‘decoupling’   in  
which organisations may separate symbolic displays for the purpose of seeking 
legitimacy from actual operational-level practice (Modell, 2009). The hybrid 
organisations’   response   to   competing   institutional   logics   are   decoupling   and   loose  
coupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Orton and Weick, 1990). Also, in order for 
organisations to preserve their old resources, they tend to avoid the use of the new 
practice by decoupling or loose coupling from recent practices (Rautianen and 
Jarvenpaa, 2012).  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified and discussed key aspects of the empirical findings, which 
have been examined in greater detail in earlier chapters. This study set out to investigate 
the institutional complexity and organisational responses to co-existing logics through 
the employment of performance measurement systems in SOEs as hybrid organisations. 
It is crucial to note that SOEs have employed (1) EVM, on a largely ceremonial basis, 
decoupled from other practices, and in this way resisted strong commercial logics; (2) 
the BSC which has been shown to be loosely coupled with other practices due to the 
conflicts between the logic of commercial operations and social activity.  Such loose 
coupling minimizes impacts on current practices while seeking to maintain the 
legitimacy of institutional stakeholders. The organisations responding to their hybrid 
nature and multiple logics environments have avoided integrating individual BSC with 
other practices partly in response to the influences of the logics of unity, seniority and 
the norm of rotation. In this chapter, the researcher also proposes a framework of 
institutional complexity in Thai SOEs, which is derived from the findings and 
discussion. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
  
9.1 Introduction  
This is the first comprehensive study of performance measurement systems (PMS) in 
Thai SOEs. The majority of research in this field has focused on other types of public 
sector organisations such as federal governments, local governments, and healthcare 
organisations, and has mostly taken place in developed countries. This study has 
examined two case study organisations and set out to identify institutional logics in the 
field of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Thailand as well as to investigate 
institutional complexity and organisational responses towards the performance 
measurement systems and incentive systems. This final chapter concludes the research 
by providing the contributions made by the discussion in this thesis. Next, a discussion 
of limitations and the suggestions for future study are addressed. Lastly, the chapter 
concludes with final remarks on the research as a whole. 
 
9.2 Contributions  
The contributions that result from this study can be categorized as theoretical and 
practical. 
 
9.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
This study has made several contributions to the performance measurement and 
institutional literatures. The findings within the research add to the literature in the 
performance measurement field by providing in-depth  exploration  of  the  organisations’  
and   individuals’   actions   toward   the   implementation of performance measurement 
systems. Modell (2009) suggested that future studies should focus more on micro-
dynamic  processes  by  building  on  individual  actors’  perceptions  and  their  responses  to  
the performance measurement systems. In undertaking this research, this thesis has 
employed a qualitative approach, which is able to provide rich data by exploring the 
perceptions of participants in various departments and organisation positions. Following 
the existing literature, this study is concerned with institutional effects; however, 
instead of focusing on institutional isomorphism, this study focuses on the institutional 
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complexity, which is described through the conflicts of competing logics and the types 
of multiplicity within organisations.  
 
The primary contribution of this study is that it is one of the first studies to identify 
institutional logics in the field of Thai SOEs and to explore how SOEs respond to 
institutional complexity. Institutionalism researchers have gained attention for 
identifying how institutional logics drive changes of organisational behaviour 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). This study employed this concept to identify the institutional 
logics embedded by organisations in the field of SOEs: the logic of bureaucracy, the 
logic of commercial operations and the logic of social activities. The other institutional 
logics  identified  can  be  derived  from  the  SOEs’  and  Thai  cultures  and  norms:  the  logic  
of unity and the logic of seniority. Accordingly, from these multiple institutional logics 
that prevail upon Thai SOEs, the nature of institutional complexity in SOEs and how 
they handle institutional complexity and their responses towards performance 
measurement and other related systems have provided rich empirical data for 
exploration. 
 
This  study  has  responded  to  the  need  for  a  study  on  ‘how  organisations  experience  and  
respond   to   the  complexity   that  arises’  as  well  as   for  an   investigation  on  ‘the  dynamic  
patterns  of  complexity’  and  ‘the  degree  of  incompatibility’  between  logics,  as  suggested 
by  Greenwood  et  al.   (2011,  p.  357).     Consequently,  we  employed  Greenwood  et  al.’s  
(2011)   and   Besharov   and   Smith’s   (2014)   frameworks   to   address   the   degree   of  
institutional   complexity   using   ‘the   degree   of   centrality’   and   ‘the   degree   of  
compatibility’  together with organisational field and organisational attributes.   
 
The findings revealed that the responses from individual SOEs may differ regarding the 
degree of centrality and compatibility of co-existing institutional logics held in the 
organization. We also found that the implementation of performance measurement 
systems whose concepts conflicted with the institutional logics can lead to the 
organization-wide reluctance to change. In this study, one of the key reasons why SOEs 
decoupled Economic Value Management (EVM) from other practices is that the EVM 
cannot be used to fulfil organisational requirements led by the logic of social activities.   
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From  the  findings,  this  study  has  adapted  Greenwood  et  al.’s  (2011)  and  Besharov  and  
Smith’s   (2014)   frameworks to present a new framework of specific relevance to 
institutional complexity in Thai SOEs (chapter 8 section 8.3). The framework has 
considered the institutional logics embedded by Thai SOEs as well as their 
organisational types regarding their degrees of compatibility and centrality. We suggest 
that the Thai SOEs belong to the contested or estranged type of organisation regarding 
the low degree of compatibility and the moderate degree of centrality of institutional 
logics. This framework can be used in future research that examines the actions and 
responses to institutional complexity by SOEs or other types of public sector 
organisations. It can also be adapted for research into hybrid organisations more 
generally that also experience a high degree of institutional complexity. 
  
Finally, the study also more clearly distinguishes decoupling and loose coupling. The 
meanings are derived from previous literature, but they are further explored through the 
differences in the implementation of EVM and Balance Scorecard (BSC) in SOEs.  In 
chapter   6,   we   suggest   that   decoupling   occurs   when   new   practice   is   ‘separate   and  
distinct’   from   recent   practices   (Dacin   et   al.,   2004,   p.   509).  On   the   other   hand,   loose  
coupling occurs when (1) a  new practice is coupled with some recent practices and 
decoupled  with  other  practices,  or  (2)  a  new  practice  is  ‘distinctive  but  still  responsive’  
to other practices (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007, p. 214).  
 
9.2.2 Practical contributions 
In addition to theoretical contributions, the study also offered a number of practical 
contributions. According to Bourn et al. (2000), the reasons for success and failure in 
implementing performance measurement programs can be categorized into three issues: 
organizational context, development process and measurement content. My study offers 
support for their statements.  
 
The findings suggest that the case organisations tended to decouple their management 
processes from EVM while loosely coupling the BSC performance measures.  The BSC 
was loosely coupled with other organisational practices according to the recollection of 
individuals collected during the case interviews and of evidence gathered from the 
organisations on the relative use of EVM and the BSC.  
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Both EVM and BSC have been adopted in order to comply with MoF requirements. 
The findings indicated that SOEs experienced less difficulty in the implementation of 
the BSC than in the implementation of EVM. The complex EVM concept was seen as a 
threat by employees. This is partly due to the difficulty of communicating the concept 
to employees, which results in knowledge of the system being limited to a few people. 
On the other hand, the BSC concept was considered to be simpler and already well-
known among SOE employees, as it similar to the current SOE performance 
measurement system. As a result, the BSC knowledge is more easily spread within the 
organisation. Also, unlike EVM, the BSC does not focus mainly on financial figures but 
also includes the other perspectives that are related to the organisation, which can be 
explained through an organisational strategy map as well as a set of indicators. As a 
result, employees can engage better with the organisational goals and mission. From 
this finding, we suggest that organisations should be aware of how to engage their 
employees in implementing any new practice. This can be done by communicating with 
the employees and providing an overview of the practices required and information on 
how the new practice is related to them through formal and informal organisational 
networks.  
 
Apart from the complexity of adopting new performance measurement practices, there 
are other factors that affect the adoption of EVM and BSC that need to be considered. 
The case evidence shows that there is a lack of organisational commitment towards the 
adoption   of   EVM   regarding   the   inconsistency   of   the   MoF’s   demands.   To   increase  
organisational commitment, the executive members are the key mechanism, as their 
influence is important for guiding and encouraging the employees in the 
implementation of new practices. 
 
Thirdly, this study also provided a view on the relationship of individual level BSC 
with incentive pay systems, which are largely considered ineffective in Thai SOEs. The 
employees reported perceptions of unfairness and judgemental bias in their experience 
of incentive-based performance systems.  A particular issue was the relative 
objectivity/subjectivity of the assessment criteria used in SOEs and how it affected 
individual incentive calculation outcomes. This was seen to vary significantly 
depending on the supervisor.  Promotions and pay raises were seen to be based on 
individual assessment scores. However, the logic of seniority in Thai SOEs can affect 
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the promotion system by favouring individuals who have worked longer or are older, 
while the pay raise rotation system can demotivate employees. The individual BSC 
system was not able to distinguish excellent employees from the other employees 
regarding the use of many divisional measures and targets to assess individual 
performance. As a result, employees in the same team or department tend to have 
similar or nearly the same performance assessment scores. From these findings, we 
suggest that SOEs should consider re-designing the incentive system to concentrate 
more on performance-based evaluation. A well-designed system and measures might 
help to reduce the negative perceptions of employees. Also, clear assessment criteria 
and explanations should be provided in order to create trust between assessors and 
employees. 
 
9.3 Limitations of the Study  
The research was conducted using a qualitative approach, which is suitable for 
investigating and exploring a social phenomenon. The research also followed a well-
prepared and planned field research process. However, inevitably this research still has 
several limitations, therefore, the findings and discussion should be reviewed regarding 
this. 
 
The first limitation is generalisability. This research employs a qualitative approach 
because it helps researchers to capture data on the perception of the informants (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). However, the mono-method  approach  as  well  as  a  researcher’s  
unsystematic views may constrain the generalisability of the findings (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). Therefore, a multiple case study method and data triangulation were employed in 
order to improve the situation. The study was conducted with two case study 
organisations that are from different industries. Therefore, in some particular topics, the 
participants’  perceptions  cannot  be  generalized. 
 
The second limitation concerns validity and reliability. Even though the list of 
participants was considered to include both sides – government agencies and case study 
organisations – one of the cases had selected most of its participants from the 
employees who take part in the implementation of State Enterprise Performance 
Assessment. This group of participants shared some common perceptions on particular 
topics that may differ from other employees: for example, the high degree of 
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motivation, they reported, in implementing new management systems. To reduce the 
interference, participants had been confirmed to be anonymous as well as off-digital 
record so they could be asked to conduct the interviews at random times.  
 
Next, some other limitations occurred, which delayed the progress of the research: 
accessibility, lack of resource facilities, and so on (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Schlappa, 
2009; Myers, 2009). 
 
The first limitation regards the limited accessibility of data. The case study 
organisations are considered as one type of public organisation; therefore, sometimes it 
was difficult to obtain some specific data due to both the confidentiality and the 
unwillingness to share such information. The problems often occurred when the 
researcher was asking for some secondary data to validate   the   interviewees’  
information. Most of the documents are confidential. To deal with this problem, the 
researcher  had  to  sign  an  agreement  to  not  publish  or  use  the  data  without  the  owner’s  
consent. Also, some documents were available to read on-site only. In addition, there 
was limited previous research and secondary data on the topic in Thailand. However, 
the researcher put her efforts into searching for secondary data by asking government 
agencies and other related organisations. 
 
A second limitation is due to time constraint. Time was one of major concerns for the 
researcher while conducting research.  The fieldwork at the case study organisations 
was time consuming; however, the researcher had to finish all the data collection within 
a three-month period. To deal with time constraints, the researcher employed a 
timetable, which was helpful to organize the research in order to specify the different 
stages and the calendar points at which the researcher started and finished each stage.  
 
A third limitation is due to the limited budget. The fieldwork in this research was 
undertaken in Thailand and all interviews were conducted in Thai as the native 
language. Due to limited funds, an English translation for all the data was not available. 
As a result, translated statements were provided for the empirical evidence only, to 
reduce the cost of hiring translators. However, regarding the validity and reliability of 
the interpretation, selected statements were translated and back-translated with the help 
of the  researcher’s  friend  who  is  fluent  in  both  Thai  and  English.     
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A last limitation involves other incidents that can affect the quality of the interviews.  
The interview sessions with some participants, especially the executive group was 
interrupted or shorter than expected. This caused some difficulty for the researcher to 
control the conversations and sometimes not all of the prepared questions could be 
asked. In addition, even though the majority of participants asked for anonymity, some 
of participants still did not agree to be digitally recorded. This is because they did not 
feel comfortable discussing sensitive issues such as window-dressing or criteria shaping 
in order to increase their assessment score. Also, the quality of digital records was 
inconsistent; for example, noise at the interview sessions could cause some difficulty in 
the later transcription. To overcome this problem, the researcher always took notes 
along with audio recording. 
 
9.4 Suggestions for Future Research  
Following the study discussion of contributions as well as limitations, it is important to 
identify potential future research. There are many avenues to consider. 
 
Regarding generalisability, one avenue for future research may involve what data was 
sought and how it was collected.  Clearly, the institutional logics identified in this study 
were based on two case study organisations in Thailand, while different types, sizes, 
industry sectors and organisational contexts could affect our findings of institutional 
logics of the field of SOEs and may also produce a new set of potentially influential 
logics. Consequently, future research can also collect data from different types and sizes 
of organisations within the field of SOEs in Thailand such as privatized SOEs and non-
commercial groups of SOEs. Some industry sectors such as the electricity sector and the 
telecommunication sector, which have active regulatory bodies, could experience a 
different set of institutional logics as well as pressures from stakeholders. As a result, 
the new set of institutional logics embedded in SOEs and how individual SOEs value 
each logic as well as understanding the organisational context could lead SOEs towards 
achieving a different institutional complexity as well as understanding how they 
respond to institutional complexity. Different comparative case study organizations 
could help identifying similarities and varieties in the patterns found in this study.  
 
Notwithstanding this study in Thailand, the lack of studies in institutional logics and 
complexity in developing countries raises the need to extend the research to other 
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countries in order to capture comparable or different cultural and social effects. Other 
research  could  also  consider  the  comparison  between  developing  countries’  SOEs  and  
developed  countries’  SOEs,  small  SOEs  and  large  SOEs  or  privatized  SOEs  and  general  
SOEs. In addition, this study investigated SOEs as one type of public sector 
organisation; therefore, an investigation in institutional complexity of Thai private 
sector organizations or other developing countries may provide another perception of 
the field. 
 
This study focussed on the incidence of competing logics in hybrid organisations.  
Other aspects that could be investigated include: how logics can be blended or are 
newly creating when new practices emerge, or are applied, in organisations. In addition, 
the organisational responses in this study emphasized the role and practices around 
performance measurement systems and the relationship with incentive systems; 
therefore, the responses to other functions of organisations should be considered for 
future study.  
 
A final recommendation for future research concerns research method. Since this study 
employed a qualitative method, future research could consider adopting triangulation 
style research methods. For example, qualitative and quantitative methods could be 
combined to obtain the perspectives of stakeholders on the institutional complexity 
regarding   other   areas   in   the   performance   measurement   systems.   The   participants’  
perspectives could be compared and contrasted and a new set of institutional logics may 
be identified.  
 
9.5 Final Reflections 
This study identifies the institutional logics in the field of SOEs as well as provides an 
analysis of the institutional complexity and organisational responses towards the 
implementation of performance measurement systems in the context of Thai SOEs.   
 
From the discussion in this chapter, limitations and suggestions for future research were 
identified, as the ability to generalize widely beyond the case study context is limited. 
Nevertheless, this study has produced valid contributions, as it provided new insights on 
institutional logics and complexity where these concepts are still underdeveloped in 
both the Thai and other developing country literature. The results offer new 
224 
 
perspectives and insights for the study of performance measurement systems in 
relationship to institutional complexity as well. It is hoped that through suggested future 
research, new findings could develop the theory further. 
 
Furthermore, I would like to explain my personal journey on this thesis. I started my 
research in September, 2011. At the qualifying stage, I planned to conduct a semi-
structured interview in four case study organisations. However, due to the constraint of 
time, it might be difficult to achieve that target. Consequently, my supervisors and I 
agreed to examine two case study organisations within a 3-month period. During the 
field study, I realised that if I had selected more participants from the middle 
management level, primary data from the interviewing method could provide more in-
depth   detail   on   employees’   perspectives   of   PMS   and   institutional   demand.   Also,   the  
research question guideline used in the semi-structured interview was based on the 
literature in institutional theory. However, I changed my focus to the concept of 
institutional logics after conducting the interviews. On reflection, I think that it would 
be better to have had the opportunity to revisit the interviewees and further explore the 
concepts of institutional logic and complexity but this was not possible. In addition, 
during my PhD study, I experienced difficulties in organising my ideas and it has been 
challenging to explain theoretical constructs and empirical findings to others. 
Sometimes this has stopped me from getting involved in conversations, but my 
supervisors helped me to gain more confidence as well as to improve in other areas 
such as systematic thinking, and communication skill. I believe that the entire PhD 
process has enabled me to better understand the world of research and can be a benefit 
to my future career. Moreover, this process has helped me to discover my own strengths 
and weaknesses and further appreciate my own potential.  
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Appendix A: The performance measurement systems 
in SOEs 
 
Appendix A-1: The SOE’s  performance measurement systems in SOEs 
 
The  SOEs’   performance  measurement   system (PMS) has been employed since 1995.  
The main objectives of introducing this system were to switch the focus of control from 
operational control to results-based control and to enhance operational efficiency of 
SOEs (Thailand Cabinet Office, 1995). Also in 1995, the Thai Cabinet appointed a 
Performance Agreement Committee, chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Finance, to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the system 
(Luangnual, 2010).  Since then, the PMS has been developed continuously by State 
Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) in collaboration with other government organizations.  
For example, the Economics Valued Added Indicator and the State Enterprise 
Performance Appraisal (adapted from the criteria of Malcolm Baldrige National Quality 
Award) were introduced in 2006 and 2008 respectively (SEPO, 2008).   
 
In addition, in 2004, SEPO introduced an SOE corporate governance system by 
adopting a system consistent with that employed by Public Limited Companies (SEPO, 
2008). In this system, board members are selected by shareholders and the chief 
executive appointed by the board. SEPO also set up a Good Enterprise System to 
monitor  SOEs’  governance.  Such system has been integrated with the SOE performance 
agreement system in order to assess SOE performance.  
 
Recently, PMS are growing in importance to the Thai Government, as they help to 
evaluate   and   improve  SOE  performance  as  well  as   to  monitor   the  SOEs’ government 
policy-based projects (SEPO, 2012).   
 
The PMS used in SOEs can be categorized into two groups: with and without SEPA. 
The  first  group’s  PMS is based on the required KPIs as shown in the table below. 
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Table A-1.1: The SOE’s  performance indicators and their weighted 
Key Performance Indicators Listed SOE 
(weighted) 
Non-Listed SOE 
(Weighted) 
Note 
Government policy-based 
projects  
 
Not measured 20% (+/- 10%) Depending on each 
organisational context  and 
some indicators are used 
across SOEs 
Operations 
 
65% 45% (+/- 10%) Depending on each 
organisational context but 
based on Statement of 
Directions and vision of 
individual SOE 
- Financial  
 
EVA, ROA, profitability 
ratios, human productivity, 
cost, debt service coverage 
- Non-financial Utilisation, lost/defect, 
quality of product and 
service. 
Organisational Management 
- Board of Directors 
- Risk Management 
- Internal Control 
- Internal Audit 
- Information System 
Management 
- Humana Resources 
Management 
35% 35% - Common indicators for all 
SOEs 
- Each KPI will have a target 
and criteria set provided by 
Sub-performance 
Assessment Committee 
- Every SOE will be 
assessed using the same 
criteria 
- Generally, MoF will assess 
SOE follow the checklist of 
tasks or reports  
 
 
 
Total 100% 100%  
Source: SEPO (2013)  
Note: The common industry 
 
At the end of the year, the result will be to divide SOEs into 5 groups, depending on 
score: 1.0 (worst performance), 2.0, 3.0 (Normal performance), 4.0 (Good performance) 
and 5.0 (excellent performance).  
 
MOF has employed this PMS to assess SOEs since 1995 with some adjustment in 
indicators and their weights. Even though the SOE PMS has been developed, problems 
still occur.  One of the important problems is that most SOEs use standard Key 
Performance Indicators such as EVA to report their performances only, without 
employing the EVA system in their management system and decision-making process 
(PermBhusi, 2010).  Moreover, other major problems also include the use of some 
standard indicators on various sizes and  types  of  SOEs,  the  linkage  between  the  SOEs’  
performance results with incentive, and the unclear criteria or measurement set forth by 
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the   Thai   government   (PermBhusi,   2010).   From   MOF’s   perspective,   these   problems  
could discourage improvement processes for SOEs as well as affect government 
decisions and actions on SOEs as one of the national economic and social instruments. 
Therefore, SEPA was introduced in 2008. 
 
The second group consists of 19 SOEs, which is divided into group A and Group Ba as 
a pilot project in implementing SEPA. At the beginning, the pilot SOEs have employed 
SEPA parallel with both PMS described in the first group. Both of the case study 
organisations, PWA and POST, are in Group Ba. In 2014, the case study organisations 
have fully employed the SOE’s  PMS.   
 
Table A-1.2: State  enterprise performance appraisal in  group A and Ba 
 
Performance measurement 
system 
Group A Group Ba Note 
SEPA Framework 
Perspective 1 to 6  
 - Leadership 
 - Strategic Planning 
 - Customer and Market focus 
 - Measurement, Analysis and 
Knowledge Management 
 - Workforce focus 
 - Process Management 
 
60% 65%  - Using an adapted criteria from MBNQA 
and Thailand Quality Award 
Result 
Perspective 7 
35% 35% KPIs employed in perspective 7 have been 
adopted from the KPIs in SOE’s  PMS in 
each SOE, which include both financial 
and non-financial KPIs. For example, 
PWA has the quality of treated water as 
KPIs in both SOE’s PMS and SEPA. 
Total 100% 100%  
Source: SEPO (2013)  
 
 
SEPO (2014) explained the similarities and differences between the SOE’s PMS and 
SEPA as follows. Firstly, the performance agreement and its process including the 
negotiation between SOE and Sub performance assessment committee remain the same. 
 
Secondly, SOEs are still assessed and scored between one to five and at the year-end, 
and the score will be used to link with the SOE incentive system. Thirdly, the set of 
KPIs in organisational management and Economic Value Management (EVM) have 
been changed and integrated with SEPA criteria. Lastly, SOEs have to do a self-
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assessment report and organisational analysis report as required in the SEPA system as 
well as submit them together with the proposed set of KPIs. 
 
In this research, SEPA will not be mentioned much because it had only an experimental 
assessment in both of cases study organisations in 2013, which was around the time the 
field research took place.  
 
Other key management tools and standards  
Regarding KPIs of SOE’s  PMS, the implementation of EVM and BSC as well as the 
use of some international standards has been set. This part will briefly discuss the tool 
and standards. Further detail will be presented in the next chapter. 
 
SOEs have been required to employ Economic Value Management (EVM or EVA©) to 
evaluate their performance and have to set up an EVM centre, which is responsible for 
monitoring economic profit, asset utilizations as well as the investment plan in every 
business unit. To implement EVM, the setup of EVM centres follows organisational 
structure, establishing one in every business unit.  The indicators related to EVM are 
economic profit and EVM implementation. Also, MoF requires SOEs to link EVM with 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) in order to create an organisational strategic map and driver 
tree. Many SOEs decided to employ a BSC model across the whole organisation. They 
use BSC to  drill down to the MoF performance measurement targets as well as add 
some other organisational related targets directly to responsible departments in order to 
ensure  that  the  whole  organisational  performance  can  reach    MoF’s    requirement. 
 
Apart from EVM and BSC, SOEs also monitor performance by referring to a variety of 
standards as well as some other guideline such as COSO, COBIT, ISO14001 in the 
information system provided to organisations recommended by the Sub-Performance 
Assessment Committee and MoF.  
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Appendix A-2:  The  SOEs’  performance  measurement  systems in PWA 
 
The Thai government gives each SOE a Statement of Directions (SODs), which is used 
in the negotiation a state of performance agreement with MOF. Most of the individual 
SOE’s  key  performance   indices   in   the  prospective   results  will   be   related   to   the   given  
SODs.  PWA’s  SOD  is  “To   invest   in  an  efficient   treated  water  system  and   to   increase  
water coverage in rural areas, to provide and to develop raw water resources to meet the 
future  demand  as  well   as   to  manage  production  cost  more   efficiently”   (SEPO,  2013).  
From  SOD  and  PWA’s  vision,  the  strategy  map,  which  was  influenced  by  Kaplan  and  
Nortons Balance Scorecard as used in 2013, is shown below. 
Figure A-2.1: Provincial Waterworks Authority’s  strategy  map 
 
Source: PWA performance report (2013) 
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The table below shows the example of KPIs in 2012 and PWA past performance. 
Table A-2.1: Provincial Waterworks Authority’s  KPIs  in  2012 
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tends to evaluate both self-organisational improvement and the improvement measured 
against the other organisations through the SOE award ranking. 
 
Another challenge that currently concerns the board of directors and executive team is 
the transformation process of the current PMS to State Enterprise Performance 
Appraisal System (SEPA), which will fully replace it in 2013. In order to smoothly 
transform, PWA encouraged its staff by promoting the year of SEPA learning in 2011 
(PWA, 2012). As at time this case study research was conducted, PWA is in an 
implementation stage of SEPA and has to employ SEPA parallel with the SOE’s    PMS. 
In 2013, PWA has to evaluate its organisation using SEPA criteria. The results can been 
seen in the table below. 
 
Table A-2.2: Provincial Waterworks Authority’s  SEPA results 
SEPA Framework Perspective Weighted Max. Score Score 
- Leadership  70% 120 42.00 
- Strategic Planning  65% 80 26.00 
- Customer and Market focus 50% 110 27.50 
- Measurement, Analysis and Knowledge Management 60% 80 24.00 
- Workforce focus  60% 100 29.50 
- Process Management 50% 110 27.50 
Total Scores   600 176.5 
Source: Adapted from Provincial Waterworks Authority Organisational performance and self assessment 
report in 2012 (2013) 
 
PWA assisted by MoF had observed and evaluated the above score by comparing the 
PWA actual practices and performance with the SEPA score criteria and guidelines. 
This 2013 score has been used as the base score for the year 2014 onwards to identify 
the improvement of PWA in the above six perspectives. Later on in 2014 the result-
based performance will be added as a seventh perspective that has employed some of 
the operation KPIs to assess PWA actual performance.  
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Appendix A-3: The SOE’s  performance  measurement  systems  in  POST 
 
Similar to PWA, the Thai government provides SODs for POST following its statement 
as   “National   service   provider   in   postal   services   and  Logistics   network   for   parcel   and  
goods distributions which can compare with   international   standards.”   From   the   SOD  
and  POST’s  vision,  the  strategy  map  used  in  2013  is  shown  below. 
 
Figure A-3.1: Thailand Post’s strategy map 
 
Source: Thai POST performance report (2013) 
 
The table below shows the example of KPIs in 2012 and POST past performance. 
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Table A-3.1: Thailand Post’s KPIs in 2012 
 
Source: Adapted from Thailand Post performance report  (2012) and Organisational performance and self 
assessment report in 2012 (2013) 
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Similar to PWA, POST as a pilot organisation in Group Ba has employed SEPA and 
done self-assessment in 2013. In 2014, POST has fully adopted the system in its 
organisation. The 2013 results can be seen in the table below. 
 
Table A-3.2: Thailand Post’s  SEPA results 
SEPA Framework Perspective Weighted Max. Score Score 
- Leadership  70% 120 41.50 
- Strategic Planning  65% 80 12.00 
- Customer and Market focus 50% 110 55.50 
- Measurement, Analysis and knowledge Management 60% 80 20.00 
- Workforce focus  60% 100 35.00 
- Process Management 50% 110 44.00 
Total Scores   600 208.00 
Source: Adapted from Thailand Post Organisational performance and self assessment report in 2012 
(2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
267 
 
Appendix B: Case study organisations 
 
Appendix B-1: The literature of water and postal sectors 
 
 
Water Sector  
Over the past three decades, the reform of infrastructure sectors such as water and 
wastewater, electricity, and telecommunications has gained attention from governments 
worldwide (Abbott et al., 2011). The reforms encouraged competition and increased 
economic efficiency. According to Abbott et al. (2011), reform of the water sector is 
needed to enhance environmental and quality standards, and provide affordable and 
drinkable water to consumers. Consequently, literature on the water sector focused on 
implications of water reform, measuring productivity and efficiency performance, and 
capital efficiency. Most research in the sector concerns developed countries. For 
example, research on developed countries (Abbott et al., 2012; Carvalho et al., 2012; 
Pollitt and Steer, 2012; Abbott et al. 2011; Allan, 2006) and Latin America (Ferro et al., 
2011; Corton and Berg, 2009) is extensive, with much less research concentrating on 
developing countries.  
 
To understand the water sector, it is important to recognize its structure. According to 
Abbott and Cohen (2009, p. 234), Saal et al. (2011), and Pollitt and Steer (2012), the 
water  supply  chain  consists  of:  ‘bulk  water  collection  and  storage,  bulk  water  transfer,  
water treatment, water distribution, sewerage collection distribution  and  treatment’,  and  
other potential activities such as drainage and irrigation. Marques (2010) and Abbott et 
al. (2012) argue that the water sector requires a very capital-intensive network structure 
to distribute water supplies to consumers. Due to economies of scale of water supply 
and the expense of duplication, a single provider is more efficient than several providers 
are, and thus water services are natural monopolies. Abbott et al. (2011, p. 116) state 
that due to monopoly and quasi-monopoly statuses, and evolving issues such as water 
quality, environment, and water management and planning, it is difficult to evaluate 
water utility performance. Due to the distortion of market power, use of traditional 
financial indicators such as profit-based indicators to assess waterworks performance 
becomes problematic (Abbott and Cohen, 2009; Abbott et al., 2011). Herrala et al. 
(2012) confirm that due to the complexity of dimensions of waterworks, it is difficult to 
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define   an   entity’s   efficiency   and  obtain results that can be compared adequately with 
similar entities.  
 
According to Reynaud and Thomas (2013), in the utility sector, profitability has 
become an important concept for operators when servicing and delivering a product. 
The authors demonstrate that the profitability concept in this sector is complicated and 
difficult to measure because operator profitability is not reliant on internal decisions 
such as investment and optimisation of production alone, but on external circumstances 
such as economic and environmental regulations.  
 
Palme and Tillman (2008) demonstrate increased use of benchmark indicators in the 
water sector. Consistent with Walter et al. (2009), recently, use of water benchmarks is 
increasing, especially water distribution indicators used commonly worldwide. 
According   to   Carvalho   et   al.   (2012),   most   benchmark   studies   assess   operators’  
performance based on production or cost estimates. In benchmark studies, researchers 
employ various economic ratios to measure and compare operators’  performance  such  
as relative profit models and shareholder return models in Ogden and Watson (1999), 
operating cost per connection and operating cost per cubic meter in Corton and Berg 
(2009), and average revenue in property constant in Abbot et al. (2011). According to 
Abbott and Cohen (2009), the issues mentioned above – monopoly power, water-sector 
reform, and its regulation – persuaded   researchers   to   study   the   water   sector’s  
productivity and performance further. Carvalho et al. (2012) state that the literature in 
this field includes examinations of economies of scope, economies of scale, economies 
of density, determinations of ownership, and various other efficiency factors to measure 
performance.  
 
Marques (2010) argues that besides economic regulation, service quality is also an 
important aspect that needs to be considered. Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008) state that 
studies of water utilities focus primarily on measuring performance using various 
techniques, but most disregard the quality dimension because a water utility devotes its 
resources to improving quantity instead of quality. Although some papers introduce the 
quality dimension, it is not a centre point of research. Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008) argue 
that quality measures provide useful information to operators and policymakers, and 
lack of quality can be a result of bad performance. Service-quality measures employed 
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in the water sector vary from country to country, depending on government policies, 
regulations, and customer perspectives (Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2008). Holt (2005, p. 192) 
suggests,  ‘Measuring  quality  of  service  is  complicated  by  the  multi-dimensional nature 
attributes.’  The  optimum  degree  of  service  quality  is  difficult  to  define  due  to  conflicts  
with costs of service improvement (Holt, 2005).  
 
Franceys and Gerlach (2011) argue that in natural-monopoly industries such as water, 
improvements to products corresponding to customer needs appear absent. The 
consensus regarding the water sector is that it could be more efficient and customer 
oriented   (Abbott   et   al.,   2012).   To   protect   customers’   interests,   regulators   and  
governments participate with consumers by providing a communication channel or 
setting up a customer-service committee because consumer involvement is an important 
aspect of water-service regulation (Franceys and Gerlach, 2011), and to develop 
performance measurements on service quality, including customer service (Franceys 
and Gerlach, 2011; Marques, 2010; Ogden and Clarke, 2005).  
 
Literature concerning customer-service indicators in the water sector focuses primarily 
on reform, especially in the United Kingdom (Ogden and Watson, 1999; Ogden and 
Clarke, 2005). According to Ogden and Watson (1999), in the case of England and 
Wales’  water  sector,  operator  performance  reports  by  Ofwat have also been used by the 
city and analysts. Although they were concerned primarily with financial and economic 
performance, customer service indicators were used to enhance analyses of the 
successfulness of operators and managerial competence. 
 
Water supply is a consumer good, and water quality relates highly with public health 
issues  (Marques,  2010;;  Palme  and  Tillman,  2008).  Many  countries’  regulators  develop  
a public obligation in health regulation comprised of service standards for an operator 
to fulfil or to which to commit (Marques, 2010). In many cases, indicators of the quality 
of treated and drinking water are also provided to ensure operator conformance to strict 
quality standards (Marques, 2010). Improvements to service quality and environmental 
regulation normally require extra investment, and as a result, reductions in returns are 
expected (Saal and Parker, 2001). 
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Among the number of quality measurements in water utilities, researchers employ water 
loss rates or unaccounted-for water or leakages as a proxy of the quality of water 
service (Lin; 2005; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008; Gonzalez-Gomez et al., 2012). Picazo-
Tadeo et al. (2008) show that water loss rates relate highly to efficiency in Spain and 
Brazil (Tupper and Resender, 2004) because high volumes of water losses require 
operators to spend more on water supply and purification (Gonzalez-Gomez et al., 
2012). The reasons behind water losses include high repair costs (Gracia and Thomas, 
2001), lack of resources (Soler, 2003), and other physical network issues such as the 
age of networks and sudden changes in pressure (Gonzales-Gomez (2012). Picazo-
Tadeo et al. (2008) point out that reducing water loss is an opportunity cost of the 
resource. Water shortages due to climate change and inefficient water management also 
cause operators and regulators to consider water loss issues seriously. 
 
Vilanova  et  al.  (2015,  p.  9)  reviewed  studies,  concluding  that  the  ‘sustainability  PMS  in  
the   water   supply   utilities’   consists   of   measures   from   three   dimensions – economics, 
social, and environments – where the set of KPIs and their targets should be based on 
organisational strategic goals and objectives. KPIs should lead an organisation to 
improve the use of resources and services. 
 
Postal Sector  
Over the last two decades, the postal sector has been liberalized in many countries 
(Iturralde and Quiros, 2008; Cremer et al., 2011; Fillippini and Koller, 2012), especially 
in the EU. The fully liberalized sector has increased postal market competition (Cremer 
et al., 2011). Other developed countries such as the United States and Switzerland still 
regulate postal delivery services, and reserve some delivery services, respectively, 
while allowing open competition for other services (Cremer et al., 2011; Fillippini and 
Koller, 2012). Hence, postal services in many countries still preserve monopoly power 
regarding some services. Accordingly, a regulatory framework, including price control, 
has been required to meet customer needs and service standards (Cremer et al., 2011). 
The emergence of new technologies such as the internet, expansion of globalisation, 
and environment initiatives and social responsibility has accelerated pressure for the 
postal sector to change its services and management (Borenstein and Becker, 2004; 
Zairi, 2000; Bravo, 1995). According to Fillippini and Koller (2012), to overcome 
changes to regulation, technology, and competition, postal reforms aim to improve 
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performance in both product innovation and service quality, and retain minimum or 
reserved services for citizens at affordable prices (Rodriguez and Storer, 2000). 
However, a literature review from Iturralde and Quiros (2008) shows that following the 
liberalisation of the postal sector, empirical research has indicated that efficiency 
assessments of the consequences remain limited. 
 
Recently, the postal sector not only offers post services as it has in the past, it is 
expanding into courier, freight, and e-services (Chan et al., 2006). Regarding the 
emergence of new technologies, a decrease in household demand (Hong and Wolak, 
2008) and pessimistic economics have been expected, so a need for change 
management  is  required  to  enhance  the  sector’s  competitiveness  and  market-orientation, 
and to consider more of what customers want (Chan et al., 2006). According to Bourne 
and Haddon (2010), although changes to the commercial nature of the postal sector and 
its substitutes have been an issue of concern, some market opportunities have been 
created such as an increase in internet shopping. Developments of this type require a 
trustworthy delivery service that is determined not only by price, but also by other 
quality factors (Gouvea et al., 2001) and improved of delivery services using the new 
communication technologies (Balogh et al. 2006). 
 
In recent decades, a number of studies of cost efficiency measurement in network 
industries such as water and energy have appeared, but few studies exist on the postal 
sector, though some research includes measurement of production efficiency due to 
similar natures (Filippini and Koller, 2012). Most research focuses on the U.K. postal 
sector, including Moriarty et al. (2006) and Homcastle et al. (2006), both of which use 
the same cross-sectional data of the delivery offices of Royal Mail. Visco Comandini et 
al. (2010) explain that one objective of using cost efficiency is to define how much 
financial support should be provided for universal service obligations (USO). Filippini 
and Koller (2012) point out that information acquired from cost efficiency is useful to 
policymakers and postal providers to increase liberalisation and be more competitive. 
 
According to Chan et al. (2006) regarding liberalisation and a rise in competition, to 
enhance competitiveness, many findings suggest that benchmarking helps postal 
providers assess their position in the sector, measure performance, and identify areas of 
improvement. Chan et al. (2006) employed the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to 
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explain the measurement system of the postal sector and list criteria and sub-criteria 
that influence postal providers (Table 2.2). 
 
Table B-1.1: Criteria and sub-criteria that influence postal providers 
Criteria Sub-Criteria 
Reliability On time delivery, Accuracy, Security 
Lead time Customer response time, Processing time, Queuing time 
Convenience Post Office, Drop box, Operation hours, Item collection, Stamp 
selling, Payment method, Delivering coverage 
Flexibility Labour, Machine, Process, Volume, Access, Sorting, Delivery 
routing, Mix, Launch 
Cost Manufacturing, Item carrying, Storage, Distribution 
Return on Assets Operation margin, Turnover 
Relationship Customer, Employee, Partner 
Innovativeness New service, New technology 
Source: Adapted from Chan et al. (2006) 
 
Chan et al. (2006) point out that these criteria help postal providers create rating and 
measurement standards that can be modified to suit individual providers. In an 
empirical study of postal sectors in 16 OECD countries, Perelman and Pestieau (1994) 
argue  that  by  benchmarking  a  postal  provider’s  performance,  some indicators of slack 
performance might not determine individual management insufficiency because they 
may relate to differences in geography and institutions among countries. They also 
point out that most literature on postal performance relates to service quality, centring 
on lead-time of delivery measures. Balogh et al. (2006) support the idea that the centre 
of attention of regulation of service quality is on delivery within time targets and 
regulated standards. For example, in the United Kingdom, most service quality 
indicators for Royal Mail are also based on a percentage of achievement of mail 
delivery within a target time (Postal Service Commission, 2012; GAO, 2006).  Not all 
such services are measured in time delivery; in the United States, some services such as 
standard mail and package services without tracking are not evaluated in this way 
(GAO, 2006). 
 
This literature review provides key activities and PMS of related sectors. These help 
researchers understand characteristics and services of each sector better, and how each 
sector focuses on PMS or setting KPIs.  
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Appendix B-2: Provincial Waterworks Authority 
 
Provincial Waterworks Authority (PWA) is the first case study of this thesis. This 
section starts off by giving an overview of the Water sector in Thailand with emphasis 
on State Owned Enterprises. Next, a background of PWA, which includes key financial 
figures, organisational structure and PMS, is presented. 
 
1. Water sector 
To gain insight into PWA, a brief background of the water sector in Thailand needs to 
be mentioned. This thesis has emphasized aspects of sector structure and reforms that 
are focused on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  
 
1.1 Overview 
According to SEPO (2013), the Thai government announced a statement of direction 
for   SOEs   in   the   water   sector   as   follows:   “To   serve   the   fundamental   demand   and  
improve citizens’  quality  of   life   as  well   as  maximise   the  utilisation  of  SOEs’   assets.”      
Recently, there are 3 SOEs in Thailand in the water and wastewater businesses: the 
Metropolitan Waterworks Authority (MWA), the Provincial Waterworks Authority 
(PWA), and the Wastewater Management Authority (WMA). Water supply and 
distribution systems in Thailand are mostly covered by two SOEs. The MWA produces 
and distributes treated water to urban areas, while the PWA provides treated water for 
rural areas. The activities of both MWA and PWA do not include sewerage businesses. 
There are also municipal and private water companies, which can be consider as PWA 
competitors. Both MWA and PWA are SOEs under Ministry of Interior (MoI).  WMA 
is an SOE under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE). The 
WMA has been founded for the intention of managing and educating rural 
municipalities in wastewater  treatment;  however, in reality WMA has not yet invested 
in any sewage treatment plants due to the lack of financial resources. It now works only 
as a management team under municipality contracts. In addition, five years ago, MOF 
had proposed MNRE to reconsider the existence of WMA but it had been rejected. 
Due to the economies of scale of water supply and the expense of duplication, a single 
provider is more efficient than several providers, thus water service can be considered 
as a natural monopoly.  In Thailand, the natural monopoly can be seen. Apart from 
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PWA and MWA, the other key water providers are local municipalities and sanitary 
districts, which are under the flexible control of MoI and village-own operated water 
systems. Some areas of responsibility of PWA and local municipalities can overlap. In 
this case, local municipalities can decide to provide the water services themselves or 
ask PWA to do so.  
1.2 Efforts to corporatize the water sector in Thailand 
In 2004, the Thai government failed to corporatize SOEs in the water sector and was 
prevented from founding a Water Regulator due to strong protests from the labour 
unions. Corporatization in the Thai context means a transformation process from a 
government entity into a 100% government-owned company that has to operate under 
the Commercial Law. At that time, the protest against water sector corporatization was 
started due to the fear that the Thai government might take further action by listing 
SOEs on the Thai stock exchange market and reducing its ownership to less than 50%.  
At present, the water sector has been regulated by a number of government agencies 
and committees, which sometimes create conflict of interest amongst themselves. In 
addition, some consultants hired by the Thai government claimed that a water 
bureaucracy in Thailand causes inefficient performance such as poor service standards, 
poor water quality and excessive operating costs (Tasman, 2000 and NERA, 2005). 
Therefore, the Thai government needs to re-organize the water sector and its related 
agencies’  structures.  However,  until  now,   there  has  been  no  significant  change   in   this  
sector. 
Regarding the failure of water sector corporatisation in Thailand mentioned before, in 
order to be more efficient, SOEs in this sector have been required to improve their 
efficiency, productivity, distribution of water supply, and customer satisfaction as well 
as to fulfil individual stakeholder requirements. Many management tools are required to 
overcome these obstacles and one of them is a PMS, which was introduced by Ministry 
of Finance (MoF). 
1.3 Key Financial Data 
The Thailand water sector still requires massive incremental capital investments, which 
need to be well-managed, as well as an adequate policy for setting water tariffs 
balanced between commercial activity and social activity (SEPO, 2010). Nonetheless, 
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the lack of an economic regulatory body in Thailand makes it difficult for operators as 
well as the Thai government to set up a water tariff structure. Recently, operators have 
been authorized to set their own tariff; however, operators that are SOEs also take 
political issues as well as other government agencies’   suggestions   into   their  
consideration. 
The water sector key data are shown in the table below. 
 
Table B-2.1: The water sector’s key data 
Key Data 
(As of September, 2014) 
Unit 
State-Owned Enterprises 
MWA PWA WMA 
Assets Million Baht 63,268 89,226 189 
Liabilities Million Baht 11,920 56,479 101 
Equity Million Baht 51,348 32,747 88 
     
Employee  4,046 7,241 127 
Water Coverage Area  Sq.km 2,519 5,831 NA 
Water Sales Million cu.m. 1,350 1,119 NA 
Water Loss Rate Per cent 23.39 28.53 NA 
Source: Annual Report 2012 of MWA, PWA and WMA and State Enterprise Reviews of MWA, PWA and MWA 
Note:  1. The exchange rate is approximately 55 Baht per Pound Sterling (as of September 2015) 
 2. The accounting calendar starts from 1st October to 30th September 
 
1.4 Other key issues 
In the Thai water sector, there is no research or clear evidence on the advantage of 
economy of scale. However, the merit of economies of density in the water sector has 
been mentioned by some participants in the interviews by pointing out that MWA’s  
profit  margin  is  far  better  than  PWA’s.   
 
It is clear that the Thai water sector has not evolved in economies of scope since the big 
two operators, MWA and PWA, are only in the water supply and distribution business 
as mentioned above, while sewerage management is operated by Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration and local municipalities, and is free of charge. The small players in this 
field such as Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) may also do sewerage 
businesses together with water supply, which may help in cost reduction. However, the 
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concept of pay per pollution had been mentioned on various occasions in a plan to 
charge the sewerage cost though water operators. 
 
  
2. Provincial Waterworks Authority 
According to the problem above, the study of SOEs in the water sector can help the 
researcher better understand the PMS field.   In   this   research,   Thailand’s   Provincial  
Waterworks Authority (PWA) is selected as a case study. 
2.1 Organizational context 
PWA was established on 28th February 1979, in accordance with the Provincial 
Waterworks Authority Act 1979, to provide a proper water supply system for Thai 
people in 74 provinces across the country.  
The   PWA   vision   is:   “PWA   shall   be   a   good   organization   with   high   efficiency   in  
providing full access to standard drinking water supply service to population throughout 
the   country”   (PWA,   2012).      The   PWA  mission   is   ‘is   an   agency   providing   the  water  
supply service in accordance with the government policy, with a main consideration of 
people’s  hygiene’.   
PWA key activities are as follows: water collection and storage, water treatment and 
water distribution. At present, PWA head office is located in Bangkok and there are 231 
waterworks, which are located across the country. 
2.2 Organisational Structure 
With more than three decades of experience and about 7,241 workers, the PWA 
organisational structure consists of 68 people at the executive level, 1,404 people at the 
management level and 5,769 people at the operational level (PWA, 2012).  Nearly fifty 
per cent of the employees are educated below the undergraduate level. In its 
organisational   structure,   PWA’s   top  managerial   positions   include   one   governor,   eight  
deputy governors, nine assistant governors and 12 directors, which are 10 regional 
directors and 2 division directors who supervise twenty-five departments such as 
Administration, Operation one to ten, Plan and strategies, Finance and accounting, Risk 
281 
 
management, Technical Affairs, Information Technology, Legal Affairs and Private 
Sector Participation (PWA, 2012).  
 
2.3 Financial data 
The PWA key financial data are as follows,  
 
Table B-2.2: Provincial Waterworks Authority’s  key financial data 
Source:  PWA annual report 2013 and 2014 and State Enterprise Review 2014 by SEPO  
 
Considering the operating income structure of each regional office, the revenue consists 
of revenue from water sales, revenue from services and net revenue from pipeline and 
connection installation; major expenditures are from material cost, depreciation and the 
allocation cost from the head office. The assets accumulate based on the assets of each 
waterworks and regional office itself. The operational versus capital expenditure is 
approximately 0.5 times and employee expenditure is 3,223 million baht in 2014.  
 
One of the water sector characteristics is the intensive capital investment in the water 
treatment  and  distribution  system.    PWA’s  long-term plan has been to invest more than 
thirteen thousand baht in fifty-nine projects from 2010 to 2014 (PWA, 2010).  
 
The sources of funds are from issued bonds or loans, government subsidy and PWA 
owned operation cash flow of which the approximate respective proportions are fifty 
per cent, thirty-eight and twelve per cent (PWA, 2010). As mentioned before, a major 
Unit: Million Baht 
Key Financial Data(1) 
Fiscal Year (October –September) 
2012 2013 2014 
Assets 81,798 87,906 89,226 
Liabilities 55,036 58,050 56,479 
Equity 26,762 29.856 32,747 
    
Revenue 22,749 26,956 27,608 
Expense 18,720 20,495 21,829 
Net Profit 4,029 6,462 5,778 
    
Subsidy(2) 1,004 1,238 1,408 
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drawback of the improvement of water sector in Thailand is the fragmented state of 
policy formulation and implementation in relation to the water sector. For instance, due 
to the lack of a water regulatory body, there are no clear guidelines for the 
implementation of a tariff setting. It is claimed by PWA that its recent tariffs cannot be 
set on a commercial basis, which leads to the other problems such as lack of funds and 
delayed schedule of investment plan. Consequently, the Thai government subsidises 
PWA for its investment in social project each year. From the investment plan and 
strategic plan, the researcher can conclude that due to the inadequate cost allocation in 
the accounting system, as well as the absence of a master investment plan approved by 
the Thai government (PWA normally submitted three to four year plans to the 
government), it is difficult for both sides, the government and PWA, to conclude the 
long-term investment plan and the needed amount of subsidy. As a result, the Thai 
government ends up subsidising PWA based on some of its projects every year. The 
government subsidy is treated as one of the revenue items in the income statement. 
 
The other example of a policy problem is that the former Thai government had forced 
PWA to be more participating with the private sector by doing thirty-year contracts, 
such as Build-owned-operate-transfer (BOOT) deals. According to the State enterprise 
review 2014 by SEPO, while technically excellent, some of the BOOT projects have 
not been financially satisfactory and according to the contract structure, PWA was left 
with contingent liabilities. Moreover, the requirement of investing in water pipelines 
and other infrastructure to non-commercial areas as well as the inadequate subsidy from 
the Thai government, PWA has relied more on liabilities as a major source of funds. In 
conclusion, both tariff structures and government policy affect PWA profitability and 
financial structure.  
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We derived the key characteristics of PWA from secondary data and literature on the 
water sector. It can be summarised and shown in the table below.  
Table B-2.3: Provincial Waterworks Authority’s  key characteristics 
Provincial Waterworks Authority Note 
Ownership 100% owned by Thai 
government 
 
Line Ministry Ministry of Interior  
Regular Body No No official regulator 
organisations. Any 
operation or investment 
that might affect the Thai 
citizens has to be 
approved by the cabinet. 
Corporatisation No  
Privatisation No  
Sector characteristic Capital intensive Derived from water sector 
literature  
Company size Large-sized Compared with the other 
SOEs 
Core product Treated water supply and 
distribution 
PWA (2013) 
Subsidy from government Yes State enterprise review by 
SEPO 
Financial structure High leverage State enterprise review by 
SEPO 
Revenue tax responsibility No Not under the commercial 
law 
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Appendix B-3: Thailand Post 
 
 
Over several decades, despite the advance of Information Technology and its 
substitution for traditional postal services, Thailand Post has played a vital role as a 
basic   communication   approach   in   strengthening   Thailand’s   economy   and   society.  
Thailand Post and CAT Telecom Co. Ltd. were originally a part of the Communication 
Authority of Thailand and were corporatized on August 14, 2003 with 100% ownership 
by Ministry of Finance. However, it is still under supervision from Ministry of 
Information and Communication   Technology.   Thailand   Post’s   vision   is   “To   be   the  
leader in postal business through a comprehensive, convenient, quality network that can 
always   be   relied   on   to   serve   the   need   of  Thai   people”.  Thailand  Post   has   defined   its  
market into four businesses as follows: postal business, logistics business, retail 
business and finance business. Only the postal market has been regulated by the Postal 
Service   Commission,   which   is   responsible   to   determine   ‘the   authorities,   rights   and  
benefits  of  Thailand  Post’  (MICT, 2010).  
 
Organisational Structure 
Thailand  Post’s  head  office  is  located  in  Bangkok  and  there  are  1,163  branches  across  
country with 22,616 workers and 3,354 licensed postal services. According to Thailand 
Post (2012), due to the uniqueness of Thailand postal market as well as to the 
differences   of   each   country’s   fundamental   structure,   it   is   difficult   to   define   both  
domestic and international benchmarking organizations.   
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Financial data 
The POST key financial data are as follows.  
 
Table B-3.1: Thailand Post’s  key financial data 
Source:  POST annual report 2013 and 2014 and State Enterprise Review  2014 by SEPO 
Note:  1. The exchange rate is approximately 55 Baht per Pound Sterling (as of September 2015) 
2. The accounting calendar runs from 1st January to 31th December 
 
Due to the tariff set by the Postal Commission on letter delivery (3 baht per letter), the 
mainstream of revenue comes from wholesale customers and other services such as 
special delivery including registered mail, EMS and parcel for which the price is not 
restricted. Due to the highly competitive market, POST plans to expand its business by 
investing in a logistics hub (POST, 2013). However, the plan has been suspended 
because some government agencies think that it may be against constitutional law that 
prohibits state agency from commercialising in an area that the private sector is good at 
(Interview record: A1_011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unit: Million Baht 
Key Financial Data 
Fiscal Year (October –September) 
2012 2013 2014 
Assets 19,101 20,217 22,496 
Liabilities 8,755 8,054 9,508 
Equity 10,346 12,163 12,988 
    
Revenues 18,257 19,392 21,790 
Expenses (16,559) (17,751) (19,414) 
Revenue tax (563) (416) (581) 
Net Profit 1,135 1,224 1,795 
    
Subsidy 0 0 0 
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We derived the key characteristics of POST from secondary data and literature on the 
postal sector. It can be summarised and shown on the table below.  
 
Table B-3.2: Thailand Post’s  key characteristics 
Thailand Post Note 
Ownership 100% owned by Thai 
government 
 
Line Ministry Ministry of Information and 
Communication 
Technology 
 
Regular Body Yes Postal Commission 
Corporatisation Yes  
Privatisation No  
Sector characteristic Labour intensive Derived from postal sector 
literature  
Company size Large-sized Comparing with the other 
SOEs 
Core product Postal services, 
communication and retailed 
POST (2013) 
Subsidy from government No State enterprise review by 
SEPO 
Financial structure Low leverage State enterprise review by 
SEPO 
Revenue tax responsibility Yes Under the Commercial 
law 
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Appendix C: Case Study Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Appendix C-1: Information sheet for interviewing participants 
 
The  Development  of  State  Owned  Enterprise’s  Performance  Measurement  
Systems 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Purpose: 
The aim of this research is to examine the development of State-Owned  Enterprises’  
(SOEs) performance measurement systems. The research will investigate relevant 
information about Thailand as the case study context for the research. Firstly, the  
research will investigate the Thai economy and deal with importance of SOEs in 
Thailand.  Next   the  development  of  SOEs’  performance  measurement   systems  will   be  
examined. Finally, the investigation will turn to the involvement of government, 
regulators, and SOEs in performance measurement policies and strategies. All of these 
are necessary background for the assessment of policy and intervention in relation to 
performance measurement development to better understand the performance 
measurement situation in Thailand.  
 
Data Collection and Confidentiality: 
The  interviews  will  be  digitally  recorded  and  will  concern  the  participants’  view  of  the  
development of SOE performance measurement systems and the involvement of 
stakeholders in SOE performance measurement policies and strategies. The data 
provided by participants will contribute to the understanding of the development of 
performance   measurement   systems   in   general   and   the   participant’s   organisation  
specifically. It will also help the researcher to enhance her interpretations of what 
different stakeholders perceive about the success and failure of performance 
measurement systems. The interviews will be coded to keep participant identity 
separate from the data.  The researcher will not use participant names in the research 
output without permission. Therefore, if participants want to remain anonymous, the 
researcher will quote verbatim anything said using a pseudonym (e.g. Officer 1, 
Manager 1). 
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As part of the requirements for the academic audit of the research, the data from the 
interview will be stored on secure computers for a period of 5 years. Participant 
information, i.e. original identity and the assigned code or pseudonym, will be stored 
electronically in a separate password-protected file that is only accessible by my 
supervisors and me. 
 
Output:  
To present the findings at conferences and in academic publications 
 
Participant rights: 
Participants  may choose not to participate in this research, or may refuse to answer any 
question, retract any comment or the whole of the interview. 
Participants may ask questions to clarify any further points about the study and I will be 
happy to send you a soft copy of the report through email. 
 
The researcher can be contacted as follows: 
Principal Researcher: 
Natnipha Luangsomboon 
Doctoral Researcher 
Finance and Accounting Group 
Aston Business School 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
Email: luangson@aston.ac.uk 
Mobile: +44(0)7932699576 
 
Research Supervisors: 
 
Prof. Alan Lowe 
Finance and Accounting Group 
Aston Business School 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
Email: a.d.lowe@aston.ac.uk  
Tel: +44(0)121 204 3370 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Stuart Cooper 
Finance and Accounting Group 
Aston Business School 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
Email: s.m.cooper@aston.ac.uk 
Tel: +44(0)1212043065
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The  Development  of  State  Owned  Enterprise’s  Performance  Measurement  
Systems 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Purpose: 
The aim of this research is to examine the development of State-Owned  Enterprises’  
(SOEs) performance measurement systems. The research will investigate relevant 
information about Thailand as the case study context for the research. Firstly, the  
research will investigate the Thai economy and deal with importance of SOEs in 
Thailand. Next the development  of  SOEs’  performance  measurement   systems  will   be  
examined. Finally, the investigation will turn to the involvement of government, 
regulators, and SOEs in performance measurement policies and strategies. All of these 
are necessary background for the assessment of policy and intervention in relation to 
performance measurement development to better understand the performance 
measurement situation in Thailand.  
 
จุดประสงค์ในการทาํวิจัย 
การวิจัยครัÊงนีÊมีวตถุประสงค์เพืÉอศึกษาการพัฒนาของระบบประเมินผลในรัฐวิสาหกจิในประเทศไทย  
ทัÊงนีÊ   การวิจัยจะประกอบไปด้วย   
1. การศึกษาระบบเศรษฐกจิ  และความสาํคัญของรัฐวิสาหกิจในประเทศไทย 
2. การศึกษาพัฒนาการระบบประเมินผลรัฐวิสาหกจิ 
3. ความสาํคัญของหน่วยงานทีÉเกีÉยวข้องกบัรัฐวิสาหกจิ   ในด้านนโยบาย   กลยุทธ ์  และระบบ
ประเมินผล 
 
Data Collection and Confidentiality: 
The  interviews  will  be  digitally  recorded  and  will  concern  the  participants’  view  of  the  
development of SOE performance measurement systems and the involvement of 
stakeholders in SOE performance measurement policies and strategies. The data 
provided by participants will contribute to the understanding of the development of 
performance   measurement   systems   in   general   and   the   participant’s   organisation  
specifically. It will also help the researcher to enhance her interpretations of what 
different stakeholders perceive about the success and failure of performance 
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measurement systems. The interviews will be coded to keep participant identity 
separate from the data.  The researcher will not use participant names in the research 
output without permission. Therefore, if participants want to remain anonymous, the 
researcher will quote verbatim anything said using a pseudonym (e.g. Officer 1, 
Manager 1). 
As part of the requirements for the academic audit of the research, the data from the 
interview will be stored on secure computers for a period of 5 years. Participant 
information, i.e. original identity and the assigned code or pseudonym, will be stored 
electronically in a separate password-protected file that is only accessible by my 
supervisors and me. 
 
การเกบ็ข้อมูลและการรักษาข้อมูล 
การสมัภาษณ์มุ่งเน้นทศันะคติของผู้ให้สมัภาษณ์ในเรืÉองระบบประเมินผลรัฐวิสาหกจิ   และผู้มีส่วน
เกีÉยวข้องหรือหน่วยงานทีÉเกีÉยวข้องในการจัดทาํนโยบายและกลยุทธ์ทีÉเกีÉยวกบัระบบประเมินผลทัÊง
ในภาพรวมของระบบประเมินผลทีÉกาํหนดโดยภาครัฐและระบบประเมินผลภายในองค์กรของ
รัฐวิสาหกจิเอง 
 
ข้อมูลส่วนบุคคลทัÊงหมดจะถูกจัดเข้ารหัส   และจัดเกบ็แยกจากข้อมูลการสมัภาษณ์   เพืÉอป้องกนัการ
รัÉวไหลของข้อมูล   ทัÊงนีÊ    ยกเว้นจะได้รับอนุญาต   ผู้วิจัยจะไม่ระบุชืÉอผู้ให้สมัภาษณ์ในเอกสารการวิจัย  
แต่จะใช้นามแฝงในการอ้างองิข้อมูล  เช่น  ผู้จัดการ  1, พนักงาน 1 เป็นต้น 
 
ทัÊงนีÊ   ข้อมูลการทาํวิจัยจะถูกเกบ็ไว้ในฐานข้อมูลเป็นระยะเวลา  5 ปึ  เนืÉองจากเป็นข้อกาํหนดของทาง
มหาวิทยาลัย   อย่างไรกต็ามข้อมูลดังกล่าวจะถูกทาํการเข้ารหัส   ซึÉงจะมีเพียงนักวิจัย   และอาจารย์ทีÉ
ปรึกษา  ทีÉสามารถเข้าถึงข้อมูลได้ 
 
Output:  
To present the findings at conferences and in academic publications 
 
ผลลัพธ์ 
การนาํเสนอผลการวิจัยต่อสาธารณะ 
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Participant rights: 
Participants  may choose not to participate in this research, or may refuse to answer any 
question, retract any comment or the whole of the interview. 
Participants may ask questions to clarify any further points about the study and I will be 
happy to send you a soft copy of the report through email. 
 
สทิธิของผู้เข้าร่วมการวิจัย 
ผู้เข้าร่วมการวิจัยสามารถทีÉจะปฏเิสธการให้สัมภาษณ์  ทัÊงบางส่วนหรือทัÊงหมดได้ 
ผู้เข้าร่วมการวิจัยสามารถถามคาํถาม  รวมถึงความคืบหน้าของการวิจัย  ต่อนักวิจัยได้   
 
The researcher can be contacted as follows: 
Principal Researcher: 
 
Natnipha Luangsomboon 
Doctoral Researcher 
Finance and Accounting Group 
Aston Business School 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
Email: luangson@aston.ac.uk 
Mobile: +44(0)7932699576 
 
Research Supervisors: 
 
Prof. Alan Lowe 
Finance and Accounting Group 
Aston Business School 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
Email: a.d.lowe@aston.ac.uk  
Tel: +44(0)121 204 3370 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Stuart Cooper 
Finance and Accounting Group 
Aston Business School 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
Email: s.m.cooper@aston.ac.uk 
Tel: +44(0)1212043065
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Appendix C-2: Statement of consent 
 
The  Development  of  State  Owned  Enterprise’s  Performance Measurement 
Systems 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Date:  
I have read and understand the information provided in the information sheet regarding 
this research. 
I freely agree to participate in this research according to the outlined conditions in the 
information sheet including my rights to refuse answering any questions and withdraw 
from my participation in this research any time without having to give any reason. 
The researcher has agreed that the data/information I provide will be stored in a secured 
filing system whereby only the research team will have access to it.  
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details in any 
presentation and publication to the public. 
I hereby consent: 
(a) to be interviewed     Yes/No (Please circle) 
(b) that the interview session being digitally recorded Yes/No (Please circle) 
(c) that the interview be recorded in written form Yes/No (Please circle) 
(d) to be quoted directly     Yes/No (Please circle) 
(e) to be quoted directly if I remain anonymous  Yes/No (Please circle) 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant’s  Name: ...................................................................... 
 
Signature:..................................................................... ................. 
 
Date:...................................................................... ........................ 
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Appendix C-3: Interview Questions Guideline 
 
List of abbreviations and explanations 
Abbreviation Explanation 
BSC Balanced Scorecard 
EVA Economic Value Added 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
SOE State-Owned Enterprise 
TQM Total Quality Management 
 
 
State  Enterprise’s  interview  questions 
 
Background information  
 1. Please describe what do you do in your job?  
  
 2. For how many years have you been involved in this organisation?  
  
3. Do you have any responsibilities in performance measurement/management 
activities?  
If yes, please explain 
  
 
Institutions and stakeholders 
 1. How many major institutions do you have to co-operate with?  
 Please, name them. 
 
2. Does your institution have any influence on organisational strategy as well as 
performance measurement system? 
If yes, please explain why and how? 
For example; 
- institution pressures; coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism 
a. rules,  norms,  society’s  cultures 
b. requirement or information needs of institutions 
c. competitive market 
 
3. How does the institution pressure affect the implementation and operation 
stage of a performance measurement system? 
For example;  
- rewarding/ incentive system 
- awards 
- requirement of performance targets 
 
4. How does the organization manage the institution pressure?  
 
5. Are there any conflicts of interest between the organization and institutions? 
 If yes, how does your organization handle it? 
 
 6. Do you have any other institutions-related issues and challenges?  
If yes, please explain.  
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Performance Measurement 
1. What performance measurement system is employed in the organization? 
For example; Balanced Scorecard (BSC), Economic Value Added 
(EVA), Total Quality Management (TQM) and traditional accounting 
 
2. Are there any factors that influence the organization to adopt specific 
performance measurement system? 
If yes, please explain 
If no, give participant some hints of possible factors and ask for 
explanation. 
- Influence by institutions such as Ministry of Finance, Regulator, 
others. 
- Influence by competitors or peers. 
- Customer expectation 
 
3. If you adopt two or more performance measurement systems, how can you 
integrate such systems together?  
 
4. What are the constraints of implementation and operation of performance 
measurement system? 
For example; resistant to change, insufficient resources and unrelated 
with organisational strategy 
 
Please, explain or give an organisational example 
 
 
5. What are the key success or fail factors of implementation and operation of 
performance measurement systems? 
For example;  
- organisational resources such as human, financial, technology  
- organisational systems such as incentive system 
- performance targets 
- coherence of the PMS and organisational strategy 
- feedback and review system. 
- support from institutions. 
 
Please explain each factor mentioned 
 
6. What are the problems occurred on implementing a performance 
measurement systems? 
For example, 
Internal driver (process, culture, people, system) 
- inaccurate and subjective measures 
- focus on performance by ignoring future consequences 
- inappropriate benchmarks 
- lack of attention to informal controls 
- resource allocation 
- strategy are not linked to department or individual goals. 
- Inadequate resources  
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External driver 
 
7. What are the organizational concerns when implementing a performance 
measurement system?  
 
8. What are you more concerned about institution, employee, customer or 
organisational performance?  And why? 
 
9. What action do you take to ensure all concerned issues are taken into 
consideration during performance measurement system implementation and 
setting up key performance indicators (KPIs)?  
 
10. Are there any sets of measures required by institutions?  
If yes, what do you think about it?  
For example; unachievable or unchallengeable measures 
 
11. In case your stakeholders cannot satisfy your performance measure criteria 
(except under very unusual situations), what preventive procedure do you 
take to avoid reoccurrence?  
 
12. How do you communicate your KPIs through your organization? 
 
13. What are the positive and negative effects on an organization of using a 
performance measurement system?  
 
14. Do you think performance measurement system is useful for State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)? 
If yes, please explain  
If no, please give reason. 
 
15. Amongst the performance measurement systems employed in SOEs, which 
system do you prefer the most and least? Why?  
 
16. Do you have any other performance measurement system related issues and 
challenges?  
If yes, please explain.  
 
17. Do you have any recommendation on how to improve performance 
measurement system in your organisation? 
 
18. How does a performance measurement system link to your organisational 
reward system? 
 
19. How are targets set/agreed? 
 
20. What procedure would be used if targets not met? 
 
21. What do you think about SOE award? (ex: discourage or encourage)  
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Institution’s  interview  questions 
(Line Ministry, Regulator, Budget Bureau and National Economics and Social 
Development Bureau)  
 
 
Background information  
 1. Please describe what do you do in your job?  
  
 2. For how many years have you been involved in this organisation?  
  
 3. Do you have any responsibilities in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)?  
If yes, plesase explain. 
  
  
Organisational information 
 
1. Could you please explain the role of your organization towards SOEs? 
 
2. What are your organisational policies on SOEs?  
 
3. How does your organization transfer your strategies to SOEs?  
 
4. What are requirement and information required from SOEs? 
 
Institutions 
 
1. What are other institutions that you need to co-operate with regarding 
SOEs?  
 
2.  Are there any conflicts of interest between institutions? 
If yes, plesase explain. 
 
3. Do you have any other institution-related issues and challenges?  
If yes, please explain.  
 
 
Performance measurement system and Institution 
 
1. Do you know anything about performance measurement systems in SOEs? 
If yes, please explain  
 
2. Does your organisation required targets or goals of SOEs?  
If yes, does your organization set any measure to follow up the result? 
And how? 
 
3. Is your organisation involved with the implementation and operation stage 
of performance measurement system in SOEs? If so, How? 
 
 
4. What are the constraints of implementation and operation of performance 
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measurement system in SOEs? 
For example; resistant to change, insufficient resources and unrelated 
with organisational strategy 
 
Please, explain or give an organisational example 
 
5. What are the key success or fail factors of implementation and operation of 
performance measurement systems? 
For example;  
- organisational resources such as human, financial, technology  
- organisational systems such as incentive system 
- performance targets 
- coherence of the PMS and organisational strategy 
- feedback and review system. 
- support from institutions. 
 
Please explain each factor mentioned 
 
6. What are the positive and negative effects on an organization of using a 
performance measurement system?  
 
7. Amongst the performance measurement systems employed in SOEs, which 
system do you prefer the most and least? Why?  
 
8. Do you have any other performance measurement system related issues and 
challenges?  
If yes, please explain.  
 
9. Do you have any recommendation on how to improve performance 
measurement system in SOEs? 
 
 
Performance measurement report 
 
1. How does your organization use or take any action with the performance 
measurement report or other required report from SOEs?  
 
2. In the case of SOE underperforming the target, will you take any action? 
And how? 
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Ministry of Finance interview questions 
 
 
Background information  
 1. Please describe what do you do in your job?  
  
 2. For how many years have you been involved in this organisation?  
  
3. Do you have any responsibilities in performance measurement system in 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)?  
  
 4. .Could you please explain the role of your organization towards SOEs? 
 
Performance Measurement System and Institution 
1. What are the government policies on performance measurement systems in 
SOEs? 
 
2.  Could you please explain the performance measurement systems in SOEs? 
 
3. What are the performance measurement systems employed in SOEs?  
 
4. What are criteria that need to be considered while making the decision on 
which performance measurement system will be employed in SOEs?  
 
5. According to Q4, what are major factors in implementation and operation of 
performance measurement system in SOEs that need to be considered before 
making a decision? 
 
6. How does your organisation influence and communicate with SOEs in 
adopting a performance measurement system?  
 
7. What are the other institutions that you need to co-operate with in order to 
both create a performance measurement system and assess performance 
measurement for SOEs?  
 
8. Are there any sets of measures required by other institutions?  
If yes, what do you think about it?  
For example; unachievable or unchallengeable measures 
 
9.  Are there any conflicts of interest between institutions? 
If yes, please explain. 
 
10. Is your organisation involved with the implementation and operation stage 
of a performance measurement system in an SOE? If so, how? 
For example;  
- rewarding/ incentive system 
- awards 
- requirement of performance target 
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11. What are the constraints of implementation and operation of performance 
measurement system in SOEs? 
For example; resistant to change, insufficient resources and unrelated 
with organisational strategy 
 
Please, explain or give an organisational example 
 
 
12. What are the success or fail factors of implementation and operation of 
performance measurement system in SOEs? 
For example;  
- organisational resources such as human, financial, technology  
- organisational systems such as incentive system 
- performance targets 
- coherence of the PMS and organisational strategy 
- feedback and review system. 
- support from institutions. 
 
Please explain each factor mentioned 
 
13. What are the positive and negative effects on an organization of using a 
performance measurement system 
 
14. Amongst the performance measurement systems employed in SOEs, which 
system do you prefer the most and least? Why?  
 
15. Does an SOE award help to encourage SOEs in improving their 
performance?  How? 
 
16. Do you have any other performance measurement system related issues and 
challenges?  
If yes, please explain.  
 
17. Do you have any recommendation on how to improve performance 
measurement system in SOEs? 
 
 
 
Performance measurement report 
 
1. Does your organization take any action with the performance measurement 
report or other required report from SOEs?  
If yes, please explain. 
2. In the case of SOE underperforming the target, will you take any action? 
And how? 
 
3. What do you think about SOE award? (ex: discourage or encourage)  
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Appendix C-4: List of participants 
 
Table C-4.1: List of participants: Policy maker group and consulting firms 
 
 Code Position Organisation Date of 
Interview 
1 A1_001 Deputy Director 
General 
Ministry of Finance 16-May-13 
2 A1_002 Analyst  level 8  Ministry of Finance 16-May-13 
3 A1_003 Director  Ministry of Finance 7-Jun-13 
4 A1_004 Advisor National Economics and Social Development 
Bureau 
4-Jul-13 
5 A1_005 Special expert Ministry of information and communication 
technology 
5-Jul-13 
6 A1_007 Vice president IRDP 9-Jul-13 
7 A1_008 Manager Ministry of Interior 12-Jul-13 
8 A1_009 Manager TRIS Crop 11-Jul-13 
9 A1_011 Analyst level 8 Ministry of Finance 7-Jul-13 
10 A1_012 Advisor Ministry of Finance 8-Jul-13 
11 A1_013 Deputy Director 
General 
Ministry of Finance 11-Jul-13 
12 A1_014 Analyst level 5 Ministry of Finance 17-Jul-13 
13 A1_015 Analyst level 5 Ministry of Finance 17-Jul-13 
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Table C-4.2: List of participants: Provincial Waterworks Authority 
 
 Code Position Department Date of 
Interview 
1 A1_010 Member of 
Board of 
Directors 
 7-Jul-13 
 
2 B1_001 CEO   5-Jun-13 
3 B1_002 CFO   30-May-13 
4 B1_003 Director PWA regional office 3 3-Jun-13 
5 B1_004 Director PWA regional office 2 3-Jun-13 
6 B1_101 Director Human resources 23-May-13 
7 B1_102 Director Legal 23-May-13 
8 B1_103 Director Policy and strategy 27-May-13 
9 B1_104 Director Informantion Technology 28-May-13 
10 B1_105 Director Human resources development 28-May-13 
11 B1_106 Director Office of Corporate communication and 
customer relation 
29-May-13 
12 B1_107 Director Finance and accounting 5-Jun-13 
13 B1_201 Manager Finance and accounting 27-May-13 
14 B1_202 Manager Policy and strategy 27-May-13 
15 B1_203 Manager Informantion Technology 28-May-13 
16 B1_204 Manager Policy and strategy 28-May-13 
17 B1_205 Manager Human development 28-May-13 
18 B1_206 Manager PWA regional office 1 29-May-13 
19 B1_207 Manager PWA regional office 2 22-May-13 
20 B1_208 Manager Administration 29-May-13 
21 B1_209 Manager Office of Corporate communication and 
customer relation 
30-May-13 
22 B1_301 Team leader Auditing 20-May-13 
23 B1_302 Team leader Finance and accounting 20-May-13 
24 B1_303 Auditor 7 Auditing 20-May-13 
25 B1_304 Assistant 
manager 
PWA regional office 2 22-May-13 
26 B1_305 Team leader  Budget planing   
27 B1_307 Team leader Informantion Technology 23-May-13 
28 B1_308 Team leader Policy and strategy 23-May-13 
29 B1_309 Personal officer Human resources development 27-May-13 
30 B1_310 Team leader Finance and accounting 27-May-13 
31 B1_311 Team leader Policy and strategy 30-May-13 
32 B1_312 Finance and 
Investment 
analyst 
Policy and strategy 30-May-13 
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Table C-4.3: List of participants: Thailand Post 
 
 Code Position Department Date of 
Interview 
1 A1_006 Member of 
Board of 
Directors 
 8-Jul-13 
 
2 B2_001 CEO   24-Jul-13 
3 B2_002 CFO   14-Jun-13 
4 B2_003 Executive Vice 
President   
  17-Jun-13 
5 B2_004 Executive Vice 
President   
  19-Jun-13 
6 B2_005 Executive Vice 
President   
  21-Jun-13 
7 B2_101 Vice President  Budget Development 18-Jun-13 
8 B2_102 Vice President  Mail and Logistics Market 19-Jun-13 
9 B2_103 Vice President  Postal products Management 19-Jun-13 
10 B2_104 Vice President  Operating systems management 19-Jun-13 
11 B2_105 Vice President  Finance and Retail Market 21-Jun-13 
12 B2_106 Vice President  Business Customer Service 28-Jun-13 
13 B2_107 Vice President  Human resources management 1-Jul-13 
14 B2_108 Vice President  Metropolitan Postal Bureau (North) 2-Jul-14 
15 B2_109 Vice President  Corporate Strategy 5-Jul-13 
16 B2_201 Senior Manager Corporate Strategy 11-Jun-13 
17 B2_202 Vice President  
Assistant 
Corporate Strategy 11-Jun-14 
18 B2_203 Assistant 
Manager 
Metropolitan Postal Bureau (North) 12-Jun-13 
19 B2_204 Senior Manager Operating systems management 17-Jun-13 
20 B2_205 Senior Manager Budget Development 18-Jun-13 
21 B2_206 Senior Manager Finance and Retail Market 18-Jun-13 
22 B2_207 Senior Manager Communication and Logistics Market 21-Jun-13 
23 B2_208 Senior Manager Quality Control 24-Jan-13 
24 B2_209 Senior Manager Postal products Management 24-Jun-13 
25 B2_210 Vice President  
Assistant 
Quality Control 25-Jun-13 
26 B2_211 Senior Manager Business Customer Service 28-Jun-13 
27 B2_212 Senior Manager Human resources management 1-Jul-13 
28 B2_301 Economist Corporate Strategy 11-Jun-13 
29 B2_302 Manager   12-Jun-14 
30 B2_303 Manager Operating systems management 17-Jun-13 
31 B2_304 Financial and 
Accounting 
Officer 5 
Budget Development 18-Jun-13 
32 B2_305 Economist 7 Communication and Logistics Market 21-Jun-13 
33 B2_306 Manager Quality Control 24-Jun-13 
34 B2_307 Logistic 
specialist 
Postal products Management 25-Jun-13 
35 B2_308 Economist Business Customer Service 27-Jun-13 
36 B2_309 Personnel 
Officer 
Human resources management 1-Jul-13 
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Appendix D: Research Ethics 
 
Ethical issues were relevant in the research design. According to Blumberg et al. 
(2005),   ethics   refers   to   the   ‘right   behaviour’   and   concerns   about   how   to   conduct  
research  in  the  appropriate  ways.  ‘Research  ethics’  relates   to   the  whole  process of the 
research study from clarifying the topic to writing up the research findings. Therefore, 
the researcher must ensure that the research design is both methodologically and 
morally sound for all involved (Saunders et al., 2012).  
 
Participants are one of the key elements in many research projects, and research that is 
likely to harm them should be prohibited. According to Bryman and Bell (2007, p. 133), 
the  word  ‘harm’  includes  ‘physical  harm;;  harm  to  participants’  development  and  self-
esteem; stress; harm to future employment and inducing subjects to perform 
reprehensible  acts’.  Moreover,  some  commentators,  such  as  Gorard  (2002),  suggest  that  
researchers should not focus only on participants, but should also consider non-
participants.   
 
The other   key   ethical   issue   is   the   participants’   identities   and   privacy.   Although   this  
research employs a qualitative strategy (semi-structured interview) that can keep 
participants anonymous, it may not entirely eliminate the possibility of identification 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). Moreover, the issues of confidentiality and anonymity should 
be worthy of concern. If the crucial information obtained from participants were leaked, 
it might cause damage to those involved. 
 
Next, informed consent is another ethical issue. Prospective participants should be fully 
informed about the research process as well as the benefits and risks involved in the 
research, to support their decision as to whether or not to participate in the research 
(Jesson, 2009). This prevents participants from misunderstanding procedure and 
becoming involved in research they do not approve of (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
 
To avoid all of these ethical issues, several actions should be taken. In this research, 
participants were asked for their permission on research participation, digital recording, 
or being directly quoted, at the beginning of the interview through the consent form. 
Any personal information such as name or contact information was not contained in the 
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research to protect the anonymity of the participants. According to Bryman and Bell 
(2007), for confidentiality and data protection, all research data obtained from the 
involved people must be used and kept confidential in line with the non-disclosure 
agreement with the participant. Data should not be kept any longer than necessary, and 
a controller of data usage should be assigned and the researcher should take necessary 
precautions  to  respect  the  participants’  rights  (Bryman  and  Bell,  2007).   
 
For the other ethical issues, the research work provided appropriate information for 
prospective participants. In addition, all necessary actions were taken to protect and 
prevent harm to participants and other involved people. Lastly, a research ethical 
guideline from Aston University was obtained as a fundamental guideline, along with 
other appropriate guidelines in the research.  
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